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ABSTRACT
This study explores welfare provision by non-state agents in contemporary Turkey. It
analyses the phenomenon neither as an extension of the redistributive functions of the
state nor as part of market mechanisms but through the theoretical lens of gift-giving. It
argues that contractual relations of the market or the anonymity of redistribution fall
short of acknowledging the personal, asymmetrical and religious formation of this field.
The welfare regime in Turkey is currently undergoing radical transformation, with
provisions increasingly expressed within a gift-giving vocabulary. Waqf, the Islamic
institution of endowment, plays an important role in this transformation. It provides
both the institutional frame of operation and the imaginary signification that
interpellates subjects to take part in these operations. Historically, waqf has been the
main welfare provider in Muslim societies and has provided a legitimate source of
social citizenship. Through its various features, it has shaped the enactments of
citizenship throughout a vast geography. This research is also an endeavour to see how
these historical features inform the present landscape of welfare provision in Turkey.
The research is built upon an extensive ethnography conducted in a central Anatolian
city, with a booming industry and an Islamic outlook. The particular focus of this
research, given its anthropological methodology, is the daily practices of various field
actors. Instantiations of gift-giving characterize the majority of these practices-things,
services, prayers, and recognition changing hands. Starting with this observation, the
dissertation approaches gift-giving as a prominent mechanism in the field of welfare
provision in Turkey. The significance of this paradigm is discussed vis-a-vis dominant
political economic discourses, and the ethical and political potentials it brings forth are
illustrated. This study is an invitation to have a fuller grasp of welfare provision as a
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Glossary of Turkish Words
Throughout the thesis the reader will come across to a number of Turkish words that are
not translated to English, although at least some of them are routinely translated in other
literature. These are words that are products of a very particular history, and that still
carry the nuances they acquired during their historical trajectory. These words constitute
the backbone of the thesis and the depth and richness of their meanings can not possibly
be encompassed in a single word translation. Still, in order to guide the reader through
the text I include brief explanations regarding the meaning of each word.
Haym From Arabic .JP. (khayr) which literally means 'good'. This meaning is still
valid in modem Turkish, however it also and more specifically describes good deeds,
beneficence. This second meaning is referred to throughout the thesis.
Hayirsever: A compound word made up of hayrr and sever, literally means 'those who
love beneficence'. In Turkish the word is often used to refer to philanthropists, wealthy
benefactors who donate large sums to public welfare and education projects. Among
this project's research participants the term has a more nuanced meaning, one that
emphasises to the conspicuousness of the projects supported by hayirsevers,
Hizmet: From Arabic ~ (khidma), which literally means 'service'. The meaning is
unchanged in Turkish but often has a moral tone that extends over the act itself,
referring to the person's intentions.
Sadaka: From Arabic Ul- (sadaka), which is often translated into English as 'charity'.
In Turkish it means voluntary alms given to the poor. It has a religious meaning as the
name of a specific and encouraged act of generosity. However, depending on the
context it also has derogatory connotations because receiving sadaka may be demeaning
to the poor.
Vaklf: From Arabic UiJ (waqf), which literally means 'halt, freeze'. In Islamic law it
refers to an inalienable and perpetual religious endowment. The institution has more
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than one thousand years of history, over which various practices and jurisprudence have
affected its nature and functions. Still, for centuries it has been the main tool of welfare
provision in Muslim societies. In contemporary Turkish it is a legal name given to a
very particular form of institution that is still at least partially loyal to the original
principles behind waqf. It is used by the research participants, though, as the generic
name for all non-state initiatives which provide welfare services and distribute aid to the
needy.
Vakrfen Vakif+cr, literally 'person involved with a vakif', however it is not in common
usage in Turkish. Among research participants it is used to refer to people who do
hands-on work for vakifs and spend their time and energy in beneficence activities,
regardless of whether they are involved with a vakif or not.
Vakiferhk: Vakif+cr+hk, literally 'involvement in vakif activities'. It is not in common
usage in Turkey.
Zekat: From Arabic r.1.Sj (zakat or zakah), which literally means 'that which purifies'. It
is the obligatory annual Islamic tax on wealth.
All foreign words, including the ones listed above, are italicised only for the first time
they appear in the text.
12
INTRODUCTION
The social welfare regime is under a radical reform in Turkey. State expenditures are on
the rise and various welfare schemes are being integrated. These structural reforms and
their short- and long-term effects have already been discussed in a number of
publications (Bugra 2007; Bugra and Candas 2011; Ozdemir and Yucesan-Ozdemir
2008; Aybars and Tsarouhas 2010). However, this transformation takes place not only
on the material basis of welfare provision or its quantifiable aspects. At the same time,
the discouse on we1fae provision is changing. The government discourse has, for some
time already, been transformed into a language of bnefaction, presenting new or
improved services in terms of care and beneficence. While enlarging the realm of
intervention and extending its social functions and expenditures, the Turkish state,
under the rule of AKP (Justice and Development Party), has refashioned social
citizenship with a vocabulary of religious compassion and benevolence.
This transformation is reminiscent of the rise of so-called compassionate conservatism
in the USA (Kutchins 2001; Carlson-Thies 2001; Cnaan and Boddie 2002; Morgan and
Campbell 2011) and the changing role of faith-based organisations around Europe (G.
Clarke 2006; Milligan and Conradson 2006). There are also studies that compare them
with Middle Eastern welfare regimes (Pioppi 2004; Jawad 2009a; Jawad and Yakut-
Cakar 2010; Karshenas and Moghadam 2009). I, too, find it important to properly
situate the phenomenon among global trends of change in state-society relations;
13
however, I believe that each historical context provides different institutions and tools,
whether discursive or practical, to initiate change. Moreover, because starting points
differ significantly, even policies that have been copied directly have unique and
indeterminable effects.
Within this context, I aim to situate welfare provision through beneficence with regard
to state and market, and to develop an understanding of subject formations within this
particular location. This thesis is about the politics and ethics of welfare provision
undertaken by citizens, whose daily work is marked by instantiations of gift-giving. I
acknowledge that making sharp delineations between welfare provision through state,
market or civil actors is hard to maintain. Indeed, one of the objectives of this thesis is
to illustrate the blurriness and porousness of these boundaries.
This porousness brings us to the first question of the thesis: How can beneficence be
understood and conceptualized outside the dichotomous conceptualisations of state-
market, state-civil society, and public-private? What are the self-understandings of
beneficence ac~ors regarding the nature of their acts? How do they manoeuvre between
the state, their own social groups, colleagues and beneficiaries to articulate the aims of
welfare provision? And how can our knowledge of social citizenship be affected by this
perspective, which introduces beneficence not simply as a tool of social policy, but also
as an important source of identity, meaning and morality?
The second set of questions follows the presumption that social acts do not take place in
isolation; that social life itself is, if not determined, delimited by already-existing
significations, institutions, structures and norms, and that it involves interaction.
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Therefore, nobody can possibly act on his or her own. So, what are the key idioms of
the language used by beneficence actors to define, explain, justify or refine their acts?
What are the institutions they rely upon and refer to? And what of the social
imaginary-which is a composite of these elements but which cannot be reduced to
their sum-that proposes meanings for these acts as well as a road map for its subjects?
Finally, what is the texture of the intersubjective realm that is built upon relations of
gift?
Welfare provision by voluntary organisations has been a matter of academic and
governmental interest in Europe and the USA for more than three decades. The last
decade finally witnessed the increasing recognition of such work in Muslim contexts as
well. Some of these studies are historical (Singer 2002; Bonner, Ener, and Singer 2003;
Singer 2008; Heyneman 2004), while several others provide valuable insights on the
issue of welfare provision by civil actors in the contemporary Middle East and North
Africa. Before moving on to discuss the premises of this dissertation and to explore its
research questions, I will provide a brief overview of selected examples from this
literature.
Religiously Motivated Welfare Provision in the Middle East
In her study on social welfare and religion in the Middle East, which is mostly based on
data from Lebanon with supplementary evidence coming from Egypt, Turkey and Iran,
Jawad (2009), discusses the role religiously motivated and defined voluntary
organisations play in the field of welfare provision. Her insights come from a social
policy perspective and her emphasis is on recognising the importance of religion both as
15
an organising principle and as a source of motivation for provision activities. Jawad
argues that in the Lebanese case, where the state is 'weak' and 'internal taxation and
political citizenship have not provided the foundations for the welfare state' (p. 78),
religion (including various sects of the Muslim, Christian and Druze faiths) is key to
human well-being and social welfare. Jawad gathers evidence regarding the religious
motivations of her informants, who shape the social policy scene in their respective
countries, and concludes that social policy (the discipline) has to cast an eye to the
moral value and pragmatic impact of religion. She frames the basic precept of her book
this way: 'let us give RWOs the scope to coordinate with each other, with government
personnel and crucially with international development institutions in a framework that
can provide a common agenda for social policy' (ibid. 259).
Gocrnen's (2011) study of religiously motivated welfare associations in Turkey works
on the similar premise of the significance of religion in the field of social welfare
provision. Yet she employs a political science approach, which is certainly less policy-
oriented and prescriptive. She challenges the mainstream secularisation and
modernisation paradigms tnat suggest an evo\utionary view of society, in which religion
would gradually disappear from public life, if not altogether. However, the value of her
analysis does not stem from this much-voiced criticism but from her detailed
investigation of the historical particularity of the relationship between state and religion
in various country settings, and therefore from her objection to generalising
explanations.
Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan (2009) also focus on the political context of welfare
provision in the Muslim world, especially in the cases of disaster relief and
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humanitarian aid. They conceptualise the political implications of these activities and
argue that religious motivations should not be allowed to overshadow the political
agenda that accompanies international relief provision of Muslim organisations. These
organisations, just like Christian missionaries, are prominent political actors in the
countries within which they operate. They effectively create and use vertical ties to
enlarge their human base.
Janine Clark's (2004) work on Jordanian, Egyptian and Yemeni Islamic social
institutions challenges this argument. The organisations she selected for her fieldwork
have explicit connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, however, as she argues, their
function is less one of recruiting the lower classes by providing them much-needed
welfare services, than it is one of creating a sense of solidarity among the middle classes
by offering them quality services in settings they can identify with. In that sense,
religious welfare organisations exhibit the characteristics of social movements with
their high impact on horizontal ties and relatively lower impact on vertical ties.
The issue of vertical ties linking the poor and the benevolent middle classes has long
been a matter of debate among scholars of the Middle East. Religious welfare
organisations are seen as nodes through which educated middle class Islamists approach
the lower classes and recruit them for their political cause (see for example Zubaida
2001). The clientelistic ties between the poor and welfare providers are blamed for
serving this function, and the providers' humanitarian aims are often suspected of being
a cover for a hidden agenda (Flanigan 2010). A similar concern occasionally appears in
the media debates concerning charitable organisations in Turkey. However, the core
assumption of recruitment has never been truly tested in the Turkish context.
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But in another setting, Egbert Harmsen (2008) takes on the task of testing and
challenging this assertion. Harmsen's work on Jordanian welfare associations employs
civil society as its core concept, not in an entirely celebratory way, discussing the status
and function of these organisations in Jordanian society and in relation to the state. He
approaches civil society 'as a realm that consciously organizes the socio-cultural
lifeworld of citizens' (p. 33) and explores what kind of citizens are produced by
religious welfare associations: dependent or empowered? His conclusions point to a
mixture: He confirms Janine Clark's (2004) argument regarding the importance and
prevalence of horizontal ties in such organisations but also agrees with Sami Zubaida
(2001) that the relationship between clients and welfare workers is one of vertical
patronage and paternalism, and it therefore has only limited empowering effect. He also
tries to situate these organisations vis-it-vis the state, both as social policy tools and
potential-but severely restricted-loci for resistance and opposition.
This dissertation benefits from the findings and analyses of these authors and aims to
contribute to the emerging field of studies on welfare provision in non-European
societies. As will be observed in the following chapters, Clark's (2004) emphasis on the
significance of networks is supported by my own findings. I advance an argument that
is only subtly made by Clark, though, suggesting that institutions of beneficence and
non-state welfare provision rely on the gift circuits of the wealthy and the middle
classes. I share Jawad's (2009) position vis-it-vis the importance of spirituality and
religion in welfare provision both at the organisational and hands-on level, and give
examples of elements of the religious imaginary that surround helping the needy in
Turkey. However, in some important aspects, I go beyond these works. First, I adopt an
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anthropological approach and aim to provide a thick description of practices. I hope that
this contributes another, and perhaps valuable, perspective on studying welfare
provision. Second, I do not only focus on religious aspects of welfare provision
(whether in terms of motivations, political orientations or financial resources) but see
gift-giving as a hybrid field of welfare provision. I shall discuss the first aspect a little
later but let me discuss the second aspect briefly now.
This dissertation aims to avoid identifying welfare provision through beneficence with
religion only, and singling out religiosity as a factor of primary importance. I rather see
the interrelations between religious, political, social and cultural aspects of how the
field of welfare provision actually operates. This does not imply downplaying the
significance of religion; instead, as the dissertation proceeds, it will become clear to the
reader that Islam (as believed and experienced by my research participants) provides
many resources as well as reasons for those involved in beneficence activities. But
whatever the initial intentions and reasons, an act of beneficence produces a multiplicity
of outcomes. These outcomes are political, social and cultural, as well as religious and
ethical. Similarly, multiple resources can be used to initiate an act. I approach religion
as one of the many sources of action and discourse formation. Therefore, I recognize the
fact that religious motivations play an undeniably important role in the phenomenon of
welfare provision, but I also argue that over-emphasizing them has its own
predicaments.
19
Theoretical and Methodological Choices
The theoretical and conceptual tools I use to address the research questions of this
dissertation draw from the academic literature on gift. Gift literature is not bounded to a
single discipline, and the concept, as well as gift practices, have so far attracted scholars
from all disciplines of social sciences and humanities, ranging from philosophy (Derrida
1997; Jenkins 1998; O'Neill 2005; Hamington 2004) to law (Fennell 2002), nursing
(Fox 1995) to political economy (Polanyi 1957). However, the great majority of these
studies documenting gift practices, as well its local theorisations, come from
anthropology (Gregory 1982; Parry 1986; Strathern 1990; Thomas 1991). Marcel Mauss
(I990[ 1924]) was the first to make a comprehensive attempt to theorise gift,
acknowledging it as a universal phenomenon. The anthropological discussion has
evolved and taken many turns over the hundred years following the publication of The
Gift. Since then, important interventions have been made to illustrate that the concept
can productively be used to understand modern complex societies, and that its value is
not limited to societies without market economies and money (Carrier 1995; Godbout
and Caille 1998). In fact, as Carrier (1992) argued, limiting gift to so-called primitive
societies means reproducing the Western self-illusion of rationality, intentionality and
individualism, and is a case in point for Occidental ism.
When I talk about gift-giving, what I refer to is not limited to presents people hand out
to each other on special occasions. Neither do I refer to the 'free gift' given for purely
altruistic reasons, although this issue will be part of the discussion. This dissertation
benefits from a broader understanding of gift, which roughly means any thing or service
given without the expectation of an immediate and equal return, but always with an
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expectation of acceptance. This definition highlights a number of important features of
the gift. First of all, for a gift to be a gift it should be accepted and understood as such.
Second, almost every gift creates an obligation of return. However, this return should be
postponed, often to such an extent that the period between the initial gift-giving and its
reciprocation becomes imponderable. Finally, the relation between gift and counter-gift
is not one of material equality but of unquantifiable equivalence.
The combination of these features gives gift relations their unique durability, extended
time span, flexibility and power to create bonds between people and groups. Because
gifts create obligations-the obligation to accept and to return-they bind people
together at least for the period during which the gift cycle is completed. However, the
gift cycle is never complete, because counter gift-giving is also itself an act of gift-
giving, thereby extending the cycle of obligation to accept and return. Hence, gift relies
on an accumulation of gratitude, indebtedness and generosity; a reliance which makes it
the fertilizer and catalyst of social ties. Gifts invoke honour as much as shame; they
may be a source of solidarity as much as of competition and rivalry. They are tools of
status or power playas well as means by which to show care and compassion. Tracing
the circulation of gifts, observing the rituals that accompany acts of gift-giving and
asking about the theory of gift in any given society-i.e. why people give gifts-
provide valuable opportunities to explore social relations.
In the context of birthdays and special occasions, gifts are often things that you can live,
and so far have lived, without. Nobody would feel desperately in need of a suede iPad
sleeve, fancy jewellery or aT-shirt with an obscene remark on it. This narrow
understanding has caused David J. Cheal to characterise gift with redundancy and
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define 'the gift economy as a system of redundant transactions in a moral economy,
which makes possible the extended reproduction of social relations' (1988, 19).
However, a broader understanding of gift illuminates how we, human beings, are
dependent on gifts for our very existence. Every act of care, from breastfeeding to
taking care of a loved one during illness, from donating to a cause to giving a friend a
lift, is a gift. Every unpaid service, from volunteering at a retirement home to offering to
help a neighbour, is a gift. In the same vein, what is voluntarily given in order to meet
somebody else's welfare needs is a gift. These gifts may well be the donations of
wealthy benefactors, as well as the time spent by volunteers and caring gestures by
employees. They are called, understood and framed as gifts by those who give them,
sometimes explicitly, often by implication. They are given without the expectation of an
immediate return, with uncertainty and always in a neatly prescribed manner. These
gifts oblige many social norms and are subject to ethical assessments. They are borne
out of religious commitments as much as citizenly attitudes, and are part of the habitus
of the people who give and take them.
The gift framework serves both theoretical and methodological purposes in this
dissertation. The theoretical contribution of the body of gift literature stems from its
intervention into common understandings of political economy. The methodological
benefits of this framework are related to the wide-angle lens it provides for viewing
beneficence in a holistic manner, which includes looking at the institutions, discourse,
benefactors, beneficiaries and intermediary actors simultaneously.
To develop this argument, I partially draw upon Karl Polanyi's (1957) political
economy approach. Polanyi suggests that economies consist of redistributive, reciprocal
22
and commodity transaction mechanisms. Yet in every society the relevance and
dominance of each element varies significantly. In our modem capitalist economies
commodity transactions have acquired unprecedented dominance over other forms, but
this does not mean the other two have become obsolete. Redistribution is now almost
monopolized by states, although their capacity to delimit the realm of commodity
transaction changes over time and place. Similarly, reciprocal relations still playa vital
role in societal and individual well-being as the backbone of family relations, voluntary
welfare provision and humanitarian aid. Taking up Polanyi's approach allows me to
situate beneficence as an act of gift-giving right next to market relations and the
redistributive faculties of the state, and to discuss how these three modes of meeting
human needs differ in their primary logic while still coexisting because of the human
capacity to shift seamlessly from one field to another.
In the academic literature, philanthropy has often been taken up with a focus on a) the
motivations behind it, which often leads to analysing religious discourse and practices
(see for example Wuthnow 1993; Martin 1994; Ostrower 1997), b) its societal
organisation, hence looking at institutions (see for example Makdisi 1981; Bremner
1988; Bonner, Ener, and Singer 2003; Prochaska 2008) and c) its social functions,
especially in creating hierarchies (see for example Harbaugh 1998; Ryan 2003; Clark
2004). Some authors also successfully incorporate all three of these dimensions. For
example, Amy Singer's (2008) comprehensive work on charitable giving in Islamic
societies lucidly explores the theological literature on the issue of charity, discusses how
giving to the needy is organised among Muslims and illustrates how these particular
forms of organisation are connected to prevailing social structures. In her study, we
come across famous benefactors, waqf founders, Sultans and Grand Viziers who endow
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educational facilities as well as soup kitchens. We also come across beneficiaries from
all strata of their respective societies. In this sense Singer does not cut off her analysis
by suggesting that the beneficiaries of such organisations were the needy. Instead, her
detailed account shows how flexible and selectively inclusive has been the concept of
'beneficiary'. But even Singer's diligent work does not introduce the volunteers and
employees of waqf institutions as actors worth focusing on, but she is not alone in this
negligence. Studies on beneficence (or philanthropy or charity) consistently direct their
interest towards the donors or receivers and assume a transparent and direct transfer of
donations.
Certainly, the intermediary work of transferring what is donated to those in need is not
completely absent from literature. Social work constitutes a significant and separate
academic domain in itself, and the practice of social work has long been a matter of
academic curiosity as well as a locus of policy intervention. This research project
suggests that social work, as practised at institutions of beneficence can be understood
within the same framework used to explore the discourses and practices of benefactors
and beneficiaries, as well as institutions. This is the methodological value of the gift-
paradigm.
Using the framework of gift makes it possible to examine motivations, practices and
institutions at the same time, along with all three of the actors involved in social
encounters of gift-giving. Looking at beneficence through the lens of gift is promising
because it creates a chance to focus on the encounter, as well as the social relationships
formed by these encounters. That is, it makes it possible to take a snapshot and analyse
24
where each person stands in this picture, and to record how these mechanisms maintain
this relationship over the course of time.
Approaching the issue of beneficence with the framework of gift is productive in one
more sense. It gives the researcher a chance to investigate the lexicon of beneficence
shared by all parties involved in it, and that is used on occasions of gift exchange. This
is particularly important because the idioms, phrases, words, prayers, gestures,
expressions, and ceremonial practices that accompany giving and receiving tell us about
rights, beliefs, religion, social hierarchies, acceptable and unacceptable behaviours,
social norms and traditions.
Religiously motivated beneficence is theorised as gift by a number of anthropologists
and a few historians (Parry 1986; Rudner 1987; Werbner 1990; Silber 1995; Silber
1998; Peterman 1997; Laidlaw 2000; Kochuyt 2009; Osella and Osella 2009). Amy
Singer (2008) briefly works on this connection in the context of Islam to suggest that
although giving is a universal human trait, its particularity in different religious contexts
should be acknowledged, because there is a lot we can learn about a particular sociality
by looking at practices of giving. She deploys Mauss' formula of almsgiving: a shift
from 'the ancient morality of the gift' to a 'principle of justice' (p. 10). She takes up this
formulation and advances it to explore the ideas about justice and social order in Islamic
societies.
IIana Silber focuses on the 'great traditions', and investigates the explanatory value of
the Maussian perspective for understanding the practices and morality of giving to the
needy both in religion (1995) and in modem philanthropy (1998). She draws attention
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to the paradoxical coexistence of disinterestedness and interestedness in gift-giving, and
suggests that the theoretical prospects of the gift paradigm lie in this paradox (Silber
1998). In order to resolve the tension that stems from counterpoising self-interest
against altruism, she argues that the Maussian point of view 'may grant that much of
philanthropic giving is ultimately self-serving and may even be facilitated by a whole
range of internal and external rewards ... and yet one may still consider it as a gift
because it nevertheless also entails, simultaneously, an element of uncertainty and
disinterestedness' (1998, 140).
In religious giving, gifts given to fellow human beings and religious institutions are
eventually gifts given to God. In Silber's approach, this is the core idea around which
particular 'gift theories' are formulated (Silber 1995). People give to be dear to God, to
accrue merit and to advance their religion. In that sense this notion of giving almost
always involves the idea of a return expected from God, however uncertain and
indeterminable it is. However, there are also 'gift circuits', the material circulation of
goods and services among people and institutions. In these circuits gifts establish
tangible connections, lasting relationships and social networks. In gift circuits not only
donations but prestige, social value and respect travel as well. If 'gift theory' is people's
answer to the question of why they give, the 'gift circuit' is the materialisation of gifts.
The distinction Silber makes between theory and circuit and the example she provides
to illustrate the use of this distinction in her work on medieval European monasteries
shifts attention from non-productive binary of interestedness versus disinterestedness
towards the social imaginary and the institutional framework of gift-giving in any given
setting.
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Thierry Kochuyt (2009), works on the Maussian three-step gift mechanism-giving,
accepting and returning-to approach Islamic almsgiving. He starts with the premise
that the principle of reciprocity requires every actor involved in gift relations to assume
the roles of both the giver and the receiver. He introduces one more protagonist to the
formula of giving, accepting and receiving: the divine authority, who is the ultimate
giver as well as the ultimate receiver. So, God gives and asks for the acceptance of his
gifts. The believer accepts these gifts and obeys the obligation to return, not to God but
to a fellow believer. This second believer accepts the gifts and thanks God, hence
returns the gift by showing gratitude. This triadic relationship, according to Kochuyt, is
key to creating solidarity among Muslims, as well as strengthening their faith in God,
who is merciful and the giver of gifts. Kochuyt provides a formulaic description of
voluntary and obligatory giving with religious motivations, which is beneficial for
analysing some of the patterns that will be discussed in the following chapters.
However, it is also important to remember that such a formula neglects the non-
religious dimensions and implications of religiously motivated gift-exchange. I will use
the research findings to clarify this point throughout the thesis.
Dissertation Structure
In Chapter 1, I develop a critique of the accounts that understand beneficence with
reference only to state or market. In these studies, organised beneficence appears either
as part of a state policy or as a by-product of market operations, which creep in to fill
the void deliberately left by the state. I offer a set of analytical tools, borrowed from
economic anthropology, to deconstruct the assumptions behind these approaches. I
suggest that these accounts are built upon a particular ontological misconception-i.e.
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homo economicus-and a conviction that contemporary societies are determined by
market relations. In order to be able to see what this view hides from sight, we need to
recognise that there are other modes of circulation which regulate how things and
services change hands in any human collectivity. Redistribution and reciprocity are as
prevalent as commodity exchange for understanding the economic aspects of society,
and either may prove to be dominant over the other depending on the context. I contend
that what defines the field of beneficence is reciprocal relations of gift-giving.
Recognising gift as the dominant mode of circulation for the field of beneficence has
important implications. First of all, it means putting aside a contractual understanding
and focusing on the larger time span of reciprocal relations, because gift is an open-
ended relationship that resists immediacy of return. Its main function is establishing
lasting bonds between people in a never-ending cycle of gift and counter-gift. So gift is
more of a bond than a thing. Second, gift allows us to question the primacy of intentions
and the free will of social agents because of its capacity for being voluntary and
obligatory at the same time. Therefore, using gift as a conceptual tool to approach
beneficence dislocates the self-interested, calculating and solipsistic individual who is
the imagined protagonist of modern public life.
The final part of Chapter 1 outlines the basic premises of an Islamic economy, as one of
the sources that informs beneficence actors in Turkey. After reviewing the literature to
single out principles and injunctions I argue that many Islamic economists agree on an
economic model, which, unlike mainstream neoclassical models, acknowledges gift-
giving as an integral part of economy. This acknowledgement is based on a dual
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understanding of human nature, which recognizes the selfish dimension, as in homo
economicus, but which adds altruism to the equation.
Chapter 2 situates gift relations in an institutional setting. I start with the observation
that the institution of waqf provides both the model and the imaginary signification of
welfare provision in Turkey. In social science and humanities literature, waqf is widely
translated as 'Islamic endowment', and refers to an institution that has played a vital
role as the source and addressee of social citizenship in Muslim societies for more than
a millennium. A waqf can, with some simplification, be defined as 'the detention of the
corpus from the ownership of any person, and the gift of its income either presently or
in the future, to some charitable purpose' (Dallal 2004, 13). In that sense, its closest
affinities in the West are the institutions of the trust and the foundation. But the
historical trajectory of waqf distinguishes it from its Western counterparts. Changing
state structures and the experiences of colonisation and modernisation during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries greatly impacted waqf institutions throughout the
Islamic world and led to the dissolution of the intricate welfare system these institutions
upheld in most parts of this geography. This chapter suggests that, while it has been
subject to serious transformation, the institution persists as a disposition of both the
state and citizens in Turkey. I illustrate this point by providing an overview of the
historical significance ofwaqfand the role it plays in the welfare regime of Turkey.
Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of methodology and an introduction to the
organisations with which I worked. The original data for this research project comes
from nine months of ethnographic fieldwork in Kayseri, Turkey. During the fieldwork I
did participant observation in a number of local charitable organisations. During these
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months I had many opportunities to observe instantiations of gift-giving as they
occurred, and I arrived at the conclusion that there are a multiplicity of gift circuits that
maintain these organisations and their wider networks. Therefore, the subject matter of
this dissertation is not only the donations of the benefactors, i.e. the gifts that travel
from the wealthy towards the needy. I argue that the main source of funding for these
organisations comes from gift circuits among the wealthy, i.e. their gifts and favours to
and for each other. So gifts (in the form of donations and favours) are not
unidirectional; on the contrary, they flow in circular patterns within the networks of
wealthy men and women. Yet, at another level are gift relationships of the workers and
volunteers of these organisations with the beneficiaries. Exploration of these gift
instances, their key terms and shared ceremonies make up a substantial part of the
dissertation. Beneficiaries' participation and role in gift-giving is also discussed within
the limits of my observations. This chapter is an attempt to reflect on the
methodological choices that made this research what it is.
Chapter 4 is a description of the location of the research, Kayseri and the philanthropists
of the city, who are eager to represent their endeavours as a local legacy. Kayseri, an
Anatolian city home to almost one million people, has been chosen for this research
project for two reasons. First, in the last couple of decades, Kayseri's booming export
industries have led to an accumulation of unprecedented wealth in the hands of a
number of local businessmen. This success in industry has attracted interest in Western
media and scholarship, and has turned Kayseri into an exemplary case to be studied in
order to understand the dynamics of the interplay between Islam and capitalism.
However, there are problematic issues in these studies, which I highlight and critique in
Chapter 4. Second, Kayseri has a significant tradition of giving to their city, which is
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claimed by town notables to be a component of local identity. The Kayseri cityscape is
dotted with buildings endowed for public use. There are also a large number of
organisations providing a wide array of welfare services and assistance to the poor.
Both the number of such organisations and the scope of their activities make it an
exceptionally suitable place to conduct this type of research.
The second half of the chapter focuses on Kayseri's philanthropists, who make these
endowments and financially support the organisations of interest. I conceptualise these
endowments and donations as acts of gift-giving and explore the sources of obligation
to which wealthy local entrepreneurs respond by investing heavily in beneficence.
Material from the interviews I conducted with notable town philanthropists is analysed
to draw conclusions about their manifest objectives and reasons. The overall argument
of the chapter speaks to the theory of gift I develop in Chapter I by suggesting that
obligation to give lies neither in religion per se nor in self-interested economistic
calculations, but in the regulative principle of the field of beneficence, which is gift-
giving.
Chapter 5 continues with explorations of instances of gift-giving, this time in the daily
practices of vakif workers. The chapter is built around the concept of hizmet, which
literally means 'service' but has broader religious and non-religious connotations. It is
an umbrella term that refers to any act which involves caring for strangers, whether it is
done in public settings or by private initiative. I argue that hizmet provides Kayseri
beneficence field actors with a theory of gift, and thus gives their acts their meaning and
spirit. It also provides the discursive tools for creating collaborations which otherwise
would seem suspect, and it allows actors to frame their daily activities as gift acts.
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Throughout the chapter, I investigate how labour, donations, prayers and the formation
of networks come to be instantiations of gift-giving by contrasting them against
commodity transactions with a similar outlook. Therefore, alongside the theory of gift-
giving, the chapter also expands on the material circuits of gift.
Chapter 6 explores how relationality informs notions of justice among vakif workers.
The focus of the chapter is on encounters between vakif workers and supplicants. Most
of these encounters take place during the application and assessment processes, when
the entitled vakif workers evaluate cases based on certain criteria. This evaluation
procedure often involves visits to supplicants' homes, where surveillance of life
standards may lead to intimate connections as well as judgement and criticism. These
are also occasions for the determination of needs. The chapter is woven around the
theme of how certain needs are viewed to be worthy of entitlements, and how the
criteria are used flexibly to justify decisions. I suggest that invocations of justice, not as
normative phenomena but as part of a person's ethical standing (in terms of being a just
person), open up the possibility of circumventing these criteria, however well
entrenched they first appear to be.
Chapter 7 intertwines diverse theoretical strands to illustrate the subjective formations
of vakif workers, especially of women. 1 suggest that, while doing vakif work, women
experience a transformation which starts with their embodied dispositions towards
poverty. Their boundaries shift during repeated encounters, and this shift makes up the
core of their ethical formations. I argue that, although the point of departure of
engagement with vakif work is often formulated in religious terms, it includes a broader
commitment to an ethics of care. This ethics is necessarily built on the practice of care
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and is intersubjective, for care acts involve at least two people. The final part of the
chapter looks into the affinity between care and gift, and investigates how gift
mechanisms can be masterfully used to constitute mutual respect.
The concluding chapter picks up from there and discusses the conditions of building
respect in relations of unequal power and standing. It argues that the principles that
govern gift-giving have a significant effect on this task, as much as they have
explanatory value. With reference to the theoretical problems posed in Chapter 1, this
brings the discussion back to the realm of political economy and queries the role of
reciprocal relations in the face of ostensible neoliberalisation.
A note on the choice of terminology
Throughout this dissertation I prefer usmg benefaction and beneficence, often
interchangeably, to denote the acts of founding and donating to organisations, as well as
the daily activities of those who work for these organisations, whether paid or unpaid,
all expressed in Turkish with an Arabic word, haytr. Such a choice is better justified by
comparing these terms with the commonly preferred terminology in the literature:
philanthropy, charity and benevolence.
The reason for not using benevolence is that because it signifies a disposition instead of
an act or a practice. Why I deliberately refrain (though not always, as will be seen) from
naming what I have observed philanthropy or charity is slightly more complicated, and
has to do with the etymology and historical trajectory of the words. Philanthropy means
the love of humankind and implies a certain reasoning and motivation behind the act of
giving it signifies. This ancient Greek term was revitalised during the Enlightenment
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and came to be used to refer to attempts to heal social ills programmatically and using
reason (Gross 2002). From the very start of the second life of the term, it was
deliberately distinguished from charity. In addition to faith in reason and greater
ambitions to heal social ills rather than individual suffering, the term separated itself
from charity with its secular connotations. In philanthropy the motivation behind giving
does not have to be religious; it is worldly and has more to do with people than with
God. Charity, on the other hand, has strong religious connotations. In the English
language it describes both a Godly virtue and the practice of giving to the needy (Gross
2002). It is highly valued in Christianity and is still widely used by Christian groups to
define their acts. One further complication with the use of charity is that it is the official
title of non-profit organisations in the UK.
My task is to express, haytr, a word of a different historical background, etymology and
cultural connotations, in a language-English-whose repertoire of words reflect
historical tensions that are not directly applicable to the Turkish usage of the original
Arabic word. Because hayir is neither solely religious nor secular, and because it defies
the particular institutionalisation of both charity and philanthropy in the West, I prefer
the literal translation (good deeds), and thus beneficence and benefaction.
Still, readers will notice some usages of the words charity and philanthropist. I reserve
charity for the translation of the name given to a very particular form of religious
giving, sad aka in Turkish (again from Arabic); which means 'alms' in the strictest
sense, but is more widely used now to connote voluntary giving to the poor or destitute.
Philanthropist is used as the rough transiation of the Turkish term haytrsever. What
haYlrsever connotes is a matter of lengthy discussion (see Chapters 4 and 7). Here, it is
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enough to note that hayirsever is translated as philanthropist, not according to any
etymological reasoning but because of the material similarity of the two: wealthy people
donating for a public cause.
Another note should be made regarding my preference to name the organisations that
are the subject matter of this dissertation. In the literature, similar organisations in
Turkey and in the region are described as 'Islamic social institutions' (Clark 2004),
'Muslim voluntary welfare organisations' (Harmsen 2008), 'religious welfare
organisations' (Jawad 2007; 2009), and 'religiously motivated welfare associations
(Gocmen 2011). In Kayseri, the preferred vernacular name is vakif, from the Arabic
waqf. Throughout this dissertation I prefer using the vernacular name instead of coming
up with a new term or employing one of the above. However, I also use the original
Arabic word, waqf, to denote the historical institution as a whole, rather than a
particular contemporary organisation. I adopt this strategy because the Arabic
transliteration is more common in the literature and has wider implications than the
Turkish legal concept of vakif In Chapter 2, I discuss the concept and the institution of
waqf, and the significance of the particular vernacular usage of the word. In Chapter 3, I
provide an outline of the common characteristics of the organisations I worked with.
This outline also addresses my reservations about using the terms coined elsewhere in
the literature mentioned above.
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CHAPTER 1 THE CHALLENGE OF GIFT: RETHINKING
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WELFARE
This chapter begins with a critique of widely held beliefs about capitalism. The Marxist
legacy of the inevitability of capitalist expansion is alive and well today. It is
commonplace to talk about the overriding powers of capitalism and their permeation
into the capillaries of societies. Capitalism, in all its fatalistic and deterministic
narratives, cast man as homo economicus: a rational human being whose sole purpose is
to further his own self-interests. Such a conception leaves room for exchange only
insofar as it maximizes gain. Exchange is thus restricted to the realm of impersonal,
gain-oriented commodity exchange, where labour and affection are predetermined and
quantifiable aspects of 'value'.
This narrative overrides the multitude of alternative modalities that do not have nearly
as strong a voice as 'Capitalism'. In order to extract these modalities from where they
have been buried, I follow authors who have challenged the inevitability of capitalist
expansion and argued that capitalism is neither as coherent nor as unified as it has been
represented. Economic and livelihood activities in any given society can better be
represented through a wide array of practices that conflict, co-operate or independently
co-exist with each other. Among them, the exchange of goods and services can be
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classified under the anthropological categories of commodity exchange, redistribution
and reciprocity.
Reciprocal practices and relations are the most overlooked of the three, especially in the
context of contemporary Western societies. This is symptomatic of an Orientalist and
simultaneously Occidentalist bias (Carrier 1992), but also indicative of two founding
assumptions: the assumption of homo economicus and the assumption of the primacy of
markets. After laying out the fundamental elements of these two assumptions and
deconstructing them to a degree, I move to expound on the missing reciprocal element:
the gift.
In the final part of the chapter, given the importance of religion in the context I have
conducted this research, I explore the terms with which scholars of Islamic economy
define the boundaries of the economic sphere, and suggest that this school of economic
thought approaches gift-giving as an integral and essential element of economy.
This Thing Called Capitalism
There is a widely accepted view among today's social scientists that capitalism is
indeed marching forward to encompass all realms of society. This legacy of Marx taints
discussions about almost any contemporary phenomenon, not only of political
economy. Capitalism is tightening its grip, subsuming societies and transforming every
place into copies of itself. The only remaining guarantee against this threat appears to be
the state.
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Conceptualised as an enemy to be fought by the institutions of welfare states, capitalism
in this views appears as a coherent whole. It is either capitalism as the base (as in the
well-known architectural metaphor) or the dichotomy of a state-versus-capitalism
conflict that determines the societal structure. What I want to underline, as a
background to this dissertation, is that no system is ever complete, nor does one system
present a singular social reality. All systems operate partially and intermittently
alongside of different codes and moral principles. Capitalism is said to have been taking
over all other social realms for the last two centuries, and we revive the same
anticipation with every new wave of capitalist re-structuring. Yet there has always
emerged a new frontier for its expansion. Perhaps we should conclude that capitalist
consolidation will never be absolute because, as Polanyi (1957) reminds us, society is
not as accessible as initially thought. Society defends itself. At every step, we witness
competing structures, practices, motivations, and relations, and they co-exist-not
necessarily as latent structures of commodity exchange.
J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006) discusses specifics of these various activities that co-exist
in today's societies as 'diversity economies'. Diversity economies range from theft to
donations, from unpaid family labour to co-operatives, and from barter to volunteering,
to name only a few. Some of these economic (or livelihood) activities are situated in
tandem with capitalist rationale while others have completely different and almost
incommensurable underlying principles. Yet these are either largely neglected by
political economists or seen as complementary to capitalist organisation of production
and consumption. What is at stake here is dismissing potential and already existing
alternatives by presenting social systems as coherent structures with an inherently
consistent logic.
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According to Gibson-Graham, the discursive strength of Capitalism (with a big C), as
opposed to capitalism as a mode of production among many, rests on three features that
are widely attributed to it: unity, singularity and totality. Capitalism is described as a
unified 'system' with an inner energy that allows it to ever expand and to recover from
crises it creates. Instead of being a loose patchwork of various practices it is represented
as having a coherent inner logic, a predetermined aim, and a direction. It is also
represented as being singular, in the sense that wherever it emerges all other
possibilities and alternatives tend to disappear. It doesn't tolerate co-existence; either
everything is Capitalism or there isn't capitalism. What is obviously non-capitalist (not
yet capitalist) is then either destined to dissolve (for example, subsistence agriculture) or
to be classified as reproducing capitalism (like women's unpaid housework). Finally,
Capitalism appears by and large to be a total system, swallowing whatever crosses its
path that may be called human, either social or personal. There is then nothing
surprising in the notion that such an all-powerful, self-identical, dynamic, and self-
explanatory system would be almost unbeatable.
In such thinking, which indeed dominates our imaginative and discursive repertoires
nowadays, partialities are transformed into allegedly anachronistic practices. Such a
view posits one set of relations as the primary determinant of the social life, and then
lines up all other phenomena in relation to it, and notably behind it. As Gibson-Graham
puts it '[n]oncapitalism is the before or the after of capitalism: it appears as a
precapitalist mode of production (identified by its fate of inevitable supersession); it
appears as socialism for which capitalism is both the negative and positive
precondition' (ibid., 7).
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It is not to underestimate the power of the patchwork of practices assembled under the
name 'capitalism' through which so many things (land and labour being the most
important) have become commodified and been turned into objects of a never-ending
trade. These practices and their rationalities permeate many forms of existence on the
planet in one way or another. Rather than taking these practices lightly, I suggest
confronting the hegemonic discourse that takes these practices as a coherent whole and
that constructs capitalism as a swelling monster. My objective is to produce an account
that looks for other practices, other incentives, and moral principles while keeping their
relationship to capitalism in mind. I try to identify spheres that could indicate more than
just another example of capitalism or another facet of the capitalist enterprise. Because
capitalism is not an all-encompassing system, one does not have to be a time-traveller or
an out-of-context saintly figure to act outside its rationale. On the contrary, acts that
openly contradict or challenge capitalist principles may well be performed by actors
who otherwise could be seen as exemplary members of a market society. The actors of
beneficence who are the subject of this dissertation will provide enough examples to
make this point over the course of the thesis.
Homo economicus
At the heart of totalised conceptions of capitalism lies an ontological simplification of
man as an economic animal guided by self-interest and profit maximisation. It is
important to briefly look at this particular genus, homo economicus, because it seriously
affects the way we think about why people do certain things. It is the reason gift-giving,
beneficence, and care seem either impossible or calculated. Or worse, they cannot be
noticed and recognised at all.
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The idea of homo economicus is based on a particular understanding of the defining
values of societies and human beings, along with the main functions of human relations.
To begin with, the underpinnings of human encounters are assumed to consist of an
exchange of things in order that individuals can make gains and profits. Adam Smith,
for example, suggested that the division of labour, as the function upon which societies
were first built, was dependent upon the existence of markets, that is, upon 'man's
propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another' (1863). In short,
societies, starting with the so-called primitives, are made up of bartering individuals,
and these individuals come together for the sake of exchange. Their propensity to
maximise their interests leads them towards each other. Hence society is itself a product
of this selfish drive.
According to David Williams (1999), Adam Smith's homo economicus, while posited
as the universal reality of man, was actually a project to be realised in order to meet the
human needs of the changing economy. Such a project 'required locating individuals in
new institutional arrangements and inculcating new habits' (p. 89). Individuals were
expected to enhance their wealth through economic actions instead of being idle or
spending their money on activities with no economic gain. Homo economicus, as a
project, was designed to create a new self, who was supposed to be 'disengaged and
autonomous (freed from negative and dangerous social customs), innovative and
reflexive (using a systematic approach for problem solving) and calculating (through
functionary numeracy and accounting techniques)' (p. 95).
Indeed, this calculating and interest-oriented subject finds itself relatively well-located
in markets and commodity exchange, but only in markets. Taking homo economicus as
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the essence of Man is imagining society as ruled by markets to the exclusion of other
forms of subsistence. Anthropological traditions illustrate quite a variety of economic or
livelihood activities that shape how things and services change hands in human groups.
Commodity exchange is only one form among others; its institutionalisation through
markets is hardly universal, and its absence should not be viewed as an aberration. To
quote Polanyi:
Adam Smith's suggestions about the economic psychology of early man were
as false as Rousseau's were on the political psychology of the savage ... While
history and ethnography know of various kinds of economies, most of them
comprising the institution of markets, they know of no economy prior to our
own, even approximately controlled and regulated by markets. (1957,44)
Polanyi emphasises that the historical and spatial universality of the reign of markets is
a myth created in the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, he too describes markets as
expanding towards an ultimate domination. With that, his account repeats the same line
of representation-that markets have come to a point where they will have finally taken
over the key institutions of the society in an incomparable manner to previous ages.
Still, he recognises by implication of decentring and historicising markets that there are
other possible and well-established ways of circulating things and services in societies.
He also acknowledges that, despite its dominance, commodity exchange was not the
only form available in 1944 when The Great Transformation was published. Nor is it
now.
By the same token, despite its discursive power, homo economicus as a project is still
far from being realised. People act with motivations other than money and with
rationales other than making profit over exchange. In the following section, I will
situate commodity exchange within an anthropological model, and explore its co-
existence and interrelation with two other forms of circulation.
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Commodity exchange and redistribution
As much as homo economicus is the ontological assumption behind the overpowering
view of capitalism and market economy, the predominant form of transaction within
this ideal type is commodity exchange. Thus, this very particular type of economic
activity lies at the heart of the ready-made explanations discussed above.
Our obsession with markets is historically contingent. Anthropological traditions
delineate three distinct forms of circulation: reciprocity, redistribution and commodity
exchange (Polanyi 1957; Dalton 1965; Lomnitz 1988). Reciprocal relations include
gifts, collective labour, household activities, and so on. Redistribution is the pooling of
resources and their return to members of the society at different rates. It is often thought
of together with the centralisation of power, whether in the form of bureaucratic states
or less complex chiefdoms. Finally, commodity exchange is the exchange of goods or
services with immediate return or with the promise of a definite return. All three forms
often co-exist in societies, serving different needs, and having distinct cultural
functions. The predominance of one system or another in a particular society varies
greatly; there are societies in which markets have almost negligible eminence (Mauss
1990[ 1924]), and there are others in which the accumulation of power through
redistribution is kept under strict control (Graeber 2004). There are others, still, in
which markets have achieved unprecedented importance and reach, yet even in this case
the other forms will not have ceased to exist. Quite the contrary, redistribution and
reciprocity play an important role, even in the existence of capitalism itself.
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Kojin Karatani (2008) has developed a critique of the architectural model of base-
superstructure in traditional Marxist thinking and suggests using another Marxian
concept, exchange, to understand how societies function, in terms of both economy and
power. He identifies four modes of exchange, three of which are the familiar
reciprocity, plunder/redistribution, commodity exchange, and the fourth, X, which is a
regulative ideal to guide aspirations for a just and peaceful future. According to
Karatani, reciprocity, redistribution and commodity exchange exist within every society
in different combinations. It is therefore quite inadequate to focus only on market
relations in order to understand modem societies. 'Capitalist social formation', as
Karatani calls it, requires more than simply relations of production that tum human
labour into commodity, namely particular modes of redistribution and reciprocity. In
today's 'capitalist social formation', redistribution is equal to the state, whereas
reciprocity is realised through the imagined community of the nation. With this tum,
'capital-nation-states' accumulate the endurance to fight off any attempts at
deconstruction through selective attacks against relations of production and exchange.
In Karatani's thinking, 'capital-nation-states ... were best represented by social welfare
nations' (p. 587) and that is why overcoming capitalism requires simultaneously
overthrowing nations and states, the pillars of capitalism.
Tellingly, T.H. Marshall had started his quest with a similar problematic: What is the
relationship between modem states and capitalism? In Citizenship and Social Class
(1992), Marshall argues that citizenship, as a system of equality at the foundation of
modem states, and capitalism, as a system of inequality, are oppositional. Yet curiously
enough, they have flourished simultaneously over the last 250 years of Western history.
This co-existence creates a paradox to be resolved, given the contradictory nature of the
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two systems. In order to resolve it, Marshall analyses the history of citizenship in its
three phases, each of which emphasises a different aspect: civil, political and social
citizenship.
According to Marshall, during the first phase of citizenship in England civil rights were
seen as the core of the citizenship ideal, and the right to own property and the right to
sell one's labour began to be protected under law. The abolishment of the old status-
based system of access to these rights allowed all citizens to act freely within the
market. The two conditions for the emergence of capitalism were thus met: the right to
work (in the Marxian terminology, free labour) and legal protection of private property
that could be translated into capital through the changing relations of production. The
inequalities, which lacked a legal definition yet at the same time were constituted by
these two core elements of law, only later began to be seen as potentially incompatible
to the premise of equality. This corresponds to the second phase of the development of
modem citizenship, the establishment of political rights. By the end of the nineteenth
century, unions began to comprehend the political power they had acquired through the
extension of political rights to all citizens, and to use this power to fight the material
outcomes of the inequalities capitalism had been producing. According to Marshall,
with the upper classes beginning to develop a wider understanding of citizenship as
being 'admitted to a share in the social heritage' (1992,6), social rights appeared as an
issue of hot debate in the twentieth century.
Hence, Marshall approaches social rights and the redistributive faculties of the state as a
means of protecting social order ('the capitalist social formation', to paraphrase
Karatani) in the face of the threats from the working classes. Marshall's account is
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explicit in its spatial and temporal account-that this is the history of citizenship in
England, and not intended to imply universal applicability. But it is still indicative of
how states, seen as the sole redistributive agents and legitimate sources of citizenly
rights, can also be seen as what made capitalism possible in the first instance, as well as
what effectively kept it functioning afterwards.
The idea of social citizenship has recently been revived and is being discussed in the
Turkish context. During the last decade, academic discussions of the issue have been led
by two prominent scholars: Ayse Bugra and Caglar Keyder. In her book, Bugra
develops a historical view to analyse the changing 'welfare regime' of the Turkish
Republic from its foundation in 1923 onwards (Bugra 2008). Her account is built upon
the conviction that the idea of social citizenship poses a real threat and challenge to
capitalism. This challenge is based on the fundamental contradiction between human
conceptions of capitalism and citizenship. According to Bugra, from the sixteenth
century onwards capitalism has caused a drastic change in the conception of human
value, which lies in its ability to labour (ibid., 23-49). In this worldview, poverty is a
matter of a lack of ability or willingness to work on the part of the poor, and is therefore
despised. It appears as a matter of regulation/alleviation, as it is a problem of sustaining
'productive hands'. In contrast to this conception of humanity, rights-based discourses
claim that basic human needs should be met for all, not for their productive qualities,
but because everyone has the right to survive with dignity. At this point Bugra refers to
Marshall's definition of full realisation of citizenship and argues that it is the
responsibility of the state to guarantee this right (Bugra and Keyder 2006; Bugra 2008).
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After making this fundamental distinction between the human conceptions of capitalism
and rights-based discourses, Bugra moves on to identify the counterparts of these two
conceptions in today's political arena. As the heir of economic liberalism, today's good
governance schemes are the carriers of the first approach. The focus is on creating
employment as a solution to poverty and cooperating with NGOs to lessen the burden of
the state. Benefaction is the integral last resort in this approach, to be mobilised and
used when all possibilities of abusing the productive capacities of the poor are
consumed. Therefore, according to Bugra, this neoliberal understanding of good
governance is an indirect version of transferring the problem of poverty to the realm of
the market by minimising state responsibilities. In contrast, approaches of social
citizenship prioritise the well-being of the society over the well-being of the market and
consider poverty as a political problem. And as a political problem, the solution to
poverty cannot be left to individual consciences and to the operations of the market, but
must instead be dealt with by the state as a matter of citizenship rights and equality.
However critical and important is this analysis, it misses an important dimension of
society and economy, and thus is profoundly flawed. Its weakness stems precisely from
the dichotomy it assumes. By situating the market and the state as the only possible
actors to provide social services, this account renders invisible mechanisms of
circulation that are not necessarily ruled by the operations of the market or by
redistributive mechanisms owned by the state. Second, it only acknowledges one
legitimate source of rights: the state. Any right that is not recognised, legitimised and
legally protected by a state does not count as a right in itself. So in this account,
benefaction and other sorts of reciprocal relations are conflated with the market and the
idea that the state can-and indeed does-act within terms of gift-giving is dismissed.
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Some accounts of the 'mixed economy of welfare' effectively include the voluntary
sector into the welfare mix in question (for example Bode 2006). However, even in such
accounts, the governance perspective (for example Jessop 1999) shifts the narrative in
statist directions, and voluntary sector actors (as the name suggests) are portrayed as
quasi-market agents to be governed by the state. Therefore states function as managers
(1. Clarke and Newman 1997) responsible for coordinating various actors, channelling
resources and controlling outcomes. Especially in cases where non-profit welfare
providers are funded by public offices (like the borough councils in the UK), the
boundary between the voluntary sector and the state, as well as that between non-profit
and for-profit organisations, is blurred. However in the Turkish case, there is almost no
public funding available to welfare-providing NGOs, and their operations are hardly
coordinated and directed towards state social policy goals, although this cooperation is
always an aspiration.
Esping-Andersen's (1990) seminal work on welfare regimes may be illuminating at this
point. Although his ideal types have been subject to some criticism (see the review of
criticism in Arts and Gelissen 2002), the scales he uses to evaluate European welfare
regimes have been widely applauded. Two of these scales are directly related to the
discussion here: decommodification and defamiliarisation. Defamiliarisation is the
degree to which the market and/or the state play a role in providing services to
individuals that were traditionally provided by the family. Decommodification, on the
other hand, is the degree to which social services are rendered by the state as a matter of
rights, therefore creating the conditions for a person to maintain a livelihood without
having to sell his or her labour. Then, defamiliarisation is a move from the reciprocal
realm to the realms of redistribution and commodity exchange, while
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decommodification is a shift from market relations towards the redistributive capacities
of the state. The social democratic welfare regime, which is what stands for the
common understanding of the welfare state when the retreat of the state or welfare crisis
is mentioned, scored high on both of these scales. In other words, social democratic
welfare regimes are characterised by the hollowing out of reciprocal responsibilities in
the provision of welfare and a rights-based safety net that guarantees a basic life
standard without dependence on the labour market. Bugra and Keyder's (2006) account,
mentioned above, illustrate a yearning for such a complete transfer, and their distaste for
gift-giving as welfare provision stems from fear of regress.
The Gift
As I have discussed in the introduction, the importance of understanding 'gift' for this
research is twofold: first, it allows us to elaborate on charitable giving and beneficence
beyond the limitations of state versus market, and on redistribution versus commercial
exchange dichotomies; second, looking through the lens of the gift requires shifting the
scale and scope of analysis to everyday relations amongst people because, as is made
clear below, gift is always an enactment of a social role, an expression of indebtedness
or an attempt to create a bond. Therefore, using this conceptual tool allows for looking
at practices and the formation of subjectivities, both of which are outside the conceptual
limits of political economy or idealistic/status-based conceptions of citizenship. So gift
provides a set of conceptual tools that exposes enactments of citizenship as temporally
and spatially located happenings in situ.
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Within this context, gift-giving is not conceptualised as a private act actualised between
two individuals out of pure generosity, affection or personal affiliation. Rather it is seen
as a political act that sets the scene in which the encounters between citizens and their
states and fellow citizens are structured and made meaningful. An influential and
significant exploration of this topic comes from one of the forefathers of the British
welfare system, Richard Titmuss. In The Gift Relationship (1997), Titmuss argues that
voluntary giving for fellow citizens is beneficial to the social fabric and constitutive of
increased levels of belonging. Moreover it is also more effective than the market for the
provision of certain services. He then gives the famous example of blood donation,
illustrating how blood supply decreases in proportion with its commodification,
increasing when it is framed as a voluntary act of gift-giving. It is important to note here
that what he describes is not only a case for the superiority of gift mechanisms over
market processes with respect to the provision of certain services, but also evidence that
for the provision of some services, non-obligation proves more effective than
obligation.
Titmuss approaches this kind of gift-giving as a modem phenomenon and argues that it
diverges drastically from Maussian principles, because it is essentially gift-giving to
strangers, with whom there are no interactions, let alone true relationships, and because
there can be no return gift due to the anonymous character of the initial gift. This
dissertation can be read as an attempt to challenge these two arguments regarding the
nature of giving to strangers. Throughout the coming chapters it will become clear that
even making an anonymous donation to an organisation sparks spirals of gift-giving,
most of which creates tangible relations among people. Before moving on with these
discussions, however, a clarification of the Maussian formula is required.
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Mauss'gift
Marcel Mauss wrote the first comprehensive account of gift-giving practices over a vast
geographical and historical expanse, in which he traced patterns of what he identified as
'universality' in the gift. In the famous The Gift (1990[ 1924]), he identified reciprocity
as a fundamental feature of gift-giving practices. According to him, the obligation to
give, receive and reciprocate is the backbone of society. In doing so, people stay in
relationships and act out friendship, partnership, hostility, cooperation, honour, war and
diplomacy. Therefore the obligatory nature of gift relationships is an answer he
provided to his tutor and uncle Emile Durkheirn's famous question of what makes
society possible, what makes it stick together. For Mauss, one possible glue is the gift.
In his conclusion to The Gift, Mauss draws moral, politico-economic and societal
lessons for today's societies from his vast study of the gift. The range of conclusions
drawn matches the concept of the 'total social system', as he coins the term for gift.
According to him, gift is a total social phenomenon, with its legal, economic, religious,
kinship, moral, and aesthetic dimensions. Gift effects all possible arenas of human
transaction. This has been so for societies without a money economy, as well as for
modem Western societies wherein commodity transactions set the norm of exchange.
Mauss cites examples from the early-twentieth-century art scene, from labour
movements, from newly establishing the idea of social welfare. and from conspicuous
non-utilitarian consumption of the wealthy to make his point that gift is not an archaic
phenomenon. There is a lot we can learn in terms of 'civility' (Mauss 1990, 83) through
an exploration of gift-giving with respect to the art of living together.
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Mauss puts an effort into drawing a moral conclusion that speaks to political economy
as well as sociology. Because, as a 'socialist without a doctrine' (lnsel 2003), his aim is
to open up possibilities of thinking beyond the dichotomies of state versus market,
individual versus society. By introducing the reciprocal voluntariness of subjects in the
circulation of goods and services, gift challenges the idea that distribution and
redistribution in societies with money economies are regulated either by the market or
the state. This is also a challenge to the prevailing conception of calculative, interest-
run, selfish man: homo economicus. According to Mauss, although 'it is our western
societies who have recently made man an 'economic animal' ... we are not yet all
creatures of this genus.' (1990,76). This is revealed in the fact that nearly every aspect
of our lives is still deeply involved in gift economies. So, for Mauss, gift is what we can
stick to in order to keep hope alive for a more humane world.
This particular political agenda has found its way into many of the later texts on the gift;
even when not employed in the same way, it has always been a source of inspiration for
imagining a world other than this one. For Pierre Bourdieu, studying the logic of gift is
a critical task 'in order to create universes in which, as in gift economies, people have
an interest in disinterestedness and generosity, or, rather, are durably disposed to respect
these universally respected forms of respect for the universal' (Bourdieu 1997a, 240).
For Godbout and Caille (1998) and for other members of the MAUSS (Mouvement
Anti-Utilitariste dans les Sciences Sociales) initiative in France, gift is an important tool
to pose a critique of utilitarianism that dominated social sciences. For anarchist
anthropologist Graeber (2004), gift economies are where we can look for real-life
examples of self-regulating socio-economic systems that escape the control of the state
but still function efficiently, being based on an obligatory voluntariness. Recently, gift
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has been taken up by new social movements to challenge the market accumulation
system in the US and Europe, and has been offered as the most viable alternative to
capitalist and expansionist money economies (Eisenstein 2011). For radical feminist
Helene Cixous (1996), principles of gift sketch out the principles of a possible feminine
economy of care and generosity, as opposed to the masculine economy of self-
interestedness, profit-seeking and aggressiveness. Similarly, the articles in Genevieve
Vaughan'S (2007) collection on gift economies discuss the possibility of creating a new
economy built on the feminine qualities of giving and care. For Komter, gift and social
solidarity thought of together offer potential opportunities to develop 'a new social
connectedness, allowing the autochthonous and the allochthonous to live together in
harmony and mutual respect' (2005, 208) in the post-colonial multi-racial context of
Europe. Even for Derrida, who declares that gift is 'the impossible' (1997, 124), that it
is a 'transcendental illusion' (p. 124) or a 'simulacrum' (p. 125), one must render an
account of this simulacrum because even if the gift is the 'ineffable exteriority' of
economic circulation, it is 'what makes the circle tum' (p. 125).
Gift as a conceptual tool
The idea behind this dissertation has affinities with Mauss' project: tracking cycles of
exchange and modes of redistribution by moving beyond the state and the market.
While I look at organised beneficence and gifts given to fellow citizens, I do not suggest
that the gift economy managed by these organisations and local notables provides an
absolute alternative to either side of the state-market dichotomy. Indeed, I rely on
historical examples that illustrate how gift economies almost always work
simultaneously with market economies (Polanyi 1957; Mauss 1990; Godbout 1998), but
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assume an ethos that is carefully kept separate from the operational logic of the market
(Mauss 1990). This section is devoted to exploring the logic of gift as the source of
distinction from market relations.
An important feature of gift is that it resists calculation, yet there have been modest
efforts at projecting the scale of gift economies in modern societies. Working with
projected numbers for unpaid domestic labour, calculable but unpaid relationships of
care, and money and time endowed in philanthropy/charity, an economist, Insel
estimates that gift economy is as big as three-quarters of the GDP in France (1995, 118).
This number excludes some totally unquantifiable aspects of gift-giving, like showing
compassion, informally passing along knowledge and experience, teaching the mother-
tongue, and so on. Even though such projections are utterly contradictory to the
incalculable nature of the gift, they illustrate how critical but unacknowledged is the gift
economy, even in its material aspects.
However, gift is not primarily about providing goods and services; rather it is about
establishing bonds. The establishment of bonds via gift relations is directly related to
the function of obligation within gift systems. Every gift is embedded with the
obligation that it be accepted and returned, but how this happens to be so is the key
question theoreticians of the gift have been seeking to answer. Mauss (1990) appreciates
the explanation that was provided him by a Maori wise man and explains that the Hau,
or the spirit, of the object wants to go back to its original owner. Although this
explanation can be taken to have a metaphorical value-that there is something in gift
that exceeds the gift object-levi-Strauss (1987) criticises Mauss for positing a
mystical and culturally limited quality such as Hau. For Levi-Strauss, gift is a structural
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relation of exchange involving three inseparable components: givmg, receiving and
reciprocating. Asking why reciprocity exists is dividing the indivisible and mistaking
the part for the whole. A gift obligates its own acceptance and return because we are
implicated in this structure of exchange and bound by its unconscious rules, which
govern our social practices (1987, 55). Hau is just another signifier (or a 'magical
name') that allows us to make sense of this structured social world. In that sense the
imaginary that is constructed around the concept Hau is the vernacular 'gift theory'
(Silber 1995).
The most common explanation for why people give is a rather economistic one: people
give because they know that they will be given to in return; they give for future benefit
and they, later, assess how profitable (or at least equitable) the transaction was. Against
this over-simplification, Bourdieu sharply states that, '[ e]conomism is a form of
ethnocentrism'(1997b, 205), because it does not recognise any interests other than those
capitalism has made known to us: the material interests of the money economy. In
contrast to this understanding based on the entrenched conception of human nature as
homo economicus, Bourdieu develops a nuanced and complicated story by introducing
symbolic capital. Gift is an important vehicle, carrying the symbolic capital of social
actors in a field of power where individuals strategise using the dimensions of time
(when to return a gift) and resources (how and what to give). Yet social agents are
already implicated in that field through their habitus, and reciprocity is the norm not in
itself but always in relation to systems of kinship, religion, economy and morality that
shape this habitus.
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In that sense, gift is an act that cannot be explained by 'logical logic', only by 'practical
logic' (Bourdieu 1997b), which is the logic of practice. It does not necessarily require
rationality, reflexivity, or even intentionality to be performed correctly. Gift is part of
habitus, an aggregated disposition that is acquired (and inherited) during a lifetime.
Derrida (1997) adds to this discussion that gift does not need to take place between
intentional pre-existing subjects. Instead subjects are implicated in and constituted via
the flow of obligations that is the backbone of gift relations.
Commodity exchange, redistribution and gift rely on various arrangements and
mechanisms to create obligation and to maintain the flow. These mechanisms create
different subjectivities, distinct relations and dissimilar interactions. What define
commodity exchange and give it its unique features are the concept and arrangement of
contract. Commodity exchange is first and foremost a contractual relationship.
Contracts strictly define the terms of equivalence between two objects or deeds, and
attribute each a value that is translatable to the other (whether in monetary terms or by
means of barter). Moreover, all contracts are limited by time and require the
involvement of at least two parties capable of understanding their terms and conditions.
Whether written or verbal, all contracts are immediate. When one party provides
something to the other, he immediately knows what will be delivered in return. And
finally, all contracts have an expiration date. As soon as the agreed transaction is
completed, the relationship created by the contract is no longer valid. Hence, contracts
do not necessitate any lasting bonds, nor carry an implication of creating one.
Modem nation-states as redistributive bodies are also often conceptualised and
understood in terms of contracts. From Rousseau, Hobbes and Locke onwards, the bond
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of citizenship has been thought of as a contract made to leave the state of nature,
exchanging unbounded freedom with a reliable order. That is why citizenship is talked
about in terms of well-defined rights and equally weighted responsibilities. Fraser and
Gordon (1998) provide an account of how this shared conception has helped to ignore
the weight of non-contractual relations in human life, and how it also proved
detrimental to the idea of social citizenship. According to them, citizenship, by
protecting private property and the right to sell one's labour, as well as by defining
equality as an abstraction with respect to sustaining contracts, made capitalism possible
in the first instance and provided it with a legal and moral basis for its existence.
Reciprocal relations, on the contrary, are non-contractual by definition. People who are
engaged in reciprocal relations rely on the social bond created and sustained by the
relation itself. It is the logic of the gift that sustains these relations and creates
obligation, as discussed above. The unboundedness and infiniteness of reciprocal
relations make them a source of various source of social bonds ranging from
indebtedness, patronage, affection, care, compassion, and congeniality to competition.
The same thing may change hands, but its social effect may be drastically different
depending on the occasion. As Gregory (1982) suggests, while commodities have
prices, gifts have ranks, and these ranks are determined by relations of closeness, power
and hierarchy.
Gift resists being subsumed under the category of commodity transaction because of its
qualities of non-intentionality and non-calculability, as well as because of the non-
contractual obligation it creates. This also allows us to see how the market and modem
state are congenial in their assumptions of subjecthood and freedom, as they both rely
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on the idea of a contract-making individual. This joint over-valuation of contract has
caused the false assumption that obligation can only be thought of when there is an
uttered, explicit agreement. Thinking through gift allows us to question this assumption,
and to look for mechanisms of obligation that are not subjected to formal laws, but that
work through the intermingling of religious faith, honour, prestige and family. This tells
us that beneficence is not as arbitrary or voluntary as theorists of social citizenship tend
to think; instead, as it is embedded in belief systems, social networks, accumulation of
capital and so on, it is institutionalised and well-orchestrated. In the following section, I
will explore how Islam approaches the problematique of exchange by briefly reviewing
the literature on Islamic economics to understand its basic tenets and instruments.
An Islamic Approach to Economy
In this final section of the chapter, I will briefly discuss what the literature on Islamic
economics say about these three of modes of exchange as part of endeavour to create a
distinct alternative to contemporary capitalism. However, it is important to note from
the beginning that this literature is neither coherent nor unequivocal. There are
conflicting ideas regarding the most basic concepts like 'the public good', as well as
practical regulations like getting a loan to establish a business enterprise. Still, there are
significant common themes and established practices to guide the discussion here. I will
first layout the foundational assumptions of an Islamic economics, then introduce its
ideals, and finally discuss the injunctions imposed in order to reach this goal.
Muslim thinkers often agree on the duality inherent in human nature regarding human
beings' attitudes towards material gain: people are both selfish and altruistic (M. A.
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Khan 1994; Haq 1996). Islam recognizes the contextual and sometimes even
simultaneous existence of these two drives and, while controlling selfishness,
encourages altruistic behaviour. The assumption that these two primary drives coexist in
human nature has led scholars of Islamic economics to develop models of consumption
theory that are in relative contrast to the standard neoclassical capitalist models built on
the assumption of homo economicus. The non-satiation rule (i.e. more is always
preferred over less) and the utility maximisation principle are replaced by a series of
choices. The first decision to be made is how much to spend in the name of God for
beneficence and how much on individual consumption (M. F. Khan 1995). This
calculation depends on the individual's sense of being rewarded for beneficence and the
satiation of his or her needs. It is neither possible nor advisable to spend all of one's
income on the otherworldly because of the primary and selfish survival drive. It is also
unacceptable to spend only on consumption, because the altruistic drive is openly
favoured by God.
Islamic economists see the problem of individual consumption as another point of
conflict between Islamic and mainstream economics. They attempt to produce a model
of ethical consumption which based on needs not wants. According to Khan, 'whereas
want is determined by the concept of utility, need, in the Islamic perspective, is
determined by the concept of Mas/aha' (1995, 34). The concept of mas/aha. which is
sometimes translated as welfare (M. F. Khan 1995), and at other times as benefit (Tripp
2006), is itself a concept with a long history and deep meaning. The Encyclopedia of
Islam defines it as 'welfare', but this meaning expands as a concept used by jurists to
mean 'general good' or 'public interest' (Khadduri 1991, 738). Hence it is often
transferred from the level of the individual to the broader scale of society and comes to
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mean 'social benefit' (for further discussion, see Tripp 2006, 68-76). In fact, these two
levels are never thought to be divisible. According to Al-Ghazali, maslaha 'is the
ultimate purpose of the Shari 'a, consisting of the maintenance of religion, life,
offspring, reason and property' (Khadduri 1991, 739). Hence an economic
understanding which locates the reasons for spending under the simultaneously public
and private coverage of maslaha is significantly different than one which starts with the
assumption of the private and rational individual geared towards maximising his or her
own interests, i.e. homo economicus.
The great majority of Muslim thinkers agree that Islam sanctions private ownership of
property (Rodinson 1974; Maududi 1984; Hosseini 1988; M. A. Khan 1994; Haq 1996).
God is the ultimate owner of everything that exists, yet this divine ownership does not
exclude human beings' right to own property and earn lawfully. Individuals are free to
hold, buy, sell, rent and inherit property. Abul A'la Maududi (1984) is insistent and
particular in this matter, because according to him, this sanctioning is what makes Islam
indisputably incompatible with socialism. Maududi's approach has been challenged by
the experiences of Islamic Socialism over the second half of the twentieth century, yet
even these governments did not completely abolish the existing property regimes (Tripp
2006). Private property is, therefore, canonically established in Islamic thinking and has
historically existed in Muslim societies without a significant breach.
The same is true for wage labour. It is acceptable to sell one's labour to make a living
and to hire a labourer (Rodinson 1974). There are no clearly defined restrictions on
hiring other than the general considerations of fairness and mutual agreement (Rodinson
1974; Zaim 1994). As long as employer and employee agree on the terms of contract
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and the wage is determined from the start, wage labour is widely accepted. Involvement
in trades and production are also positively apprehended both canonically and in
historical practice (Siddiqi 1981). The only distinction is made between lawful and
unlawful earnings (Maududi 1984). 'Dishonesty, fraud and deception, coercive
practices, and gamblesome or usurious dealings are prohibited' (Siddiqi 1981, 17).
Trading certain goods that are regarded by religion as impure are also forbidden, like
alcohol, pork and other swine products (Rodinson 1974). Anything earned through these
prohibited practices is considered unlawful (haram) and the rest is lawful (ha/a!).
While earning and owning are generally sanctioned in Islam, how much to own is a
matter of great dispute. As will be discussed below, certain injunctions limit the
accumulation of wealth, but jurists throughout history, along with the political and
economic thinkers of the last century, have not come to an agreement on what these
injunctions truly mean and to what extend they should be applied. According to Iranian
scholar Ayetullah Mahrnud Taleghani (1983) it is outright forbidden in Islam to save
and hoard more than one needs. His ideas are shared by a number of jurists and thinkers
who have aimed to further the egalitarian and public-minded aspects of Islam (Tripp
2006). Yet there are many others who downplay these aspects and rather come up with a
business-minded version of Islam, which favours savings, entrepreneurship and wealth
(see the discussion in Haenni 2011).
Scholars of Islamic economics aim to create economic thought and corresponding
economic tools based on these core premises. The core problematic of most of this
literature (the question behind even the most quantitatively economistic sources) is how
to establish a society in which economic injustices are decreased to a minimum. In order
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to establish such a society, what is needed first is to define the basic precepts of the
economy. According to Timur Kuran (2004), the massive literature on Islamic
economics posits two principles upon which such an economy can be built: equality and
fairness. 'The principle of equality forbids gross inequalities in the distribution of
goods' (p. 104), yet what is sought is not ultimate equality. Islamic property regime
does not allow such an absolute end to be achieved. Instead, while extreme inequalities
are ruled out, a moderate degree of inequality is accepted. This brings us to the principle
of fairness. Kuran defines fairness as 'people's gains are to be "earned" and their losses
"deserved". It requires the economic system to treat similar economic contributions
similarly, and different economic contributions differently' (p. 104). Therefore,
economic transactions can only be treated according to their economic value. Gender,
race, class, family, and age cannot form the basis of discrimination in business.
These two principles, which are meant to pave the way towards a just society, can only
be enforced by injunctions that take the exploration from the level of the imagined
society and aspired-for ideals down to the realities of practical life. These realities are
shaped by injunctions when followed, yet they are also open to influence from the
economic, social and political contexts in which they are rethought and applied
(Rodinson 1974).
The most famous and celebrated of these injunctions is the prohibition of interest. The
Qur'anic prohibition is directed against riba, which literally means 'addition' to the
original amount or size. However, jurists are unanimous in the understanding that in
Qur'anic terminology riba means 'lending money for a prefixed rate of return or
interest' (Haq 1996, 117). According to Siddiqi, the rationale behind the prohibition has
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a number of dimensions: First, 'in the case of consumption loans [interest] violates the
basic function for which God has created wealth, which envisages that the needy be
supported by those who have surplus wealth. In the case of productive loans, guaranteed
return to capital is unjust in view of the uncertainty surrounding entrepreneurial gains'
(1981, 63). Therefore, on the one hand, interest on loans encourages a propensity to
save rather than to spend on consumption or beneficence. In doing so, it deprives
destitute members of society from their rightful share of wealth. Yet on the other hand,
when a loan is invested in production, risks involved are not shared. It is the debtor who
singularly assumes all risk, while the creditor is guaranteed a positive return. Thus,
interest once again makes saving and hoarding more profitable than making direct
investment, so money is taken out of productive circulation without creating any real
benefit (maslaha) for society.
The other reason behind the interest ban is that 'it transfers wealth from the poor to the
rich, increasing the inequality in the distribution of wealth' (Siddiqi 1981, 63). Through
the mechanisms explained above, interest creates an upward flow of wealth. Those who
need money most can only acquire the least of it at the highest interest rates. They pay
these rates to those who already have their needs covered and their surplus wealth
intact. Wealth becomes more and more concentrated, not distributed.
The second Islamic injunction directed towards maintaining equality and diffusion of
wealth is inheritance. The Islamic inheritance regime, which is detailed in the Qur'an,
has the net effect of hindering the concentration of wealth. It requires well-defined
distribution of patrimony to all lawful inheritors, and thereby does not allow wealth to
remain concentrated after death (Maududi 1984, 62). Because siblings of the same sex
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get equal shares, it also rules out primogeniture. Therefore, the growth of family estates
is interrupted (Kuran 2004, 106). According to Tillion (2007), this intricate inheritance
regime has historically posed the greatest threat to the patriarchal political order of the
Middle East, giving female family members a share of the inheritance and making male
household heads financially independent, thus risking clan loyalties. However, it would
be fair to say the challenge has never been welcome and the rule has often been
sidestepped, especially on the matter of female inheritors.
The final injunction I want to expand on is the injunction of giving. It is also the most
relevant to the subject matter of this dissertation. The Qur'an obliges Muslims to give
away a certain proportion of their wealth as zekat, and encourages ongoing voluntary
giving as sadaka. Zekat is one of the five pillars of the faith and is often seen as being in
equal importance with daily prayers. Zekat is due on money, valuables, merchandise,
agricultural land, livestock, property and investments. Although it is not explicitly
stated in Quran, the widespread and agreed upon rate for movables and merchandise is
2.5% of the value of the items that make up a person's wealth (Kuran 2003). Zekat only
accrues if one has an accumulation above a certain limit, which is widely accepted as
any wealth that is equivalent to or more then 85 grams of gold (Senturk 2007, 65).
There are widely discussed and contested calculation methods for commercial
inventory, agricultural produce or financial investments, that I will not detail here. What
is more important for the discussion here is that zekat is a mandatory transfer of wealth
from the rich to the poor (or the needy otherwise) and its redistributive function has
been much elaborated by Islamic economists-to such an extent that in his literature
survey, Siddiqi considers it to be 'one of the main pillars of Islam's economic system'
(1981, 61). Zekat is said to have many economic functions like increasing aggregate
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demand, but its most important econormc effect is once again related to the
concentration and accumulation of wealth. Zekat efficiently discourages hoarding and
saving by 'increasing the cost of waiting' (S. M. Ahmed 1980, 124), since wealth
shrinks as time passes, due to the annual zekat. According to most Islamic economists,
the combined effect of the interest ban and zekat is to direct wealth towards production,
consumption and beneficence (Zaim 1994). Accordingly, Tripp calls these the
'instruments of the moral economy' (2006, 124).
Zekat functions as a tool of both redistribution and reciprocity. Throughout the history
of Islam there have been numerous attempts to centralise the collection of zekat at the
hands of states (Zysow 2002; Tripp 2006). Most of these schemes failed after a period
of time, usually due to the high overhead costs incurred in this cumbersome activity.
During the last century, for example, Pakistan has revisited the idea and established
zekat as a tax to be collected by state agents. However, this fund made up a mere 0.2 per
cent of GDP in 1994 (Tripp 2006, 125). The common practice is to leave the payment
and distribution of zekat to individuals, thereby transferring it to the realm of gift
relations. This does not make zekat any less of a redistributive tool, but grants it an
important role in reciprocal relations as well.
Zekat is not the only injunction to give. Though not as strict and predetermined, there is
also an injunction to spend a proportion of one's wealth on the needs of other people,
especially co-believers. This injunction to spend generously on charitable purposes is a
tool defined by the Qur'an to encourage the altruistic side of human nature. Because
zekat is obligatory, its performance is not expected to create any soteriological rewards,
while charity, because it is voluntary, is what brings a person closer to God (Topbas
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2006). Historically, however, beneficence has never been a purely voluntary, personal,
conscientious and ad hoc act. An institutional and intricate framework has been
developed, and this has effectively channelled beneficence towards welfare provision
for more than a millennium. This topic will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
This list of injunctions is nothing if not exhaustive. It reflects the selective processes
Islamic economists go through in their attempts to delineate a distinctively Islamic
economy. These attempts do not take place in a vacuum either; they are often
undertaken to find a response to the modem capitalist social-economic order to which
Muslim societies and individual Muslims must adapt. In the face of the invasive power
of capitalist markets (and the values intrinsic to them), which require integration and
adaptation (as felt by Muslim intellectuals), these injunctions are taken up, invented and
reformulated. That is why, however authentic and Islamic the vocabulary is, their
utterance is shaped by an outside that is seen pervasive and hostile, but at the same time
powerful and admirable. This is the challenge Islamist economists and intellectuals in
general are facing: how to come up with a truly authentic and Islamic answer to the
questions created in a different order, in a world not of their own making. In other
words, as Charles Tripp elegantly puts it:
... their views of society, social cohesion and public utility were
informed by the very categories that had made possible the imagination
of a world transformed by the expansion of capital, the organisation of
human labour and the calculation of social utility. They tried to reclaim
these for a distinctive Islamic order, but their reasoning was often
vulnerable to the influence of that which they were seeking to criticise.
Interpretations of Islamic obligations were coloured, often shaped, by
these same imaginative constructions. As with other proposed
alternatives to capitalism, their visions seem less like radical
alternatives, and more like projects competing on the same terrain,
judged therefore by broadly similar criteria. (2006, 8)
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As an example, let's take up the prohibition of interest. As the Kuran observes, Islamic
economists often approach these injunctions as 'unambiguous guidelines for attaining
economic justice' (Kuran 2004, 109). It seems as if their application to real life
situations is simply a matter of procedure, yet although everyone agrees to the
injunction, say for example the interest ban, there is no agreement on the procedure. In
order to find a way to operate within a global economy maintained by financial
institutions whose main sources of revenue are interest-on-credit and an infinite number
of financial derivatives, it was necessary to establish a banking system that worked in
accordance with Islamic principles. In the last fifty years, Islamic financial institutions
that operate on principles of profit-sharing instead of based on interest have become
increasingly popular in the Muslim world. However, how much of these practices of
interest-free banking are really 'Islamic' per se is still a source of much debate.
According to well-known Pakistani economist Naqvi, 'to replace interest by profit is not
necessarily an Islamic reform either, because it might replace capitalism based on
interest-and-profit by a capitalism which is based only on profit!' (1994, Ill). He,
among many others, argues that the prohibition of interest is only one facet of a rule
'which prohibits all financial deals that perpetuate, or create, distributional inequalities'
(p. 112). However, as Tripp argues, 'Islamic banking, far from challenging global
capitalism, has become an integral part of the global financial system' (2006, 147), one
of the most infamous sources of inequality on the face of the earth (Hardt and Negri
200 I).
Similar examples can be given regarding inheritance or state-run zekat funds, however
the question here is not how genuinely Islamic contemporary enactments of Islamic
injunctions are; it is rather what to make of a system of economic thinking that
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approaches spending by humans through God as an intrinsic and mandatory element of
individuals' resource allocation. This premise becomes even more important given that,
as discussed at the beginning of the chapter, capitalist invasion of life-worlds is never
complete and homo economicus is a construct, not a depiction of reality. The Islamic
approach to human nature allows an economics in which redistribution and reciprocal
relations are given as much importance as commodity transactions. Through the
sanctioning of private property and trades, Islamic economic thinking openly promotes
commodity transactions. But the assumption that human beings are altruistic by nature
and the injunction of generosity in giving bring reciprocal and redistributional activities
to the fore as well, rather than approaching them as marginalised and archaic forms of
social transaction destined to disappear with the transformation of economic systems.
This certainly does not mean that these three mechanisms are equally weighted. The
leading role is not determined by religious precepts but by social, economic and
political contexts. Still, they are integral to Islamic economic thinking and to the self-
conceptions of Muslims as believers and ethical beings.
Conclusion
In this chapter, my aim has been to introduce and situate a particular mechanism of
exchange into its rightful place in our conception of modem socio-economic order. This
order is often named capitalism, without any further qualification, and at the expense of
a wide array of modalities that are far from being capitalist- or market-oriented. In order
to open a space for one among many of these neglected modes, i.e. the gift, I focused on
a few threads that make up the core assumptions behind the deterministic and fatalistic
narratives of capitalism. One of these threads is the ontological misconception of man
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as homo econormcus, while the other consists of the dualistic and antagonistic
conceptions of state and market.
The idea of homo economicus and of delimiting exchange with commodity transaction
leaves us with a human being who is predisposed to exchange what she owns for
maximum gain and to further her interests. In the universe of such persons, everything,
including labour and affection, has a predetermined and quantifiable value, and
exchanging them is an objective, impersonal act. In order to challenge this view I
introduced another mode of circulation: the gift.
Among gift's many features, the most critical is that it is primarily a social relation, not
an object. Gift builds upon connections between people and enhances them. It creates
subjects who give, accept and return within socially determined terms and conditions.
Therefore it relies on social meanings, statuses and positions. Gift is also a relation that
expands over time; it is not immediate and rarely has closure. So it lasts unless there is
an explicit move to break up the gift cycle.
As such, gift cannot be approached simply as a private act, one that begins with a
seedling of generosity planted in an individual's consciousness. It is very much socially
created and regulated. and takes place according to rights and obligations that precede
the gift act itself. Among these grammars where gift finds its expression, religion
occupies a noteworthy position. Scholars of Islamic economics particularly emphasise
gift acts defined as zekat or sadaka as integral elements of a distinctively Islamic
economics. This phenomenon does not formally exist as economy at the moment and its
possible existence as a coherent system is dubious and cannot overshadow the
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significance of this particular aspect of Islamic economic thought. Reciprocal relations
are key to the well-being of society-as-market transactions or redistributive
arrangements.
Yet belief itself cannot cover all aspects of any single gift act. A number of social
factors affect its very possibility as well as the way it is enacted. There are social
institutions that have power over realms much larger than the consciousness of
individuals, and through these institutions, giving and receiving subjects are created.
The next chapter will reframe such an institution, the waqf, as a lawful instantiation of
gift-giving and as a powerful component of the social imaginary regarding welfare.
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CHAPTER 2 WAQF AS INSTITUTION AND IMAGINARY
This chapter introduces institutional forms of gift-giving in Turkey and the imaginary
that has developed around these forms. The discussion revolves around the institution of
waqf. I do not examine this institution as a historical example but is instead a living
legal formation that shapes and affects current welfare provisions in Turkey, whether
they come from citizens or the state. I also attempt to illustrate how the waqf can and
should be understood simultaneously as a religious and secular institution.
I begin with a detailed description of the waqf and its features. I then discuss the
historical roles waqf institutions have played in societies: as social policy tools, building
blocks of the public sphere and instantiations of citizenship. The final section of the
chapter is devoted to illustrating how the waqf as an institution affects and informs
current beneficence activities and the welfare scene in Turkey. In order to do this I
briefly overview the historical development of welfare services since the foundation of
the Turkish Republic.
The Institution ofWaqf
In Turkey, doing registered charitable activities is only possible under one of two legal
titles. The first of these is the title dernek (association). the generic name for any civil
Society organisation. Any seven people who come together around an idea or a cause
73
can establish a dernek, register it with the Ministry of Interior and start functioning
immediately. The second legal title is vaktf, which brings with it some special tax
privileges but is at the same time a lot harder to establish. The founding of a vakif
requires a considerable initial endowment and a guarantee for its perpetuity. The
number of existing vakifs in Turkey is thus understandably much smaller.
But in Kayseri, the founders, workers and volunteers of charitable organisations almost
always refer to their respective organisations as vakifs, regardless of their actual legal
status. These organisations may actually be associations, or may even lack any legal
status at all, but in the vernacular they are all called vakifs. There are also derivations of
the word in wide circulation, such as vaktfctltk. identifying the activity of being
involved with these organisations or charitable activities in general, or vakifct, meaning
those who actively work for such causes. Although there exist a variety of terms that
could be used to define the work that vakifcis do and their institutional affiliations, the
strong preference for these neologisms points to a significant element of these people's
self-understanding and identification, as well as the historical path we can trace back in
order to develop a fuller understanding of these acts and their social meaning.
Vakif is the Turkish variant of the Arabic word, whose common transliteration in
English is waqf. As mentioned before, I use 'vakif' when I refer to the organisations
that provided me the data in the Turkish context, while I use 'waqf' to denote the
institution itself, with its social, economic and civic implications. The waqf is a legal
institution that has had regulated religious endowments throughout the history of Islam.
Despite many changes in the details of waqf law over this lengthy history, the term
waqf has usually designated a particular endowment made by a man or a woman for the
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benefit of well-defined beneficiaries. The endowment might consist of movables and
immovables that would either generate revenues to sustain the waqf, such as land or an
estate, or that would be beneficial on their own, such as books or scientific equipment.
The beneficiaries of these endowments could be mosques, schools, hospitals, aqueducts,
fountains, roads or inns; they might also be their administrators, personnel, students,
patients, guests, and patrons, or even the family members of their founders, as well as
various categories of the poor. A complete list of endowments, beneficiaries and plans
for distribution of revenue from these endowments would be compiled for every waqf in
its founding document, the vakifname, or waqfiyyah (waqf deed) and distributed among
beneficiaries. Waqf deeds are written in the presence of a judge and two witnesses, then
signed by the founder, witnesses and the judge. The established waqf is then
administered by a trustee (miitevelli) or a board of trustees, who are responsible for
keeping the promises made in the deed; therefore, their performance is not a private
matter but subject to checks and balances by local judges and the community in order to
keep the legal, religious and societal implications of the waqf intact. In contemporary
Turkey, waqfs are established at a state office iVakiflar Mudurlugu) and are periodically
audited by state officials, so their system of oversight has been moved from the purview
of local judges and communities to a centralised state office. The significance of this
shift will be discussed later in the chapter, but first I want to introduce some basic
features of the waqf.
Historically, founding a waqfwas a public act that gave the founders prestige. Yet waqf
founders did not necessarily belong to the ruling or upper classes of their respective
SOCieties;they were men and women from all walks of life. All these founders were
individuals who made endowments from their own property, not in the name of an
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office. Among such founders were sultans, sultanas, high rank government officials,
local notables, traders, and humble homeowners or even a booklet. Women actively
founded waqfs too, to such an extent that up to 40% of some cities' waqfs were founded
by women (Cizakca 2000).
Founding a waqfwas not a right/obligation restricted to Muslims either. In the Ottoman
Empire, Jews and Christians were equally qualified to make endowments. Initially,
these endowments could not be made to benefit a Jewish or Christian religious
institution, like a church or a synagogue, but this prohibition was later left aside on the
premise that these too would benefit travellers and the poor (Singer 2008, 99). So,
having come into being as a Muslim institution, the waqf's civic features soon
overshadowed any religious content, and the idea was adopted by members of different
faiths. According to Verbit (2002), through various adoptions, the institution travelled
as far as England and gave rise to the institution of the trust.
Over the course of the institution's history, waqf institutions have become an integral
and essential element of urban environments in Muslim geographies. Mosques,
hospitals, schools, soup kitchens, roads, infrastructure, caravanserais, Sufi lodges,
libraries, observatories, scientific laboratories, student inns, scholars' quarters, public
baths, fountains, marketplaces, bazaars ... in short, nearly all public places were built as
waqf and financed by endowments. While in Tabriz in the thirteenth century a complete
neighbourhood housing 30,000 people was built as the waqf of the chemist-statesman
Rashid el-Din (Arjomand 1998), Ottomans used the waqf as an urban development tool
to transform the landscape of newly conquered towns. Various studies have documented
in detail the impact of the waqf in the built environment (see for example Ergin 1953;
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Pinon 1987; Haneda and Miura 1994; Demirel 2000), but the urban function of waqf
was not limited to architecture.
Waqf institutions were an integral part of daily life in Muslim towns. As an economist,
Cizakca (2000), approaches this aspect of the waqf through the supply of public goods,
which are non-rivalrous and maintain non-excludable provisions. He argues that the
waqf was very successful in achieving a steady supply of these goods by effectively
financing public welfare services. A range of professions were sustained by
endowments, like scholars, teachers, doctors, Qur'an reciters, imams, administrative
personnel of all these establishments, their cleaners, porters, drivers and so on.
Moreover, waqf institutions were an integral part of commercial and productive life in
cities as well as in rural areas, since shops in market places, workshops for industry and
the arable land in villages, in most cases, belonged to waqf institutions. Therefore waqf
laws and practices directly affected leases, production and trades.
The waq{ between public and private
The institution of the waqf poses challenges to our modem understanding of the
public/private binary, as well as of self-interestedness and altruism. These challenges
stem from a) the legal property regime of the waqf, b) the intentions ofwaqffounders-
the Arabic word 'waqf" literally means 'to stop' or 'to freeze', pointing to the fact that
endowed goods and properties were once and for all removed from market transactions
and made absolute. They were then seen as belonging to God, upon whom humans had
no claim. In that sense, at least in principle, waqf property was protected against state
confiscation, taxation, inheritance laws (to varying degrees) and market transactions.
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However, there have been many exceptions, including massive confiscations by the
states that were founded after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the beginning of
the twentieth century, as will be discussed in detail.
The second important feature of waqf law was that it considered the expressed desires
and intentions of the founders as being above any other property law. Hence, for
example, founding a waqf made it possible to sidestep Islamic heritage rules. Founders
could endow some of their property as a waqf, and thus take it out of inheritance and
give some beneficiaries privileges. By this method, favoured children, some distant
relatives or freed slaves would be able to benefit from the inheritance. These two
important features have led some scholars to question the authenticity of the charitable
intentions of waqf founders, as waqf endowments could have well been used as a tool to
protect private earnings and property. With these two features in operation
simultaneously, the waqf has been an important financial tool for centuries. Later, it
became customary to make distinctions between waqf institutions that are genuinely
founded with charitable motives and others that simply aim to protect family property.
According to this classification there were two types of waqf: the waqf ahli (family
waqt) and the waqf khayri (charitable waqt), yet in legal terms, a family waqf was no
different from a charitable waqf providing welfare services to the general public. This
distinction was also not possible to uphold in many circumstances, since the exclusive
list of beneficiaries of any family waqf would still end by listing the poor as the final
beneficiaries in the event that the original beneficiaries had died (Cizakca 20 II, 80).
Hence, some of waqfs that had initially been founded as waqf ahlis were gradually
transformed into waqfkhayris over their centuries-long existences. Moreover, almost all
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waqf institutions benefited family members, freed slaves, servants or relatives by
assigning them to trustee positions, as members of the staff or as recipients of revenue,
despite the fact that the main aim of the waqfwas to serve public causes.
Given these ambiguities, it is not easy to maintain this distinction between the family
waqf and the charitable waqf. However, the attempt to do so says something about our
modern desire to establish an absolute separation of public and private interests and
functions. This desire often goes hand in hand with a forgetfulness about the political
dimension of the distinction and by whom it was first made. Amy Singer argues that the
distinction made between the family waqf and the charitable waqf may actually be the
result of criticism the French launched against the waqf system in their colonised
territories. The colonial regime aimed to access land endowed through waqfs for
settlements and to liberate these properties for commercial transactions (Singer 2008,
107). The waqf system was inimical to these goals because it had created a considerable
amount of inalienable property. Thus, to prove that some waqfs served no public
function would have created legitimate grounds for a shift to a private property regime.
The notions of public and private, from the standpoint of ownership and function, are
thus challenged by waqf property law. According to Dallal, '[w]aqf systems duplicate
many of the roles played in the modern states by public, non trading corporations,
religious and charitable foundations and trusts, religious offices and family settlements'
(2004, 28). To complicate the matter a little more, I will now elaborate on how the
intentions of waqf founders make us consider the binaries of public and private, as well
as self-interest and the common good. In their waqf deeds, Ottoman waqf founders
systematically elaborated two sources of motivation for their acts: spiritual development
79
and guaranteeing a good afterlife by being close to God and contributing to the well-
being of the community (Singer 2008, 100). Although the first motivation is oriented
towards the salvation of the self while the second was directed towards public well-
being and relief, these two were neither conflictual nor incompatible, as the concept of
maslaha suggests (see Chapter I). Instead, they complemented each other because they
reflected the conception of the community of believers 'not as an antithesis to the
private individual but as an integral or synthetic component of [an individual's] life as a
Muslim' (Hoexter 2002, 122). Therefore the well-being of the community of believers,
the maintenance of its order according to Islamic principles and morals, and the well-
being of each and every individual who is part of it, contributed to the spiritual progress
of the individual as much as he or she contributed to it; he or she was directly affected
by it.
Certainly the considerations of waqf founders does not have to be limited to their
manifest aims. In particular, monumental waqf works like huge mosque complexes that
involve soup kitchens, schools, public baths and accommodation facilities for students
and staff, bear witness to the prestige, power and piety of their founders (Kayaalp-Aktan
2007). And all these qualities were particularly beneficial for the rulers who could
utilise them to legitimise their rule. If power was necessary for sovereignty over people,
then piety, and hence prestige, were required for one tp establish him- or herself not
only as a powerful and capable ruler but as a 'just' one (Mardin 1991).
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The waqf as a civic institution
The waqf system acted as the main welfare provider in a vast geography for more than a
millennium. Hospitals, soup kitchens, lodges, shelters, orphanages and schools were all
run by waqf institutions (Bonner, Ener, and Singer 2003; Dallal 2004). Moreover, these
institutions provided the poor and destitute allowances of food, clothing and money. It
will be evident later in the chapter that, at the moment, it is this dimension of the waqf
which effectively shapes the imaginary regarding the well-being of society and poverty
alleviation in Turkey. However, the eminence of the waqf is not limited to its vital
importance in welfare provision. The waqf is, once and for all, a civic institution,
intertwining these two functions within itself.
Scholars have approached the waqf as a civic institution, emphasising its various
aspects as a social policy tool, a public sphere agent and as an instantiation of
citizenship. In this section I will outline these formulations. Focusing on waqf
institutions' great potential for social impact, Arjomand (1998) describes their
systematic use as a major instrument of public policy. In his research on the successive
states that have reigned over today's Iran, Arjomand details rulers'-especially Persian-
speaking viziers' and grand viziers '-tactical moves that involve making endowments
towards the teaching of one school of Islam or another, for one sect of Sufism or
another. He also illustrates the different emphases placed on certain sciences, like
astronomy in one period or chemistry in another. Through the waqfs they founded, these
rulers actively shaped the educational and denominational composition of their subjects
and delicately balanced possible tensions between various groups. The public role they
assumed through these endowments was also an expression of the management of
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another tension, namely between the native and established elites of the towns, and the
ruling military classes who were rarely of similar origins. In this context the institution
of the waqf provided the legal and social basis for a civil society that cannot be thought
of as exclusively separate from the state (Arjomand 1998).
Miriam Hoexter's (2002) approach to the waqfhas important parallels with Arjomand's
civil society argument. Hoexter attempts to illustrate how the waqf as a lawful
institution and, as a material and legal entity, is a testament to the existence of a public
sphere in Islamic states throughout history. She grounds her argument in a definition of
the public sphere as 'a zone of autonomous social activity between the family and the
ruling authorities' (p. 119), in a way broader than Western civil society conceptions.
She argues that within the specific constellation of power in Islamic political thought,
waqf institutions have created a realm for the communication of discourse between the
rulers, the community of believers and the Islamic scholars, wherein each party acted in
accordance with a shared understanding of rights and duties. Because the rulers were as
bound by waqf law as any other citizen, members of the public could rightfully and
openly make claims to rights and entitlements. The same principle also initiated a
participatory cooperation between the rulers and local communities on issues such as
welfare provision and urban development. In short, the waqf thus functioned as an
integrative institution wherein shared values were established and maintained between
the people and their rulers.
Isin and Lefebvre approach the waqf as an institutionalised form of 'gift giving [that]
instantiates and organises legal rights and obligations, legal subjectivity, and legal
legitimation' (2005, 6). As such, they see it as a legitimate source of citizenship, to be
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understood beyond Orientalist and Occidentalist conceptualisations. Building on
Derrida (1997), they argue that subjects are implicated in gift-giving practices; that
'they do not pre-exist but are constituted through them' (p. 8). Hence, the waqf as a
civic gift-giving practice creates the subjects that enact and fulfil it. Attributing to the
waqf the quality of being an instantiation of citizenship poses an important challenge to
dominant understandings of citizenship.
As I commented earlier with regard to establishment criteria, the creation of a waqf was
necessarily the act of an individual, and how it would be run was also determined in
detail by that individual. It was the same for the rulers of Islamic states. Sultans,
governors and high officials only established waqfs as individuals, never in the name of
an office or a realm. As Hoexter observes, this would be a practice 'simply unknown to
Islam and unacceptable according to the terms of the law of waqf' (2002, 121). The
waqf is essentially a person's gift to his or her community, city and eventually to God.
Despite being a public act that carries legal, moral and social obligations, this personal
starting point should not be taken lightly, as it provides a clue about the power regime
that symbolises the social order the waqf. This power, however institutionalised,
remains a personal one, enacted within relations of gift-giving. Hence, it is neither
abstracted nor impersonalised like the bureaucratic workings of modem welfare states.
It implies belonging to a polity, having a status within it and acknowledging an
obligation to contribute to that polity as a virtuous member. The religious marking and
value of such an act only adds to its personal aspects.
Containing all these facets, the waqf is both a religious and secular organisation. The
discourse that surrounds it is interwoven with religious imagery and vocabulary, but at
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the same time it is a governmental tool, a citizenship act and the building block of civil
society. Both the reasons behind its establishment and its social functions attest to an
intermeshing of secular and religious values and operatives. It is also a significant
institution of welfare provision, and fulfils this function through gift-giving. It is a
public institution driven by both public and private motives and incentives that are both
religious and secular.
The decline of the waqf
During the nineteenth century, waqf institutions started to lose their importance as
modem bureaucratic apparatuses began to develop. Moreover, the intricate and complex
welfare system that had been upheld and maintained by the institutions had become a
target of detrimental policies. These policies served the ultimate desire to modernise and
Westernise colonised Muslim lands and especially the Ottoman Empire.
lsin (2007) argues that, during the nineteenth century, Western powers insistently asked
for the abolition of the waqf system and the liberation of waqf properties in the Ottoman
Empire. According to him, behind this condition rested a double motivation. The first
was capitalist drive. At the time, almost one-third of all land across the Empire was
withdrawn from market transaction as waqf property. It was viewed as important to
liberate this land and make it accessible to market actors in order to transform modes of
production and circulation in the Empire. So, looking for new landscapes to expand
their markets for raw materials and products, Western colonisers urged these properties
to be alienated. Second, the project of abolishment was driven by ideas and ideologies
about nation-state building and citizenship. Citizenship then began to be understood as
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membership to a state with well-defined geographical borders and an identifiable
population, a member that has both rights and duties towards the state itself.
Intermediary institutions, such as guilds in Europe and waqfs in Muslim societies, were
seen as aberrations unwilling to recognise the validity of any other institution that
presumed to come between states and individuals. Citizenship in centralised nation-
states ties each and every individual to the state, and more importantly, is expected to
tear apart all other belongings, identifications, sources of rights and loyalties. On the
contrary, waqfs were themselves sources of legal subjectivities, local connections, and
lasting relations of gratefulness and reciprocity.
Colonial regimes, as a general trend, are marked with such dislocations. Manuel de
Landa (1997) argues that colonialism was not only about extracting resources and
transferring wealth. He describes how colonisers aimed to copy their own institutions
and governmental models in the geographies they colonised. This required either
ignoring and wiping out (as in the case of indigenous peoples of the Americas) or
changing the already-existing systems of land distribution, production, finance and
governance. All these local systems and institutions were labelled backward, non-
modem and as impediments to progress. Seen as a stumbling block of colonisation, they
were better off replaced by Western institutions. Although the Ottoman Empire
occupies an ambiguous place in the history of colonisation, its encounter with colonisers
included similar efforts. The Ottoman property regime, taxation system and waqf
institution became targets of these policies (S. Pamuk 1987).
When it comes to creating copies of certain institutions, colonisers were never alone.
Almost all around the world Westernised elites of their respective colonies were more
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than willing to dislocate local arrangements and establish modem systems. Bureaucrats
of the late Ottoman Empire became convinced of the drawbacks of the waqf system, so
implemented such policies eagerly. Still, the abolishment of the waqf system did not
happen instantaneously, given its entrenchment in society and sacred status. In Turkey,
it took almost a century for the nationalist and secularist modernisers to tear the system
down. First came centralisation, which deprived the waqfs from their financial and
administrative autonomy. All waqfs in the Empire were moved under the rule of the
newly established Waqfs Ministry in 1836 (Cizakca 2000). The ministry was charged
with collecting all waqf revenue and redistributing a designated portion back to it.
Centralisation caused an immediate decline in the establishment of new waqfs and
crippled the already existing ones by causing a shortage of resources.
The second attack to the system came in the form of taxation. Waqf institutions had
been enjoying tax exemptions due to the Islamic legal base that recognised them as
property endowed to and owned by God. In 1860, after the Crimean War, the British
government posed the condition of abolishment of the waqf system, in response to the
Ottoman government's request for a loan (Cizakca 2000). It was not possible to abolish
the system completely but, in 1867, for the first time in history, waqf institutions were
made to pay taxes to the state. According to lsin (2007), this was not simply a financial
decision aimed at reducing the budget deficit and contributing to the payment of foreign
debt, but also an important move towards secularising the state and its framework of
citizenship. He argues, ' ... the secularisation of waqf administration practically
displaced waqfs as an institution of virtue, a gift to the city and God, and thus exempt
from taxation, and dissolved it into a state service. With the 1867 tax law, the ground on
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which the massive secularisation of the early republic would be built on was
established' (p. 10).
During the second part of the nineteenth century the waqf system continued to lose
power and importance. The Empire's loss of territories had a catastrophic effect on waqf
institutions, as it also meant the loss of revenue-regenerating waqf land. During the
chaotic years of World War I and the subsequent Greco- Turkish War the abolishment
project was held aside for a period. The new Turkish Republican government then made
a last move to eliminate all traces of the previous welfare regime by confiscating the
great majority of waqf properties. With this move, the perpetuity principle was
irretrievably damaged and most waqf property was sold or nationalised. In 1926, the
Civil Law introduced the term 'tesis', simply meaning establishment, in order to
designate endowments for a specific purpose, and wiped the legal system off the term
waqf completely. Waqf then became a term used to refer to the remnants of Ottoman
waqfs that had been centralised and confiscated, and also to waqf institutions belonging
to non-Muslim minorities protected by international agreements. Only after 1967, with a
change to the Civil Law, was the term tesis (establishment) replaced by vakif, and the
foundation of new vakifs was made possible, albeit without the institution's religious
character and the principle of perpetuity, due to the secularist foundations of the
Republic.
Yet, despite all attempts to secularise and centralise it, the waqf as a regulative ideal and
an important element of the social imaginary has survived. With its religious,
personalistic and public undertories, it is this ideal that still resonates between the
discourse of politicians and the acts of benefactors in the contested realm of welfare
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provision III Turkey. It is also this ideal that feeds into the vernacular vocabulary
developed by Kayseri charity workers, such as the neologism vakifci as a term of self-
identification denoting anyone who personally and systematically aides and cares for
others. The idea of the waqf is also alive in the state discourse around providing for its
poor citizens, to such a degree that the state inserts itself into this arena by founding
waqf institutions of an interesting sort. Understanding the creation of these state vakifs
requires a brief introduction to the Turkish welfare system. In the next section I will
provide this background information.
The Welfare Regime of the Turkish Republic
In Turkey, the first three decades of the Republic were a period of authoritarian, single-
party rule, during which, the state tried to consolidate itself. Within its newly drawn
borders lived a mostly agrarian, war-ridden and poverty-stricken population, only 24.4
per cent of which resided in urban environments (Bugra 2007, footnote number 25). Yet
the strong and even sometimes forceful aspiration of modernisation enacted by the
founders of the Republic did not include attempts to increase the rate of urbanisation.
According to Bugra, this was indicative of a deliberate attempt to contain poverty and
'backwardness' in the villages (2007, 39). This policy required the creation of workers
whose village origins would remain intact and without permitting their migration to
cities. Factory compounds were established all around the country, most often in
locations far away from cities, usually with their own dormitories, where workers were
first introduced to 'modem life'. These workers were recruited from nearby villages,
and as they usually had their families still residing there, they maintained close ties with
their places of origin. The livelihoods of these peasant-workers and their households
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mostly depended on agricultural production. Bugra identifies this policy with the
peasantist ideologies of the early Republic. This ideology was made appealing to the
peasants themselves through tax exemptions and various state subsidies. In short, the
fiscal and labour-related policies, enacted together, proved successful in keeping rural
populations immobilised and containing poverty in the countryside until single-party
rule ended in 1950. With the exception of the industrial workers, villagers had no health
insurance or social citizenship rights.
Yet during the 1940s, the last decade of the single-party rule, other developments in the
realm of social citizenship were enacted. First, the Social Security Organisation for
formal sector workers (SSK) was established in 1945, and second, various retirement
schemes for civil servants were gathered under the roof of the Retirement Chest (Emekli
Sand,gl) in 1949. These two organisations, along with another scheme established in
1971 for the self-employed-including agricultural workers (Bag-Kur}--would then
form the corporatist three-tier welfare system of the second half of the century. Yet, in
these early years, as well as through the end of the century, the SSK and Retirement
Chest covered only a small minority of the working population, let alone those who
were not working but were in need of social assistance.
Gradually, formal social welfare mechanisms in Turkey grew into an inegalitarian
corporatism with a hierarchy of pensions and health care among the working population
(Bugra and Keyder 2006). Corporatism is a hierarchical welfare system that treats
various elements of the working population differently under an assortment of welfare
schemes (Esping-Andersen 1990). The trademark of this system is the special privileges
civil servants get as an award for their loyalty to the state. In Turkey too, the three-tier
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social security system consisting of the Retirement Chest for state employees, SSK for
workers and Bag-Kur for the self-employed favoured civil servants in terms of benefits,
pensions and health care. Also, all three of these separate schemes were premium-based
and left more than fifty per cent of the working population (i.e. informal workers) and
those who are not eligible to work, uncovered (Bugra and Keyder 2003).
According to the report Bugra and Keyder prepared for the United Nations
Development Programme (2003), the Turkish welfare regime can best be understood in
comparison with the regimes of Southern European countries. These regimes are
characterised by a labour market structure in which self-employment and family
workers are prevalent; a large portion of the labour and other economic activity goes
undocumented; the social security system is corporatist; there is an almost total absence
of formal policy against poverty; and the importance of family, local governments and
networks in increasing the livelihood of individuals is at social risk (Saraceno 2002;
Bugra and Keyder 2003).
Both in other Southern European countries and in Turkey a significant transformation
along more universalistic and egalitarian lines has recently begun. In Turkey one of
these recent developments was the introduction of the unemployment wage in 1999 for
those who have accumulated a certain level of premiums in the system. The three-tier
system was then abolished and all schemes were brought under the roof of the Social
Security Institution (SGK) in 2006. The establishment of the SGK first eliminated
inequalities in the realm of healthcare provision to different scheme members: all
hospitals, including participating private ones, were opened to the working population,
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pensioners and their dependents. Second, all children under the age of 18 were granted
access to universal healthcare.
Welfare provision to those who are not covered by the social security system is a whole
different story. The Green Card scheme, introduced in 1992, gave this large portion of
the population access to healthcare services. Gradually the number of Green Card
holders reached almost 20% of the population and exceeded the number of SGK
members in some impoverished provinces. When the Green Card Scheme was
terminated and all cardholders were transferred to the General Health Insurance Scheme
by the end of 2011, 9.5 million cardholders' medical needs were being met by public
funds (SGK 2011). Minimal monetary assistance to 'poor and needy' citizens over 65
years of age began in 1976, but disability and career benefits only began in 2005. All
these benefits are financed by the Social Security Institution but the eligibility of
individual beneficiaries is at the discretion of Social Solidarity Vaktfs in every province
and district.
Social Solidarity Vakifs
Apart from these monthly benefits schemes, most social assistance schemes are
financed and administered by the Fund for the Encouragement of Social Cooperation
and Solidarity (Sosyal Yardtmlasma ve Dayantsmayt Tesvik Fonu), which reports
directly to the prime minister and operates in provinces and districts via state-founded
Social Solidarity Vakifs. At the moment, there are 931 Social Solidarity Vakifs located
in town halls all around Turkey. The trustees of each vakif consist of the provincial
governor or the district governor, the mayor, the highest Ministry of Health and
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Ministry of Education officials, the chair of the Social Services and Child Welfare
Directorate and three notable citizens. This board of trustees is responsible for assessing
and selecting those who are in need of assistance, and to manage the funds they
regularly receive from the Fund. They also determine who will receive old age or
disability benefits. Although established in 1986, the Fund became important in poverty
alleviation during the second half of the 90s, yet it was at the beginning of the 2000s
that its budget and reach began to be significant. In 2001, the Solidarity Fund's budget
was 486 million Turkish Lira (£234 million), and it has provided support and relief to
over 9 million citizens (Bugra and Keyder 2003). Coming to 2009, the Fund's
expenditures began to exceeded its income, reaching and has reached to 2,365 million
TL (£1,020 million), out of which 500 million TL (£215 million) is used for transfers
made to the Ministries of Education and Health for their own social assistance schemes
(like free meals for students at rural schools or the Green Card Scheme), while the rest
was used for the vakifs' own social assistance expenditures (SYDGM 2010). The
assistance activities of these vakifs include provision of cash allowances; food, clothes
and coal supply; coverage of extraordinary medical costs that fall outside the Green
Card Scheme; running soup kitchens and providing disaster relief.
Initially, Social Solidarity Vakifs were expected to receive donations from persons and
from the private sector alongside their public funding. This way, they would have had
autonomy and fulfilled the function of creating solidarity, as the name suggests. But the
donations have fallen short of expected levels, and at the moment vakifs are almost
solely dependent on public resources (Acar 2009). There is only one significant donor
to the fund though: the World Bank. After the catastrophic financial crisis of 2001, the
World Bank began allocating resources for conditional cash transfers to be distributed
92
through Social Solidarity Vakifs. Transfers are tied to school attendance and regular
health checks for pregnant women and their newborns, in accordance with World Bank
policies; the responsibilities of the vakifs are only procedural.
Local Social Solidarity Vakifs have relative control over their resources that are not tied
to such strict schemes, but they do not have the autonomy to invest their income in
revenue-generating activities, as ordinary vakifs can lawfully do. The majority of their
boards of trustees consist of appointed bureaucrats, and these bureaucrats act like agents
of distribution for centrally allocated funds. Boards have a few members from the civil
sector-local notables reputed to have expertise about the needs of the poor-yet, at
least in Kayseri, these members act only as advisers to be heard from once in a while.
The real decision-making powers lie in the hands of the governor, who makes decisions
regarding allocation and also decides the criteria for assistance. But again, given his
official position, he lacks the autonomy to shape the vakif as a waqf founder should be
able do. Practically, Social Solidarity Vakifs are no different from local Social Services
or Healthcare Directorates, spending centrally allocated resources on centrally
determined tasks.
As discussed earlier, waqf institutions are by definition founded by persons, and for a
waqf to be established in the name of an office or as part of central state mechanisms is
unheard of. In that sense, Social Solidarity Vakifs, as state-founded, impersonal
redistribution tools, are an aberration. Given their current operations, it is also hard to
suggest that they function like awaqf at all. So the choice of designation for an
institution of this type and legal status is truly striking. Why would a state claiming to
be a modem welfare state choose a gift-giving institution to regulate its welfare
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provision activities, even though in practice it does not want to relegate any autonomous
entity? The answer to this question is hidden in the social imaginary that defines
legitimate and socially approved ways of providing aid and welfare in Turkey. The
Turkish state, after a long fight against the institution and a decent amount of effort to
create modem and Westernised ties between itself and its citizens, entered the welfare
arena the only way it historically knows how: the waqf. These state vakifs show us how
entrenched the institution is and how strong the imaginary of caring for needy members
of society through civic initiatives. In its first attempt at being an inclusive social
welfare state, the Turkish Republic resorted to the very social citizenship institution it
had aimed to abolish.
Welfare Provision as a Personal Act
Social Solidarity Vakifs illustrate how the institution of the waqf and its historical
functions haunt the Turkish state on matters of social citizenship. When the welfare of
its citizens became an issue to be tackled, the social and institutional memory of the
state came up with the same system that had fulfilled similar needs for centuries. Even
though the end product is far from loyal to the essential features of the waqf, this
institutional choice is still indicative that it is alive in the imaginary. In this final section
I will delve into the matter a little more and try to trace a certain characteristic of the
waqf in today's welfare politics. I will also briefly describe a historical period with
which we can draw some parallels and observe the same characteristics at work.
In his speech on 25 December 2007 about the distribution of coal to families in need,
Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said, 'My esteemed Governor, my esteemed Provincial
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Governor, you need to get on the truck, take the driver's seat, and go there if need be.
You ring the doorbell and hand out the coal and the stove yourself. The day you do that,
Turkey shall fly high' (AKP lletisirn Merkezi 2012). He has repeated the same
sentences in various contexts, sometimes in criticism of the self-conception of the state
and bureaucracy, other times while introducing new policies, but always to point out a
transformation in the state structure, as well as the image of the state in Turkey. The
figure of the centrally appointed governor who does not hesitate to enter the house of a
poor family, who serves people personally, who shows up in the most deprived parts of
cities as the representative of the benevolent state and as a person with compassion for
the inhabitants of those neighbourhoods has been positioned, in Erdogan's speeches, in
direct contrast with the faceless bureaucrat who feels no personal responsibility to the
people, who does not leave, as he put it, 'his ivory tower' to see the extent of the
poverty all around; a representative of a state which is itself distant, detached,
oppressive, and even hostile.
Erdogan's words not only reveal an acknowledgement of state's responsibility towards
maintaining the welfare of its citizens, but also prescribes a very specific way of
performing this duty: gift-giving. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the coal to be
distributed by the local governors is actually among the holdings of the Social Solidarity
Vakifs in very town. The personalistic aspect of the waqf as an institution of gift-giving
allows and informs governors to be personally involved in their operations. The
language of the gift colours the discourse of welfare in many ways. Erdogan is not the
first political figure to employ this language when presenting a welfare provision,
neither is he the only one criticised for it. Right after the Ottoman welfare regime that
had been built around the institution was made obsolete, the Ottoman Sultan
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Abdulhamid II established a similarly personalistic welfare regime. His example may
provide insight into the developments of today.
Nadir Ozbek (2002) provides an analysis of welfare and social state policies in the
Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) and the subsequent Mesrutiyet (Constitutional Monarchy,
1908-1918) eras. By placing these two time periods within the same framework, he
goes against the conventional views of Ottoman History, that Abdulhamid and
Mesrutiyet mark two totally separate, indeed contrasting eras with distinct dominant
ideals, power regimes, aspirations and political climates. In most accounts, the
Abdulhamid era is described with terms like stagnancy, backwardness and
conservatism, while Mesrutiyet is characterised with the feeling of dynamic
modernisation (see for example Berkes 1964). Ozbek rather argues that these two
epochs of the Ottoman Empire are indicative of continuity in the path towards
modernisation, and in the construction of the modem state as being responsible for the
welfare of the population. The waqf system had already been made obsolete before
Abdulhamid, so in his wide-ranging welfare provision, other models and systems were
used, just as in the Mesrutiyet era. But there is also a breach, a rupture that, I argue, still
marks our discussions about welfare. This rupture is not institutional, but discursive and
related to a shift of imaginary.
According to Ozbek, Abdulhamid's welfare regime had a personalistic and benevolent
appearance despite the fact that it did not make much use of the waqf. These aspects of
his welfare provision helped him create and maintain the legitimacy of his 33-year
reign. This particular regime relied not only on the personal charity of the sultan but
also on the mass mobilisation Abdulhamid personally triggered to provide for the
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population. Schools were built in the remotest villages, the first poor house/shelter of
the Empire was founded, as was a well-equipped modern children's hospital. Charities
of all sorts that were affiliated with various ethnic and religious groups flourished with
the support of the sultan. Mass circumcision ceremonies were held in Istanbul for the
sons of the urban poor, while Abdulhamid himself sent presents to the new graduates of
primary schools in provincial towns. A welfare benefit/income support wage (Maas-t
Fukara) was issued to help the poor, who were not considered to be fallen or degraded
in moral terms, but simply in need of help to survive. This complicated system of
welfare effectively bypassed any impersonal bureaucracy and maintained its personal
outlook until the end.
As I have mentioned, Abdulhamid, unlike his predecessors, did not establish waqf
institutions to execute his public duties. With the system centralised and financially
crippled, his choice does not necessarily reflect a shared disdain towards the institution
on his part; quite the contrary, it might be read as bypassing bureaucracy to carry on
with two important features of the waqf: its personalistic element and its autonomy.
Ozbek argues that this particular strategy of power 'resulted in the "over-
personalization" of rulership in the Ottoman Empire', which came to mean carrying on
the personal, paternalistic and unbureaucratic aspect of the monarchy (2003, 206).
When the suspended parliament finally started to work again and the constitutional
monarchy was declared in 1908, one of the first actions taken was against this complex
system of welfare, which was seen as a source of legitimacy and popular support for the
sultan. Financial resources were cut. all separately maintained and supported welfare
institutions (like hospitals, shelters, orphanages) were nationalised/centralised. various
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laws were issued to criminalise begging and idleness among the poor and the entire
welfare system was bureaucratised. Aspirations for modernisation were present during
both regimes, although Mesrutiyet governments differed from Abdulhamid's reign in
that their search for legitimacy occurred increasingly with reference to the nation, in
resonance with the bureaucratic secular nation-state formations in the West. Secular
Republican ideals implying a reliance on personal sovereignty and representational
democracy could not tolerate the informal, personalistic and religiously expressed
welfare regime of the Abdulhamid era. With very little in the way of resources in the
war-ridden country and separatist movements all over the Empire, in effect, this did not
represent the replacement of one system with another but the loss of the actual welfare
establishments.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman state was trying to
establish itself as a modem (perceived as Western) state responsible for the well-being
of its citizens and therefore the sole provider of social services (Ozbek 2002). But the
personalistic aspect of the waqf survived into this period, even when the institution was
paralysed. Although waqfs were no longer being established, Ottoman rulers like
Abdulhamid and notables continued investing in civic gifts for welfare provision, which
were to be known as personal endowments. These gifts did not connect the populations
to their rulers in the terms of modem citizenship but through relations of reciprocity.
They therefore relied on an understanding of both rulers and citizens as persons rather
than as representatives of an impersonal state office and the faceless masses comprising
a population to be governed.
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Coming back to Erdogan, we can observe a reference to this particular notion of rulers
and citizens, between whom gift is a primary mechanism of legitimation, and being a
'just' ruler is an important criterion of this legitimacy. Erdogan and 'his governors'
provide welfare services within terms of gift relations and revitalise certain aspects of
the waqf as institutionalised gift-giving. This is not to argue that Erdogan makes a
deliberate effort to find out about these features and revive the institution; instead, he is
operating in a terrain of terms and solutions that are readily available to him. The
imaginary that has developed around the institution of waqf, which is itself a form of
gift-giving, haunts available discourses, vocabulary and horizons of imagination.
Conclusion
An institutional way of showing the responsibilities of citizenship and endowing the
polity, the waqf tells us about ways of understanding welfare provision that are not
necessarily limited to the market or the state. It is better understood through the lens of
gift-giving, and in this institutionalised form waqf interpellates the givers (lsin 2005). It
therefore outlines the framework for legitimate and socially appropriate ways of giving,
and creates legal and socially recognisable subjects. Waqf founders, workers,
benefactors, and beneficiaries are all situated within this framework and thus have
certain accompanying entitlements and responsibilities. In that sense the waqf is both a
source of social citizenship and a tool of welfare provision.
In this chapter I have focused my interest in particular on two features of the waqf. The
first is its indifference to distinctions made between public and private. I have argued
that the institution blurs the boundaries between self-interest and the public benefit,
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salvation of the soul and the well-being of the community; or better said, it interweaves
these strands into an institutional and legal form. The second feature that has found
emphasis in this chapter is its nature as personal endowment. The waqf is built on
personalistic relations that situate human beings not as anonymous individuals
assembled as a population, but as persons with well-defined positions in society. The
importance of this feature will once again come to the surface when I discuss the
significance of networks in Chapter 5.
In the second half of this chapter, I focused my interest on the contemporary apparitions
of the waqf in the welfare scene of Turkey. I suggested that, consciously or not, the
waqf's characteristic features haunt the discourses and practices of those who are
involved in welfare provision in Turkey. However it is important to note that this
account is specific to the Turkish case and does not necessarily apply anywhere else the
institution of waqf has existed as a structural element of public life. In the Arab
countries, for example, Jawad argues that the waqf 'is but a spectre of its former self in
terms of its social orientation towards public benefit' (2009b, 49), because centralisation
and confiscation had taken place contemporaneously across the Ottoman Empire. Yet
elsewhere, for example in Bangladesh, the waqf system is still functioning, and nearly
all mosques and religious establishments in the country stand on endowed land (Sadeq
2002, 141). In Palestine, though, the institution recently acquired a completely new and
radically political meaning when 'Hamas expanded the meaning of waqf to include an
entire land with well-delimited territorial boundaries-historic Palestine, from the River
to the Sea' (Aburaiya 2009, 63). With this move Hamas claimed that Palestinian land
does not belong to its present occupier but to God, and therefore to Muslim generations
to follow. All these examples illustrate that the present day condition of the waqf as an
100
institution and as an imaginary varies greatly among predominantly Muslim countries,
let alone those with Muslim minorities, and a comprehensive study to investigate the
issue transnationally is very much needed.
The waqf's significance stems from the fact that all these discourses and practices pose
a significant challenge to the all-or-nothing approaches that dominate recent welfare
discussions. The waqf introduces the concept of the gift back into political economy,
which is often thought of in terms of commodity transaction and redistribution. In the
coming chapters, I will direct my interest to daily practices of contemporary vakifs in a





Throughout this research my main method of inquiry has been ethnography. Equipped
with its methodological tools, I completed extensive participant observation at three
vakifs in Kayseri. I spent a total of eight months in two phases between August 2008
and August 2009, working in these organisations, and joining their workers both in the
work environment and outside it. My aim was to be as close as possible to the actors
who play the intermediary role between donors and beneficiaries in order to be able to
observe the minute details of decision-making, registering, giving and receiving. This
chapter will disclose the particulars of this experience, as well as the tensions that
accompanied the process.
Doing ethnography means paying 'attention to the contingent ways in which all social
categories emerge, become naturalised, and intersect in people's conception of
themselves and their world, and further, an emphasis on how these categories are
produced through everyday practice' (Rofel 1994, 703). My aim throughout the
ethnographic fieldwork was to grasp the social categories and recurring practices that
emerge during encounters surrounding welfare provision in the setting of Kayseri
vakifs. Ethnography granted me close contact, a gradually educated eye and various
opportunities to use my whole body as a learning tool. I preferred ethnography over
other qualitative data collection methods, such as surveys, interviews, or video-
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recordings, because only ethnography made such proximity attainable. Ethnographic
findings linger between the natives' view and the researcher's analytic deductions, and
this is what makes it a superior methodological tool if the researcher aims to focus on
practice more than discourse.
Ethnographic method (in this case its most well-known subsect: participant observation)
presumes that prolonged day-to-day contact with any cultural phenomenon is the best
way to understand it. Being alert to everything happening in a setting without
dismissing the most ordinary, the most that-goes-without-saying features of daily
occurrence-rather paying particular attention to them to understand the most mundane
operations of culture/power-are key to ethnography. To put it more eloquently with a
quote from Clifford Geertz,
The important thing about the anthropologist's findings is their complex
specificness, their circumstantiality. It is with the kind of material
produced by long-term, mainly (though not exclusively) qualitative,
highly participative, and almost obsessively fine-comb field study in
confined contexts that the mega-concepts with which contemporary
social science is afflicted-legitimacy, modernisation, integration,
conflict, charisma, structure.. . meaning--can be given the sort of
sensible actuality that makes it possible to think not only realistically and
concretely about them, but, what is more important, creatively and
imaginatively with them. (1975, 23)
Approaching ethnography in this way, as a creative and imaginative task undertaken in
collaboration with research participants, is rejecting the assumption of any transparent
transcription of culture; I recognise that ethnography is a practice of 'writing culture',
making, interpreting and fixing it (Clifford and Marcus 1986). I also recognise that
ethnographic practice and writing have to be aware of their own location and
relatedness to the world, the awareness itself reflecting some of the symbolic and
structural positioning of all human subjects, all human experience. And also as an
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inscription practice, writing ethnographic accounts is a continuation of fieldwork rather
than a transparent record of past experiences in the field. Writing in general is itself a
method of inquiry (Richardson 2000), and ethnography in particular is inquiry through
'thick description' (Geertz 1975). Any description is a description done by someone,
and therefore tells not only about the occasion/setting described but also about the
enquirer, the narrator. The narrator's/ethnographer's gaze is immanent in the description
but subject to change, to be re-located by what is seen and what is learned. What then is
at stake is a continuous deconstruction and remaking of the researcher's position,
negotiating it with informants and destabilising it throughout the process (Rose 1997).
Therefore, methodological choices in ethnographic studies are unavoidably affected by
the shifting positioning of the researcher. In the next section, I will discuss the
significance of my own position on the research project I have undertaken. The focus of
the discussion will be on issues of being an insider or an outsider, or better said, the
conditions and predicaments of strangeness.
The Perils of the Inside
The advantages and disadvantages of being an insider to the culture and people studied
is a well-explored theme in anthropology (Headland et al. 1990; Al-Makhamreh and
Lewando-Hundt 2008; Behar 1997). A critique of the simplistic assumption that being
an insider leads to a more subjective account while being an outsider guarantees
objectivity is also very well developed (see for example Peirano 1998; Labaree 2002).
In this section, my aim is not to produce another account to illustrate how these
assumptions can be challenged by ethnographic experience. Instead my question
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addresses the assumed contrast of the insider versus the outsider itself: How can we
determine whether a person is an insider to a culture or an outsider? Does shared
religion or nationality automatically qualify one as an insider? Or, are the qualifications
that lead to admission much more complex and numerous than these?
At first sight, a Turkish woman, born and raised as a Muslim, could well be assumed to
be an insider in a religiously conservative Anatolian town. Yet, this was true for me
only to a certain extent. Certainly, I knew the language spoken in Kayseri to a level of
perfection, which allowed me great ease both in participation and observation; and I was
well equipped with the religious and cultural codes to help me navigate the field without
creating great disturbances. Yet in many other matters, I was a total stranger-strange
and foreign in more than one respect. I was an anomaly as a married woman travelling
and living alone. My husband was a thousand kilometres away, working on his own
project. My research participants incessantly asked me why I had not accompanied him
to wherever he was. At least he could have been around to keep an eye on me. But he
only came to Kayseri once and only because I deeply felt the need to prove that he
really existed. I was also an anomaly as a student at the age of 29, well beyond the
normal graduation age. People were also suspicious about my lighter colouring, who
could have easily passed as a white European. All in aliI was not easily assigned to the
category of' one of us' .
Besides being seen as a stranger I was actually feeling truly strange myself too. Kayseri,
a city of tall concrete buildings, large boulevards, poor public transportation--
especially in the evenings-and of very few places to go out on your own was a lot
more foreign to me than London. Being socialised in certain ways in metropolitan
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environments, the home-centred life in Kayseri depressed me to a great degree. This
sense of alienation was doubled given that I did not actually have a home or any friends
there. So most evenings, after the people I interacted with as part of my fieldwork had
gone to their families and moved onto another phase of human interaction, I was bound
to my room, sitting alone with my notebook, laptop and TV, with five or six hours to
pass before going to bed. The life I lived in Kayseri was one of an outsider, having
nothing to contribute when people shared the events of the evening before, stories about
their guests or their children's troubles. My life outside fieldwork was a void with the
exception of a few phone calls and painfully long hours spent in front of a computer
screen, taking field notes and doing transcriptions. Gradually, however, I overcame this
strangeness-both in the eyes of others and within myself.-but only to a degree. Still, it
was enough to gain a Bourdieuian 'practical sense', a sense of the game.
When I went to Kayseri my initial contacts were acquaintances of my mother, who had
visited the town to give a talk in 2002. She was invited by a friend of hers, the late
Nevin Akyurt, who had been a very prominent figure in the field of beneficence in
Kayseri, and who will be a subject of discussion later in this thesis too. To these early
contacts I was so-and-so's daughter who chose Kayseri to do her research. But for the
great majority of the people I worked with I was simply a young woman who had come
from London with a vaguely defined task called 'research'. Kayseri had had visitors
from European countries in the form of journalists and businessmen, but I did not
belong to either of these categories and the way I wanted to conduct my research was
unlike the way journalists prepared their stories. Namely, I was not particularly
interested in meeting town notables or learning the secrets to the city's industrial
success. So who was I?
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It is very common in Turkey to think believe others to be spies. Some state officials 1
met with were self-confident enough to ask openly whether it was the British
government that had asked me to conduct this research. 'I am funded by a British
university but I chose my own topic and this is my project', 1 replied. They were so
unsatisfied with this answer that they did not even bother to discuss it any further. I was
even recorded in the phone book of a middle-aged man as 'the British Spy' only half
ironically. He had a particular talent for figuring out people's insecurities and playing
on them; mine was easy to guess, and he kept pushing that button. I remember one
particularly embarrassing incident: He was the director of one of the important vakifs of
the city and his organisation was invited to a collaborative meeting at the governor's
office, along with some others. He kindly invited me to join them and observe the
meeting and I happily accepted, until after the meeting, he introduced me to the director
of another organisation just like this: 'This blonde lady has come from England to
research us.' I rushed to get hold of the conversation and started to explain what I was
doing there, but as 1was mumbling about my research topic this guy persisted with his
witty comments: 'See how good her Turkish is! She is really well trained!' I was now a
British spy good enough at Turkish to pretend to be Turkish ... I gave up and laughed
the situation off, hoping to find another chance to meet with this other director.
Although most of it was mockery there was certainly an element of sincere distrust
embedded in this incident and its subtler likes.
So I found myself in a setting where everybody approached me politely, but always
with reservation. On the extreme I was seen as a spy, but most often I was simply a
stranger and as a result, a source of suspicion. My attempts to overcome this by talking
about my project describing my life and myself were usually received with polite nods.
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which did little for my peace of mind. Yet I eventually established very solid, reliable
and enriching relations with many of the people working and volunteering at vakifs.
Looking back, I figure that if half of this accomplishment was owed to long-term
contact, the other half at least had something to do with my own readiness to change
and viscerally learn the subtle codes of their behaviour.
As my research methodology involved volunteering at vakifs and taking part in their
activities, I slowly learnt the grammar of vakif workers' ethos, their vocabulary, idioms
and more importantly the pillars of argumentation about what was just and what was
unjust. So I began making sound comments about daily events and challenging opinions
that I did not agree with, within this vocabulary. I began speaking their language. Yet,
acquiring the language skills to operate within that ethos was certainly not the hardest
task nor the most valuable asset. Rather, I would say, my bodily and habitual formation
affected my relationship with the men and women of these organisations more than
anything.
In order to clarify this point I may recount a particular day at Erciyes Feneri. It was one
of the clothing distribution days in December 2008. During this period Erciyes Feneri
staff and volunteers were working round the clock and at weekends to be able to supply
all registered beneficiaries with new clothes before the approaching religious festivities.
Erciyes Feneri clothes distributions normally took place twice or three times a year, and
provided the setting for the organisation's most intimate contact between volunteers,
workers and beneficiaries. The idea was to invite the beneficiaries and all members of
their households so that everybody would receive apparel suitable to their sizes and
tastes. Because serving 40-50 families a day was a laborious task, and also because
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female beneficiaries would not want to discuss their sizes and styles with male workers,
the organisations' female volunteers were very active during these periods.
Until that day I had always been welcome at female volunteers' meetings, but I still
occupied a rather strange position among them and was not necessarily invited to work
with them. So when I offered my weekends to help during distribution they didn't add
my name to the list of volunteers but did tell me I would be welcome. I went. My
months of volunteering at Erciyes Feneri had actually made me more knowledgeable
about the whereabouts of certain items than many other female volunteers, so after a
while, they assigned me the task of finding correct shoe sizes for beneficiaries. I found
shoes, asked if they liked them and helped them try the shoes on. Later, during the lunch
break, when I approached the back room where volunteer women gathered to eat, I
overheard them talking about me. One was saying, with apparent surprise: 'Have you
seen how this girl from London touched the dirty, muddy feet of those kids? She was
smiling and chatting with them all time!' The others concurred with the assessment of
how extraordinary the situation was, certainly to my surprise. When I entered the room
they stopped the conversation but welcomed me with visible congeniality and
appreciation. All through the preceding months, I had been observed, assessed and now
finally accepted with the help of a pair of tiny muddy feet. These little feet became the
signs of my conformity to their norms and values, and hence a shared ethical stance.
The incident during the clothes distribution was actually a misreading on the part of the
volunteers. What they interpreted as a hallmark of my transformation to become like
them was quite an ordinary act for me. My physical boundaries had been differently
shaped, and touching the muddy foot of a child would not be the source of disturbance
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for me under any conditions. Nevertheless, I appreciated realising that I had finally met
their expectations and standards to be let in. What had made rapport and intimacy
between us possible was not my verbal explanations, but my bodily reactions, which
illustrated how much I had become like them.
Therefore, I can contend that overcoming my strangeness required an effort not only to
be seen as one of them but also to really become one of them. I had chosen to put
forward this effort partly because of my need for acceptance, but more importantly
because of its methodological value and relevance. When I went to Kayseri, informed
by critical anthropologists (Altorki 1988; Abu-Lughod 1999; Mahmood 2005) and
feminist scholars (Stanley and Wise 1993; Cixous 1996; Weedon 1997), I was
determined to foster such a level of intimacy that I would understand the processes
involved in the self-formation of my research participants through my own experience
of these processes. Developing this intimacy meant rendering myself docile and letting
my body learn the codes.
In the final chapter I explore the ethical transformation of the women and men who take
part in the activities of charitable organisations in Kayseri. There I argue that ethical
transformation has an intrinsic bodily aspect and, in some instances, it is actually this
that precedes the intention of transformation. This embodied transformation requires a
level of docility that gives subjects' bodies plasticity and malleability. Docility and
ethical self-formation, as such, do not only present theoretical and empirical aspects of
this project. Instead, they signify important research processes. In Kayseri I also
experienced a transformation, a very particular self-formation, one certainly resembling
that of the people about whom I write.
III
Looking back now, I can see the docility with which I rendered myself to the people I
admired and respected there. I let them affect me, shape my attitudes, and teach me by
setting an example. I also disciplined myself by trying, sometimes very hard, to act like
the person I wanted to become. So for me, just like them, working there was part of an
ethical self-formation. And just like them again, I got tired, I had regrets, I developed
conflicting attitudes and thought over and over again about my reactions. I pushed
myself to be more patient when J felt the urge to scold somebody for a mistake. I had to
struggle to keep my smile intact and my attitude always genial after ten hours of hard
work. I had to act with humility in order to gain humility-in order to be humble, not
the other way around. J personally experienced the hardship involved, especially the
hardship of sustaining behaviour while consciously or unconsciously waiting to change.
This attitude was my response to a combination the expectations of the people I worked
with and my own research strategy. The expectations were there for those who knew my
mother, even if barely. She was a good reference for me at the beginning but at the same
time in their eyes she set the standard for my moral and societal standing. It took me a
while to be known with my own name, not just as so-and-so's daughter. But more
importantly, as I said, I was eager to walk the way they led me, to be perceptive as a
child and responsive as a disciple because while doing ethnography, I figured that my
research tools were not limited to my sound recorder, notebook and cognitive skills. My
body could be a tool too and its capacities were not limited to seeing and listening. It
could teach me a great deal if I chose to be adaptive and step back from my privileged
yet cramped observation tower. In the next section, I will discuss how senses are
hierarchically distributed according to their contribution to knowledge and
understanding, and the possibilities of using the body in its entirety as a learning device.
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Ethnography: Seeing or Becoming
According to Walter Ong (1969) senses are hierarchically ordered in different ways in
different cultures. In Western literate cultures vision has a primacy over the truths of
sound, taste, touch and smell. Hence, what is seen is considered to have a greater truth-
value than knowledge acquired via other senses. Looking at the evidence coming from
various cultures, Bloch (2008) suggests that the dominance of vision is not unique to
Western epistemology. It is not necessarily universal, but certainly generalisable. He
gives an example of the epistemology of the Zafimaniry of Madagascar, detailing how
they equate sight with truth and language with the potential for deceit. Limiting the
discussion to sight and hearing, Bloch does not touch upon other senses.
Whether it is generalisable or unique to Western culture, the primacy of sight has long
been established in social science writing. Viewing evidence, reading texts, witnessing
events and observing happenings have not only been the techniques of natural scientists
but also of ethnographers in their trademark method: participant observation. When
Geertz (1972) compared culture with a drama to be read above the native's shoulder, he
emphasised the role of the ethnographer as the reader who has the privilege of being
close enough but still outside the text, such that it can be impartially read as it unfolds
before his or her own eyes.
James Clifford (1986) provides a detailed account of attempts to challenge the primacy
given to sight in anthropological tradition. He pays particular attention to those who
think of the representation of culture as 'poetics that is an interplay of voices, of
positioned utterances', and hence understood through a discursive paradigm rather than
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a visual one (p. 12). According to Clifford, these efforts brought about a shift away
from the much-criticised ethnographic gaze (which is seen as the hallmark of an
assumed divide between subjects and objects, and also of the unequal power balance
between the ethnographer and the people studied) toward expressive speech. With this
shift, the author's voice is recognised as one among many and therefore its claim to an
'objective, distancing rhetoric is denounced' (p. 12).
Clifford's examples are mostly about the writing stage of ethnography. However, my
own problems with primacy of sight informed me during the process of fieldwork itself
even more than it did during writing. Or better said, once such primacy is cracked
during fieldwork, it may not be re-established on paper. My experience of fieldwork, in
ways that had only partly been anticipated, taught me to be perceptive to data that
cannot be observed; that is, by seeing alone. By this, I do not mean being open to
listening (which goes without saying when it comes to social science methodologies); I
suggest taking very seriously the issue of participation within the method of participant
observation, even such that one's body learns without being fully conscious of the
process; one's hands know where to rest and how to grasp without deliberate imitation
of others' movements; one's skin, nose and even taste buds become active tools in
making sense of the social world. All these can be subsumed under the more general
title of learning to live, and they often cannot be avoided. What my fieldwork
experience taught me is the importance of recognising these processes and valuing the
data they provide. This means acknowledging that ethnography is a bodily practice,
where the body of the researcher in its entirety becomes a tool of research.
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Lila Abu-Lughod (1988) recounts an illuminating incident from her fieldwork among
the Bedouins of Egypt, one which then showed her how much she had internalised the
values of her hosts and how this internalisation had helped her develop a fruitful
analysis afterwards. During the two years she spent with the Awlad Ali Bedouins, she
was hosted by a prominent figure of the tribe and eventually became accepted as a
member of his household. As a woman with Arab roots, she eventually found it more
comforting and also more strategically feasible to be the 'dutiful daughter' of her host
family, welcoming the boundaries such a role imposed on her as much as the
opportunities it created. She even sincerely wanted to become like the persons she
admired during her stay there. One day while they were preparing a feast and she was
cleaning rice for cooking, she accidentally found herself in a position of embarrassment:
'face to face with a dignified old man, not a relative' her face uncovered. She blushed
deeply and ran into the nearest doorway. After describing this incident in an article she
comments:
It was at this moment, when I felt naked before an Arab elder because I
could not veil, that I understood viscerally that women veil not because
anyone tells them to or because they would be punished if they did not,
but because they feel extremely uncomfortable in the presence of certain
categories of men. Veiling becomes an automatic response to
embarrassment, both a sign of it and a way of coping with it. This and
my other experiences trying to live as a modest daughter were ... essential
to the development of my analysis of modesty and women's veiling.
(1988, 155)
Somewhat similar to Abu-Lughod's experience, my volition to self-transformation
improved my understanding of the practices common at Kayseri vakifs. Chapters 5, 6
and especially 7 exhibit this understanding. which would have been impossible to
intimate without such in-depth involvement. This also led to a gradual improvement of
my relationships with the people I worked with in the field. So, I can contend that the
social distance created by where I came from, my vocation and my class origins were
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somewhat abridged by the growing moral closeness between us. Changes in my
attitude, posture, and boundaries, as well as my opinions, vocabulary and argumentation
contributed both to the possibility of research and to the knowledge I acquired during
this process.
Estrangement versus intimacy
The methodology I have outlined above would probably horrify a natural scientist (or
anyone with positivist inclinations), because of the blurriness between the objects of the
study and the subject conducting the research. Neither does ethnography provide an
easy escape from the epistemological questions of objectivity and objectification at the
centre of positivist disciplines. Quite on the contrary, participant observation as an
ethnographic social science methodology is almost an embodiment of these questions.
Keane argues that 'ethnographic knowledge has always been marked by a tension
between epistemologies of estrangement and of intimacy' (2005, 62). These two
epistemologies cannot easily be contrasted against each other, with the former as the
bearer of positivist arguments and the latter as the source of particularism and
relativism. Instead, they share common assumptions regarding freedom and human
agency, and have been adopted at different levels and in different traditions of
anthropology. Yet they are both there, in every writing, every piece of research.
Following Keane's formulation I can suggest that swinging between these two
epistemologies, hence learning through the most intimate contact and making not only
what you have seen but your own personal experience material for further analysis, is at
the heart of ethnography.
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This tension between the two different epistemologies can also be read as an implication
of (although not perfectly mapped onto) the classic home/field divide in anthropology.
In their seminal edition, Anthropological Locations (1997a), Gupta and Ferguson, in
unison with their contributors, show the uses and limits of this divide, and most
importantly its implications in creating hierarchies between various types of
ethnographic work. They illustrate the well-established and unspoken premise of
anthropology, wherein 'home' is a 'place of cultural sameness and that difference is to
be found "abroad" (l997b, 32). The book itself undertakes the task of showing how
'home' is, from the start, actually a place of difference-shaped by gender, class,
sexuality, and race-and how 'field' does not have to be a place that is travelled to. As
they suggest in their introduction, field and home are both to be uprooted if
ethnography's great strength of being located is not to become a liability, as happens
'when notions of "here" and "elsewhere" are assumed to be features of geography,
rather than sites constructed in fields of unequal power relations' (ibid. 35). They go on
to suggest:
Fieldwork reveals that a self-conscious shifting of social and
geographical location can be an extraordinarily valuable methodology for
understanding social and cultural life, both through the discovery of
phenomena that would otherwise remain invisible and through the
acquisition of new perspectives on things we thought we already
understood. Fieldwork, in this light, may be understood as a form of
motivated and stylised dislocation. (ibid. 37)
This motivated and stylised dislocation does not have to be a one-off journey that starts
with travelling to the field and ends with a story of exit. Instead, there is a shuttling
between 'home' and 'field' within even an hour during fieldwork if we are to stick to
another-and simpler-metaphor and approach 'field' as the location of experience and
'home' as the location of analysis. regardless of their geographical sites. In that sense
'field' can be seen as where epistemologies of intimacy reign, while 'home' would be
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where you shift to estrangement. And both are implied in the fieldwork; they co-
existent, since there would be no purified data collection moment which is not informed
by a hint of epistemological estrangement and vice versa. The shift is unavoidable and
valuable, and it should be recognised and appreciated, for it is the insurance against
both going native or remaining a stranger forever.
Methodological Focus
So far, I have discussed various aspects of my position vis-a-vrs my research
participants in the field. In this section I will reflect on how I drew the boundaries of
this research and focused my interest on some people and processes rather than others.
There are two very important issues to be discussed in this context, although the list is
not exhaustive. The first issue is about my research choices regarding on whom and
what to focus. Below, I will discuss how I came to direct my interest primarily on the
intermediaries, i.e. vakifcis, instead of the beneficiaries or benefactors, and on how this
choice affected the findings. The second issue stems from a very important but not-yet-
discussed dimension of my subject position: gender. In order to illustrate how gender
relations shaped the boundaries of this research I will describe how my initial research
plan had to be substantially revised once I began fieldwork.
Delimiting the field
Roughly categorised, there are three types of actors in the field of beneficence in
Kayseri: a) the vakif benefactors, b) the intermediaries who work at vakifs either
voluntarily or on salary, and c) the beneficiaries who receive aid and services from these
vakifs. The following chapters will complicate this categorisation, however it is
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beneficial to stick with it in this section for analytical purposes. This research focuses
on the intermediary group and often black-boxed processes of mediation between
donors and beneficiaries.
Beneficence is often understood as the straightforward process of donating for the well-
being of the needy members of a society. However these donations rarely reach those
who need it directly. There are often institutions, processes and people who pass the
donation on, though not without affecting it. Beneficiaries come to these institutions, are
subjected to the intermediary processes and interact with the employees or volunteers of
vakifs. Therefore, beneficence is not a singular process in which goods and services
flow uni-directionally, but rather is a web in which a multitude of services and goods
are carried between nodes.
In this web, vakif workers occupy significant nodes where the power to decide who
receives what resides. This position embeds vakif workers deeply into a variety of gift
relationships with both the benefactors and the beneficiaries. At the same time, they
devote their time, energy, connections and sometimes financial resources to vakif work
and therefore actively give gifts themselves. In both situations, they are far from being
simple vessels, their discourse sets the limits of possibility in the field, their decisions
affect the livelihood of beneficiaries and their practices have both ethical and material
consequences.
I have designed this research with the aim of gaining maximum access to the day-to-day
work of mediation. Doing participant observation has proved to be highly effective
towards reaching this goal. By Jiving and working with vakif workers I have acquired
an intimate knowledge of their practices, language, relations, fields of influence,
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interactions, networks and transformations, as discussed in previous sections. However,
for the overall comprehension of the gift circuits and the web of beneficence, the
research had to be complemented with data about the benefactors and beneficiaries as
well. I have had ample chance to observe these two groups in their interactions with
vakif people and at the moments of gift exchange. I was able to take note of the variety
of ways they responded to vakif workers: most of the time they were amenable to
entering the vakif workers' game and playing according to the rules. Yet occasionally,
there were some who defied the unspoken rules, challenged the decisions, refused to
give or accept gifts. Moments of contact were rife with possibilities.
These observations have earned me insight into the perspectives of the benefactors and
the beneficiaries; however, I cannot claim to have achieved a full understanding. My
observations remained limited to the moment of encounter. What happened before or
after was beyond my reach. In order to overcome this anticipated limitation I developed
a number of complementary strategies to my initial research plan. These included
participant observation among the benefactors in the form of attending their informal
but regular meetings in each other's homes, which was expected to give me access to
gift circuits among the wealthy donors, as well as to their decision-making processes.
Unfortunately, these gatherings proved inaccessible for me, for the material and
structural reasons that are discussed in the following subsection. However, as I initially
planned, [ conducted interviews with the benefactors and founders of vakifs and asked
about their motivations, as well as their self-reflections (more detail on these interviews
is given in the Complementary Research Strategies section).
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My relationship with the beneficiaries was more complicated. I had initially planned to
conduct interviews with them. However, I was already sceptical about this strategy and
it proved to be of very little use. I conducted seven preliminary interviews with the
beneficiaries of one of the organisations I worked with, and had countless opportunities
to chat informally with them as they waited their tum to apply for or receive provisions.
I told them openly about what I was doing there, then enquired about their lives in
general and listened to their stories of hardship. But whenever the conversation reached
the point at which I asked them about the experience of receiving aid, my interviewees
turned timid. In their eyes, I was closely connected with these organisations, and
regardless of how hard I tried, I couldn't successfully distance myself from the vakifs.
My questions intimidated them, as they had already been subject to serious questioning
before their applications were approved. Their responses were not addressed to me but
to the organisation to which they were registered, such that even as they voiced
criticism they also expressed gratitude. I was unable to get them genuinely talking to me
and to me only.
In any case, as a believer in the strengths of ethnographic methods, I would not have
considered interviews sufficient to serve the goals of this research. Participant
observation would be necessary, which would mean observing the beneficiaries' daily
survival strategies, tactical moves to improve their own conditions and decision-making
processes leading to developing preferences for one organisation over another, as well
as listening to their comments about vakif workers. about their encounters with them,
about vakif admission criteria and so on. And such a task could only be accomplished if
I had not begun my research by working with vakifs. I would have needed to start over,
in a place no one formally associated me with a vakif Moreover, the time span of
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research available for the project was insufficient to attempt to conduct these two
separate but intimately related ethnographies. Still, it would be ideal and this side of the
story deserves to be told in a future project.
Gender matters
While I was planning this research, I noticed a particular emphasis given to the semi-
formal in-home gatherings for which Kayseri was famous. In the rare social scientific
writing on Kayseri these semi-formal home visits (oturma, literally 'sitting', as they call
it in Kayseri) were identified as an important site of politics and decision-making
processes (ESI 2005; Dogan 2007). Both publications describe oturma as a private
gathering in which public matters are debated between the elites of the town, especially
among men. In my preliminary visit to Kayseri, I was told that even the decision to
establish another university had been taken at one of these gatherings.
Given the importance of these visits and my aspiration to access charitable networks in
the city, I initially planned to attend several of these oturmas and to do participant
observation within the circles in which beneficence was organised. I was aware that
otunna was strictly a gender segregated get-together, and I was intrigued by the fact that
none of the publications mentioned the other room where women gathered. I was
therefore hoping to grasp this missing part of the story in depth, but also to be accepted
into men's room as an 'honorary male' because of my researcher identity. All of these
assumptions and expectations proved non-viable after I spent some time in Kayseri and
learned more about the culture of oturma. As reported, the environment was gender
segregated, and this segregation was not only spatial but temporal. While amen's
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gathering took place in one house, the women of that household were responsible for
serving guests. Women's oturmas would always take place during daytime and were
strictly bound by time regulations imposed on the women by their husbands' working
hours, such that no men would be present where and when a women's gathering was
taking place. As a result of this system, it was out of the question for me to be invited to
men's oturmas where decisions important for my research were taken.
Unaware of the nature of the meetings, for a while, I assumed that I had not been invited
due to issues of trust or rapport. Only later did I figure out that a structural obstacle
existed that I could not possibly overcome, or even make an attempt to overcome. A
young Turkish woman who is overly interested in men's gatherings would only arouse
further suspicion, which could in turn harm my access to women's activities as well. So
I had to accept these norms and change my research strategies accordingly.
Making such an alterations to research decisions is common among the experiences of
other researchers too. Similar examples about how gender played both a limiting and an
enhancing role in research experiences can be found in contributions to Altorki and El-
Solh's collection Arab Women in the Field (1988). For example, Shami (1988) details
how she gained access to the impoverished slum neighbourhood of el-Wadi in Amman,
Jordan through the special care she paid to operating within the moral boundaries of the
locality. This required limited her interaction with the male residents but allowed her an
in-depth comprehension of the women's world. Similar accounts are provided by
Altorki (1988) and Abu-Lughod (1988) regarding their experiences in Saudi Arabia and
Egypt respectively.
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The gendered boundaries that I came across during my research kept me away from the
private sphere of men but allowed me access to that of women, which made it possible
to collect a considerable amount of material for this research. I also experienced no
difficulty accessing the public part of the men's world. In the organisational
environments of the vakifs I studied, men and women work together, so I was welcome
to follow men on their daily tasks, take long rides with them, go on home visits, load
and unload vans, sort clothing and distribute coal. I also attended many meetings that
took place during the day or after work hours in offices. The reason I was the only
woman in most of these meetings was not an issue of segregation but rather of the
limited presence of women in decision-making positions. I also conducted interviews
with some of the male directors in their offices, warehouses or workshops. Some of
these men were public figures, for whom my research was a confirmation of the
specialness of their home town, and they were thus eager to meet me, provide me
contacts and answer my questions. Ultimately, my access to men as informants was
only restricted when they moved into the private spaces of their homes.
My interaction with women was more intimate. I regularly attended the weekly
meetings of the female volunteers at Erciyes Feneri. I worked with them at fundraising
lunches and charity fairs. We had opportunities to spend time together outside of the
vakifs. I was also invited to their fortnightly oturmas, each time in a different person's
house. The director of Melikgazi Vakf was one of my initial contacts and I travelled
with her, joined her at weddings, and kept her company during her hectic workdays. I
later became the welcome house guest of some of the women I met, staying over in their
homes for many nights. But it was always single or widowed women who invited me
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for dinner or to spend the night. All other women made sure that I left before their
husbands came and their family was reunited.
In these homey and more intimate settings, I became part of women's daily housework
and chatter. I witnessed the conflicts that arose between them, I heard their comments
about each other's behaviour and therefore had opportunities to observe how vakrfci
subjectivities were worked on in the quotidian. Hence, gender made a big difference on
the final content of this dissertation. Had I been a man I would have had different access
limitations and different opportunities. I would have had to be closer to the world of the
hayirsevers (philanthropists) than that of the vakifcis (vakif workers), and would have
produced a very different account.
The Site of Ethnography
For this research I chose three vakifs in Kayseri. As I have described in detail above, I
worked in these vakifs, participated in their staff and board meetings, joined their
employees and volunteers in their work routines and during their out-of-work hours.
These three vakifs were chosen because of the scope of their work and also because of
their contrasting characteristics, as will be seen below.
All three of these vakifs are local organisations that distribute aid (usually in kind) and
provide certain welfare services to their registered beneficiaries. Their activities are
limited to a particular city, Kayseri, although they occasionally send out items of need
to organisations elsewhere. They are founded and run by Muslim believers (although
the degree of observance varies greatly). None of the organisations have direct ties to a
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particular sect or order but a few of the founders and workers are active members of one
religious order or another. The organisations' beneficiaries come from all walks of life,
with various lifestyles and religious orientations. Organisations are intentionally blind to
these differences. Islamic discourse and terminology is widely used as a common
repertoire to communicate ideas of justice, to initiate and reciprocate gift-giving and to
discuss ethical problems. However I did not observe any systematic attempts to
Islamicise the lifestyles of beneficiaries or educate them in religious matters. Some of
the volunteers and founders have personal or familial ties to the ruling AKP (Justice and
Development Party), but the organisations have no direct affiliations with the party.
Erciyes Feneri
Erciyes Feneri is the largest aid-providing organisation in Kayseri. They have around a
thousand households registered for receipt of regular (almost monthly) aid. The criteria
for registration is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. The association has a supermarket in
which no commercial transactions take place. Registered beneficiaries come to the
market on their allocated days and spend their allowance on items that can be found in
an ordinary supermarket, like food, detergent, nappies, tableware, etc. Beneficiaries also
receive clothing twice or three times per year, and are provided with furniture and
carpets if needed. All clothing, furniture and carpets are donations in kind, but most of
the food items and detergents are bought by the association from suppliers that have
agreed to provide them at a considerable discount on wholesale prices. In 2009, monthly
supplier payments amounted to 50,000 TL (equal to around £20,000).
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Erciyes Feneri also runs a public bath for those without access to hot water. Every day,
approximately 50 women and children bathe in this facility and have their laundry done
by the employees. Most of the clients are impoverished widows and their children, but
the organisation also accepts women who are known to be in destitute in exchange for a
symbolic payment that amounts to £ I. Neither the electric company nor the water
supplier asks for payment from the bath house. Erciyes Feneri only covers the cost of
the coal used to boil water and the salaries of three workers.
Another significant activity of the association IS runmng a soup kitchen for fast-
breaking (iftar), during the month of Ramadan. Every year, an unused floor of a multi-
storey car park is rearranged as a refectory and hosts 700-800 people per evening. Iftar
patrons are poor families, working men and women who cannot make it home to break
their fasts and anyone who appears outside at dusk for any reason. Because the car park
is located at a busy junction where people change buses and trams, this last category
makes up a significant share. Every evening a three-course meal and beverages are
served to these diners. There is a fixed sponsorship rate that approximately covers an
evening's expenses, so every iftar is actually paid for by someone from the Kayseri
business community. Erciyes Feneri covers evenings that are not sponsored.
In total, Erciyes Feneri has 10 full-time employees (four women and six men) and
around 20 active female volunteers. The association does not have a salaried director
but the head of the board attends to all administrative work, as well as to purchasing and
employment decisions. Erciyes Feneri expenses are covered by this businessman, a
spice trader from a prominent family, and six others who make up the board.
Miscellaneous donations make up a minimal share of the budget. Some additional
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fundraising activities are mostly organised by female volunteers. I will discuss one
particular fundraising event, the charity fair, in Chapter 5.
M elikgazi Vakfi
Melikgazi owns a private hospital serving the healthcare needs of patients with private
or public insurance, or with financial means to pay. But unlike other private hospitals
they also accept patients who have neither the means nor any kind of insurance. These
patients, who for whatever reason fall outside any health insurance scheme are treated
for free. The hospital was built exclusively with donations and then let to a company.
The tenant company pays an agreed upon amount of rent and also guarantees the
treatment of a given number of patients each month. These patients also either receive
their medications from the vakif or reimbursements for their prescriptions.
The second major undertaking of Melikgazi is a shelter for patients and their attendants
who come from neighbouring towns and do not have the means to pay for a stay in
Kayseri. Kayseri has two very large public hospitals and a university research hospital.
It thus serves as the health hub of the region and attracts patients from surrounding
cities. Melikgazi's shelter provides these patients and their relatives with roomsibeds,
hot water, laundry services, breakfast, dinner and shuttle services to hospitals while they
complete their period treatment. It works in cooperation with the social services
departments of hospitals. Patients and their attendants who declare they have no place to
spend the night are transferred to the shelter via shuttle buses. There are 85 beds in the
shelter, often in rooms of four. There are also futons in the corridors and in common
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rooms, which are used to accommodate patients' relatives if the demand for the night is
higher than the capacity.
The shelter building was actually constructed by a well-known industrialist family, and
was endowed to the university to be used as a local health clinic. It was far too large for
this purpose; the university had only utilised the entrance floor of this three-story
building and left the rest untended. Noticing this, Melikgazi proposed using the vacant
space as a shelter. They refurbished the building with donations, and continue to receive
donations of sheets and mattresses. The same sponsor, a large furniture manufacturer,
provides breakfast and dinner from his own soup kitchen.
The vakif is located in the backyard of Melikgazi Hospital. It is a newly built, tiny
single story building with two offices and a meeting room. The founders of the vakif
include the chair of the Industrial Region and the metropolitan mayor, alongside many
notable Kayseri businessmen. There are II employees working at Melikgazi and only
the director, who also has close ties with other vakifs of the city, is a woman.
Kayser; Darulaceze Vakfi
Darulaceze was founded with the aim of building a care home for the elderly. With
great amounts of donation, it managed to build a large compound to serve this function
within a short period. After the care home was built, its administration was transferred
to the municipality. The vakif itself then became partly obsolete. At the time of my
research the beneficiaries of the vakif were mental health patients and their families, but
it was functioning with very limited resources and with only three paid part-time
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employees. Darulaceze uses a former public bath as a shelter for ten-to-twelve homeless
men who have mental disabilities and diagnosed psychological illnesses. This shelter is
not as well supported as Melikgazi's patients' shelter, so both the living conditions and
the services provided to their guests are limited.
Besides running this shelter, Darulaceze assists families with mental health patients. It
distributes basic food packages consisting of pasta, cooking oil, flour and tomato paste,
and occasionally pays electricity and water bills for these families. In the winter some of
these families are given sawdust to bum in special stoves.
In order to generate some income, the vakif collects paper and plastic from factories and
sells them to recycling facilities. They also accept donations in cash and in kind,
including second-hand clothes and furniture. These donations are then sorted in the
shelter and used for the patients themselves or families included in the outreach scheme.
Complementary Research Strategies and Data Analysis
This ethnographic study was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the
American Anthropological Association (AAA) and the Association of Social
Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth (ASA). I also obtained an ethical
clearance from the Ethics Committee of the Open University. At the beginning of the
fieldwork and throughout, I obtained the informed consent of my research participants
and anonymised their names whether or not they asked for anonymity.
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During the fieldwork I took extensive field notes, sometimes during the day, other times
at night while I was alone, but always within the same day. The notes were comprised
of a diary, which included a detailed record of the day's events, people's names,
descriptions of places, people and incidents, as well as my own reflections on these. I
also made notes of threads to follow and questions to be asked in the future. I
photocopied my notebooks frequently and saved the copies in a different location as a
guarantee against loss of data. When the fieldwork was over I read the field notes
thoroughly several times to detect patterns. I created an index to help me locate
particular incidents, phrases and attitudes, and so re-arranged and compiled the data
systematically under various heading. Some of these headings later became subsections
of the dissertation.
Participant observation at the three vakifs gave me a substantive understanding of
practices and discourses, as well as an insight into the processes of ethical
transformation that take place among vakifcis, Yet in order to have a better
apprehension of the context in which these are embedded 1 developed some
complementary strategies. These strategies included interviews with an array of vakif-
related people, selective study of the media and a general attention paid to public life in
Kayseri.
I conducted 21 interviews and one focus group study. These interviews were organised
into four sets. The first set consisted of prominent public figures in Kayseri. From this
group I interviewed the Director of Social Services of Kayseri Municipality; the wife of
the mayor of Kayseri, who is also active in arranging coordination meetings with
representatives of almost all of the charitable organisations in the city; and an official in
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a local municipality who is responsible for the administration of a women's cultural
centre that actually acts as the locus of charitable activities and welfare provision in this
district. With this small group my aim was to get a general idea about the city and the
range of welfare activities that were being undertaken by state and citizens' initiatives.
The second set of my interviews was with the donors and founders of these
organisations: the chairman of the Industrial Zone, who is at the same time a wealthy
businessman known for his generosity and a founder of many local vakifs; a
businessman who lives in Ankara but endows schools and medical facilities in Kayseri;
another businessman who supports many of the vakifs and is one of the oldest people
who is still active on a few of the vakifs' boards of trustees; the owner of a large private
hospital who is the main donor for one of the organisations I worked with; and a doctor
who now lives in Istanbul but still has an established name in Kayseri for being among
the founders of many vakifs, I made enquiries to this group about their reasons for
establishing these vakifs and supporting non-state welfare initiatives, as well as on the
meaning of gift giving to their fellow citizens.
The third set included the directors or workers/volunteers of four organisations other
than the ones at which I worked during my fieldwork. The interviews I conducted with
this group focused especially on their activities, resources, criteria for help, the span and
volume of the aid they provide and also the meaning of their work. I used this data for
purposes of making comparisons with the three vakrfs I focused on and to see what
possibilities existed for generalisation.
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My last cluster of interviewees was a selected group of workers and volunteers from the
organisations at which I did most of my research: Erciyes Feneri, Darulaceze Vakfi and
Melikgazi Vakfi. I conducted these interviews during the final month of my stay in
Kayseri and asked them to talk about their own work, now that we were close enough
and because they were aware of the extent of my knowledge about the internal
dynamics of each organisation. The idea was to give them an opportunity to reflect on
what they saw as the core issues regarding their work and to clear a platform allowing
them to enquire about my research findings and produce a challenge. This group
consisted of the director and two employees of Erciyes Feneri, an employee and the co-
director of Darulaceze Vakfi, the director of Melikgazi Vakfi, and finally a freelance
accountant who volunteers at all three of these organisations along with some others. I
also conducted a focus group with the Erciyes Feneri volunteers. Eight women accepted
my invitation and found time to participate in this study, where we discussed what it
meant for them to be active in such a context, their own evaluation of the work done
and the impact of gender in this work.
Seventeen of these interviews and the focus group study were audio recorded, and then
transcribed by a research assistant. I have read and edited the transcriptions, anonymised
the names and then catalogued the contents. The other three were recorded in written
notes, then taken through the same processes of anonymisation and cataloguing.
Aside from participant observation and interviews, I also paid attention to public life in
Kayseri, and some of the interviews were part of this effort. Following Navaro- Yashin
(2002), with public life I refer rather ambiguously both to the state and the people,
which through interaction and intermingling, act out the public life of a town. I
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deliberately refrain from using the term 'public sphere' in order to avoid a clear-cut
distinction between the domains of 'power' and 'resistance', state and civil society.
Thinking along this vein, I did not approach public life categorically but instead
thematically. Any event, person, news item, organisation, book or film that related to
the concerns of this research was therefore identified as a potential source of data.
In order to be aware of the resources people make use of in constructing their discourse
and practices of vakif work, I attended some talks and a stage show about charitable
giving, followed news items and columnists writing on the issue, borrowed commonly
read books and followed the national media in general. This part of the research helped
me to connect all that is happening in Kayseri to the wider transformation of state
discourse in Turkey. Since Kayseri is not a closed microcosm not a bounded entity, its
public life is not separable or independent from public life at the national level.
Especially by paying attention to mass media, which is equally consumed nationwide, I
aimed to shift the scale of the research. In the next chapter I will start by introducing a
prominent theme that echoes in the local, national and international publics, both
through media and scholarship, then continue by relocating Kayseri within these
discussions.
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CHAPTER 4 KAYSERi AND ITS PHILANTHROPISTS
This chapter provides an introduction to Kayseri, a central Anatolian city of nearly a
million people, but only a few of these represent the city in the public imaginary in
Turkey. These few, who have established successful businesses in the last few decades,
have promoted an image of Kayseri as the home of shrewd and smart entrepreneurs and
merchants. However, these men (and a relatively small number of women) do not want
to be known only for their million-dollar exports or high-tech factories; they also want
to be acknowledged as philanthropists. They invest heavily in building schools,
mosques, student residences and health care facilities, and they support vakifs working
in various arenas of welfare provision.
This chapter starts with an overview of the socio-economic climate within which these
philanthropist entrepreneurs operate, and situates Kayseri within this overview as an
important case in point. This section introduces various takes on Kayseri, both the
celebratory and the derogatory. Aiming to escape these narrative conventions, I provide
a descriptive account of Kayseri and its philanthropists before moving on with the field
within which they operate. I suggest approaching beneficence as a separate field, one
with its own values and regulatory mechanisms, in order to acquire a sharper
understanding of the acts of benefaction that play an important role in public life and
city-making in Kayseri. In the final section. I direct my interest to manifesting the
motivations of benefactors in order to further the argument that the dominant
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mechanism in the field of benefaction is gift giving, which cannot be understood simply
as either an economistic enterprise or as a religious practice.
A Success Story
Turkey's transformation under the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government
has received growing interest from academics as a well as the international media since
2002, when the party came to power a surprise success in the elections. It has been
widely discussed whether the AKP, as the heir of a lineage of Islamist parties, had a
political agenda of turning Turkey into an Islamic state, or of being a representative of
moderate Islam, and further, whether it had the potential to successfully lead a marriage
of Islam and secularism (Nasr 2005; Turam 2007; Gumuscu and Sert 2009; Tugal
2009). Within years, as the AKP proved to be more and more market oriented, 'pro-
progress' and an ally to Western powers, the moderate Islam view gained
predominance. Proponents of this view suggest the AKP experience illustrates an
example of how democracy, economic growth and modernisation can be embraced by
practising Muslims without any major tensions. For most, the indicator of this peaceful,
if surprising, co-existence is the overall economic growth in Turkey and the changing
lifestyles of its visibly Muslim citizens, which often find expression in the urban
landscape. In that sense, the strengthening of capitalism in the production of
commodities, landscapes and lifestyles is often taken as proof of successful
modernisation, or at least as a proof of the possibility of co-existence of Islam and
modernity.
Kayseri, with its industrial success, rapid capital accumulation and conservative
outlook, occupies a special place in these accounts. It is one of the so-called Anatolian
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Tigers, out of the way from Turkey's established business centres but a booming
industrial success and an AKP stronghold, with the party's candidate winning 70% of
all votes in the last municipal elections. So, in many narratives about Turkey's
transformation under AKP rule, Kayseri is showcased as the exemplar.
An early and influential study on Kayseri as an informative case about the Turkish
experience was conducted in 2005 by the Berlin-based European Stability Initiative
(ESI). The ESI's (2005) report was titled Islamist Calvinists. Their observations
regarding the booming economy of Kayseri as a major furniture and textile exporter
were put in use to challenge claims that approach Central Anatolia as the heart of
religious conservatism, backwardness and stagnancy. Kayseri has grown from an
agricultural and trades-oriented small town to a major manufacturing site over the last
couple of decades. As of 2009, Kayseri had a designated industrial zone lying on 2350
hectares on the western outskirts of the town. It is occupied by approximately 800
factories and large workshops. About 45,000 workers are employed on these premises.
Outside the borders of the Industrial Zone are some other industrial compounds hosting
a major textile factory, a sugar producer and a giant electronics manufacturer.
In order to account for this economic development, ESI reporters followed Weber's
analysis of Protestant Ethics as what made capitalism emerge in the West, and argued
that Islam, as it was lived and experienced in Kayseri, might well be understood as
providing fertile soil for entrepreneurship and economic progress. Weber (1985( 1930]),
in his seminal work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, approaches
capitalism not only as a product of material conditions, like a change in property
ownership, but as a social phenomenon with cultural and religious origins. Trying to
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build a causal explanation for the historical and geographic specificity of the emergence
of capitalism, Weber directs his interest to the Christian Reformation and to the radical
changes Reformation caused in the psyches of European Christians. Weber argues that
Protestantism, especially Calvinism, provided an answer to the question of how
believers could be assured of their salvation when the authority of the church and clerics
was deeply undermined. In Calvin's teachings, worldly material success and gains could
well be interpreted as an indication of salvation. Therefore it was almost a religious
duty, a calling, to work on a profession and make worldly gains. These gains could not
be spent conspicuously or for leisure, so they had to be accumulated. Thus came the
necessity of capital accumulation for the emergence of capitalism and its related work
ethic.
Although the ESI reporters cautiously stated that it was 'hard to say whether the rise of
'Islamic Calvinism' among Kayseri's entrepreneurs is a cause of their commercial
success (as per Max Weber), or whether increasing prosperity has led them to embrace
interpretations of Islam that emphasise its compatibility with the modem world' (2005,
25), they argued that in Kayseri religion and economic prosperity had reinforced each
other. Authors of the report went on to note that 'economic success has created a social
milieu in which Islam and modernity coexist comfortably' (p. 34) in the heartland of
conservatism in Turkey.
The report has been applauded for the challenge it posed to accounts that argue for an
incompatibility between Islam and capitalism. The argument was found convincing, and
similar accounts produced by the Western media followed. A New York Times article
argued that 'the case of Kayseri presents one of the strongest arguments that Islam.
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capitalism and globalisation can be compatible' (Bilefski 2006), so Turkey's EU
membership might be nothing to fear. Similarly, PBS produced a documentary called
'Turkey's Tigers' and emphasised how Islam did not present an obstacle for capitalist
development in the town, featuring cliched shots of covered women on the streets and
businessmen in smart suits being interviewed in their spacious offices.
In a more recent account, Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdagi (20 I0) followed
in ESI's footsteps, developing similar stories for other Anatolian cities in order to find
out whether Kayseri could be counted an example was unique in character or
representative of a trend. They argued that globalisation and Europeanisation processes
had affected Turkish cities in similar ways, but cities' reactions to these processes
varied significantly depending on local capacities. Keyman and Koyuncu Lorasdagi
suggested that prevalent Islamic values in Kayseri, as much as they advise prudence,
protection of family ties and hard work, can also be seen as inducers of economic
growth, although they might also tum into impediments against urban development by
supporting conservative and introverted tendencies. Yet, in general, these scholars
agreed with the ESI reporters about the prevalence of practising Muslims turning into
successful entrepreneurs and gaining visibility in all sectors of the society.
Both the ESI (2005) report and the studies that followed it identified Kayseri with
growing industry and accumulating wealth. Kayseri is depicted as a city of businessmen
whose Islamic values and practices support their business aspirations and give them a
competitive advantage within a global ising market economy. One of the most important
of these advantages is benefiting from Islam as a resource for the institution of a
communal bond of mutual trust. Bugra (1999) situates this function within the changing
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world economic trends, and suggests that it is especially useful to have such a resource
when production becomes increasingly flexible. Flexible production brings about the
increased need for outsourcing, subcontracting, informality and flexible working hours.
The needs of these firms can be met more easily within networks of reciprocal
exchange, mutual trust and shared values.
In a similar attempt to shift the gaze towards world economic processes, Hosgor (2011)
opposes situating the term Islamic capital against a notion of secular capital at all. She
suggests understanding the rise of a capitalist class in religious Anatolian towns by
looking at internationalisation processes rather than attempting to craft unsustainable
distinctions between Anatolian capital and Istanbul-based capital, or Islamic capital and
secular capital. Her argument is built on the conviction that there exists one and only
one capitalism. As a result, cultural values and attributes can only make cosmetic
changes on capitalisation processes in general. Although it is important to look at
processes of greater scale, especially in order to avoid essentialism, Hosgor's account
falls short of accounting for the cultural meaning and significance of these processes.
Adas, on the other hand, suggests looking at the 'dialectical process wherein capitalism
and Islamic culture interpenetrate and transform each other' (2006, 115). In this way it
would become possible to see how capitalism is made as part of 'one's culture'. This
formulation requires creative work indeed, involving going back to primary resources
(like the Qur'an and hadith) and interpreting them anew in communication with the
actualities of the market and economic order. Kayseri's brand of capitalism is a living
example of this.
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The celebratory approach of the ESI is not shared by all students of Kayseri. A different
and more critical approach came from Dogan (2007), who deployed a Marxist
framework of space production and focused on the interaction between the cityscape,
Islamist local municipality and capitalist expansion. Dogan conceptualises the spatial
and public outcome of the transformation Kayseri has been experiencing as a 'deformed
public sphere'. By this he means a particular form of public sphere marked by
neoliberal policies that chop off the public service provisions of the local municipality
and replace them with charitable activities relying on the mobilisation of Islamist circles
and the business elite. Dogan argues that this particular formation of the public finds its
expression in the organisation of cityscape: an encouragement of car ownership, family-
centred recreation facilities, gated residences and mass housing projects, soup kitchens,
sports centres with designated prayer rooms, and so on. Dogan does not tell us why, for
example a sports facility with a prayer room or a municipal soup kitchen constitutes a
'deformity' in public space creation. His analysis, which links the particular trajectory
of capital accumulation in Kayseri with local governance, appears short-sighted when it
comes to understanding the citizenly claims that are fulfilled by such facilities and the
social imaginary which recognises these claims. Public space in Kayseri, with its visibly
Islamic references, does not meet Dogan's expectations for a 'properly modem' urban
environment and is therefore called 'deformed'.
In this chapter, I will neither resort to the celebratory narratives of the happy marriage
of capitalism and Islam, nor approach the appearance of Islamic references in cityscapes
as an aberration from an ideal. I will restrict myself to the simple and agreed upon
observation that a visible accumulation of wealth is taking place among some of
Turkey's practising Muslims, and this wealth finds its expression in the changing
141
cityscapes as well as in the consumption habits of this emerging middle class. Kayseri
embodies all manifest signs of this transformation and has therefore received attention
both nationwide and beyond. In the coming section I will walk you through the city
with an attentive eye to the gifts which link capital accumulation and religious/ethical
concerns in a way different from expanding markets and changing lifestyles.
Land of philanthropists
Kayseri strikes the first-time visitor with its large boulevards, tall buildings and plentiful
squares. Situated on the northern plains of an inactive volcano, Kayseri looks as if it has
all the space it needs to expand and enlarge. It is a city that adores greatness, vastness
and visibility. Apartments are advertised by their spaciousness: An ordinary middle
class flat is 180 square metres-twice the size of a comparable one in Istanbul. Offices
are even more conspicuous, furnished with desks larger than family dinner tables and
sofas you cannot rest your back on without your feet being lifted off the ground. It takes
quite an effort to cross the boulevards that cut across the city in all directions, and an
extra effort to cross back again if you realise you meant to check another shop on the
other side. Except in the historical heart of the city and in the few shanty
neighbourhoods on its outskirts, Kayseri, in its greatness, makes the lonely pedestrian
feel like Gulliver in Brobdingnag.
In this land of greatness, it probably shouldn't surprise anyone to see huge signboards
on schools. But it does. Each of these signboards, which are too large to be nameplates,
has a person's name written on it. And it is not only the schools; same names, or at least
same family names, can be read on hospitals, student residences, health centres,
mosques, Qur'an schools, and day care centres. These are the names of people who
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donated to the construction and furnishing of these buildings. After spending some time
in the city, one feels a sense of acquaintance with them, for seeing the names so often in
such huge letters. Kayseri's wealthy are proud of their gifts to their home town and
want to make it known. They like the notion leaving something behind and they also
like commemorating their late ancestors with public buildings.
This custom becomes even more prominent on the campus of the town's only public
university. There, every faculty building has a sign almost as wide as the building itself
displaying the name of a city notable. Only one building was built with public funds and
hence has remained anonymous: the president's office. All other faculty buildings,
cultural arenas, meeting halls and sports facilities have proper names. It is widely
known within the city that, once the decision to build a university campus had been
made, the prime minister of the day called Kayseri' s rich one by one and assigned each
the construction of a building. The notables' enthusiasm for building schools is not
limited to higher education. Nearly every primary and secondary school in the city
centre that has been built within the last 20 years has a philanthropist's name engraved
on it. People from Kayseri business circles proudly told me this anecdote more than
once: According to them, on his visit to Kayseri, the minister of education congratulated
Kayseri's wealthy for their endowments to schools to such an extent that subsequently
the ministry needed to allocate no further funds.
In addition to these very visible endowments to public projects, Kayseri is the home of
quite a large variety of vakifs involved in an array of social services and assistance
provision. These associations and vakifs distribute food packages, clothing and coal to
the needy; provide free medical aid for those without health coverage; run shelters for
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the mentally ill and cancer patients; help poor couples with marriage expenses; operate
a public bath and a laundrette; collect and distribute medicine; offer funding and
housing to students; design certificate programs for women; run soup kitchens in
impoverished neighbourhoods and so on. These associations and vakifs are much less
visible than the endowed public buildings, and they certainly receive less funding from
the business community. Still, there is a significantly higher number of such
organisations in Kayseri than in the surrounding cities, as well as a few well-supported
and established organisations that are widely known across the city.
Kayseri business people put forward a deliberate effort to construct and represent
themselves as benevolent and responsible citizens by investing in civic gifts such as
schools, as well as founding vakifs and financially supporting them. This self-
representation finds its utmost expression in the Kayseri Philanthropists Summit. To
date, four summits have taken place, with the Turkish president in attendance as an
honoured guest at the last two. The attendance of President Gill, who is also a Kayseri
native, gave the summits airtime on national TV, thus entrenching the reputations of
city notables as philanthropists. Kayseri municipality encourages the aspirations and
self-representations of its wealthy by hosting these events and actively bringing matters
up for discussion and resoltuion during these summits. At the closing ceremony of
every summit, those who have made the greatest endowments receive plaques
expressing gratitude for their contribution to the city.
The Kayseri Chamber of Commerce has published a book to commemorate those who
have made endowments to the city, titled A Story of Difference: Our Philantropists
(Seker 2008). This heavy volume includes names, short life stories. achievements and
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endowments of the Kayseri rich. Some of those who are included in the book give
advice, tell stories and share their experiences about the work and philanthropy with the
readers. Others express their pride through photographs they submitted to the editor that
depict them with their families or in front of the buildings they donated.
Summits, books and, most importantly, those buildings that carry the names of their
respective benefactors, help create and sustain a local identity for Kayseri that
celebrates beneficence. Yet this element of local identity is specifically reserved for the
wealthy, the great majority of whom are male entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurship and
business-mindedness are other adjectives proudly claimed by the same people and
known nationwide as attributes of Kayseri people, as it is formulated by Mehmet Y., a
prominent industrialist:
I don't think there is another city in the world that resembles Kayseri in
this sense. I mean there are philanthropic efforts everywhere. But there is
no competition like we have here. I mean the competition in donating
more and more. Of course for competition there should first be richness.
In that sense, local identity, formulated as such, is available for only a few to claim.
This chapter is about these few: the entrepreneurs who became established wealthy
capitalists in once-unindustrialised Anatolian towns over the last couple of decades, and
who invest heavily in beneficence in their horne towns. In the vernacular they are called
hayirsever, literally meaning 'those who love doing good deeds'. Most hayirsevers
identify as Sunni Muslims. In the recent social science literature which focuses on the
tension and cooperation between Islam and capitalism, these acts of beneficence are
treated as by-products of a combination of capital accumulation and religious
orientation; they are not considered for their own sake as acts with multivalent
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meanings and effects. Because they are seen as a derivative of wealth which, in this
case, is accumulated within the realm of opportunities created by neoliberal capitalism,
they are also understood within market terms. Notwithstanding the purity of the
religious intentions, hayirsevers are accused of helping sustain a social order that is
organised around the interests of capital (Dogan 2007; Ozdemir and Yticesan-Ozdemir
2008; Haenni 2011). Even when religious intentions are recognised, they are
approached as tools for wiping consciences clean of the sins intrinsic to operating in a
market economy (Kuran 1995).
The problem at the heart of these accounts is their limited view of economy and society,
which neglects any form of circulation other than market operations. In the next section
I will return to the idea of gift with reference to Chapters I and 2, and will discuss why
it provides a better framework with which to understand acts of beneficence than an
instrumentalist, market-oriented view. But I will also suggest that gift may help us
disentangle the problems created by a view which overvalues the religious reasoning
people articulate when asked about their motivations.
Thefield of beneficence
I approach beneficence as a field in the Bourdieuian sense. Therefore, I see a field as a
partially autonomous sphere of play, prescribing values and with its own regulatory
mechanisms. 'These principles delimit a socially structured space in which agents
struggle. depending on the position they occupy in that space, either to change or to
preserve its boundaries and form' (Wacquant 1992, 17). Because each field has relative
autonomy, Wacquant argues, 'they cannot be collapsed under an overall societal logic,
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be it that of capitalism, modernity, or postmodernity' (p. 16). This does not mean there
is no interaction between fields of play, nor does it mean values and practices cannot be
transferred from one to another. People struggle with the boundaries of these fields in
order to make them more compatible with others, experience anxiety and unease in the
face of incommensurabilities, and translate one set of rules to another through creative
work. The core of Wacquant's reading of Bourdieu is his emphasis on the inadequacy of
a greater scheme to the enterprise of gaining a deeper understanding of these fields:
their rules, ethos, boundaries, depth and width; field actors' investments, tools, capital,
positions and possible manoeuvres; and the hierarchy, tension, conflict, cooperation and
alliances between these actors. A meta-narrative like the expansion of capitalism
sprawls onto these fields and hides the particulars that are constitutive of the social,
much less grand mechanisms.
The dominant regulative principle of the field of beneficence, which organises the
circulation of goods and services, shapes acts of exchange, and determines the social
and symbolic value of these acts, is gift giving. Characteristics of gifts which make
them distinct from commodity transactions define the features of the field and delimit
the possibilities of action. Premises of gift giving not only shape practices but also the
desires of actors playing in this field, as they set targets for achievement and otTer prizes
that are ditTerent from what market relations could otTer. In the realm of market
relations the primary indicator of success for a player is accumulation, while in the field
of beneficence it is generosity-to what degree an actor is willing to liquidate his
possessions. Because in the field of beneficence, social ties are created according to
one's willingness to give, prestige and social status are generated during acts of giving,
and a person's social worth is determined by his competence in the etiquette of giving
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and receiving. Certainly, the symbolic capital gained in one field can be converted to
economic capital another, but this is not necessarily so. The dominant mode of
exchange in these two fields is so distinct in their primal logic that often such
conversions become too costly. As a result, actors who play in the field of beneficence
in Kayseri stay in the game by donating to causes the others work for and doing favours
for each other's organisations, as well as by working for and donating to the vakifs they
founded themselves.
In Chapter 1, I put forward the question of what creates obligation in gift relations.
Here, as a tentative answer, I suggest looking at the regulatory mechanisms of the field
of beneficence and the habitus of the actors who play within it. The obligation to give
can well be found at the moments when an actor's habitus overlaps with the field. In the
coming section, while discussing the manifest motivations of hayirsevers, I will provide
an array of examples to illustrate this point. However, the significance of this issue
makes it worth mentioning here too. Following Isin and Lefebvre (2005) I contend that
gift-giving cannot be understood simply as a voluntaristic individual act. It, of course,
involves a person's willingness, but it is a willingness to respond to an obligation, a
desire that performs a socially determined role.
Such an approach, while in contrast to economistic explanations of beneficence,
problematises purely religious elucidations as well. The field of beneficence is laden
with religious meanings and significations, which open up space for pious formations
that take shape while endowing. Piety is both a motivator and an end result to be
achieved through acts of gift giving. But connecting beneficence exclusively to
adherence to religious norms or pious intentions of the heart give us a simplified and
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also essentialist view of beneficence, as well as religion. Although it is important to
understand the element of religiosity in this field, limiting the field of view to religion
carries two risks: First, it may cause one to overlook the civic and social aspects of
beneficence, as well as benefactors' awareness of these aspects and investments in
them. Second, it may lead to giving religious norms an explanatory value in and of
themselves, and missing the incoherency and multivalence imminent in the practice of
these norms. Similar to Osella and Osella's study of Muslim entrepreneurs of Kerala, I
prefer 'a framework which better allows for appreciation of contradictions and plurality
of interests, glossed over or dismissed as insignificant in many accounts of
contemporary pietism, where coherence of subject and action are privileged' (2009,
205). The next section will introduce the manifest motivations of the hayirsever, locate
piety as a source of motivation among many and illustrate the implications of gift as the
regulating principle of the field.
Why Endow?
Giving back to the city
Imentioned at the beginning of the chapter that for Kayseri businessmen, beneficence is
part of local identity. As in the case of the Philanthropists Summits, they also make
every effort to claim this identity. The most valued form of beneficence is giving civic
gifts to Kayseri itself. Building schools, endowing estates for public use and donating to
vakrfs are all understood as the fulfilment of citizenly duties towards their home town.
These wealthy men openly assert that they are indebted to Kayseri for the opportunities
they were presented with over the course of their lives. They conceptualise this
indebtedness with the Turkish word vela, which means both 'indebtedness' and 'loyalty
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out of love'. Beneficence is foremost seen as an expression of vefa to the city.
Therefore, those who donate to international organisations or make their endowments in
other cities are occasionally criticised, and their love of Kayseri is questioned. Even if
an entrepreneur established his business and made his fortune in another city, he is still
considered to be indebted to Kayseri for having been born there. Mehmet Y. explicitly
makes this point:
There is a love of Kayseri, among those who were born here but migrated
somewhere else. They say that, I was born and raised in this city so I have
to pay back.
Isin and Lefebvre's (2005) discussion of Greek euergetism reveals a similar fervour for
beneficence among local notables and the ruling elite of ancient Greek cities.
Euergetism is an ancient Greek form of civic gift-giving that benefits everyone in the
city, citizens and non-citizens alike. This could be in the form of undertaking provisions
for some services, as well as endowing buildings and facilities for public use. There was
no legal requirement for the rich to spend on euergetism, but these notables are
nevertheless implicated in a certain ethos of giving that legitimised their rule over the
cities. Isin and Lefebvre note that euergetism implied 'that associations (cities, collegia)
expected their rich to contribute from their wealth to the public expenses and the rich
spontaneously and willingly complied' (p. 9).
Kayseri businessmen talk about a similar expectation that comes directly from the city
itself. But the ways they conceptualise and rationalise this expectation vary greatly. For
some, donating to the city is, as I explained above, the payment of a debt. For others, it
is explained as a tradition they proudly carry on. There are also more mystical ways of
explaining how the city demands endowments. Such arguments follow that beneficence
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is an attribute of the city, that there is something impalpable about Kayseri which urges
them to give. For example, according to Ahmet G., Kayseri had been home to many
saintly figures who still watch over the city. Beneficence was their heritage, their
particular way of extending care over centuries. Similarly, Ahmet H. resorts to a more
scientific discourse, only to disclose that the source of obligation is as obscure to him as
to Ahmet G.:
You know turtles. Their babies crack their eggs and immediately start
walking towards the sea. How do they know that they have to reach the
sea? How do they know, even, what sea is? It is in their genes. Just like
this, Kayserians have this [benefaction] in their genes.
Early pedagogies
When Ahmet H., a prominent industrialist, shared this example of turtles, he was
actually talking about his own son's involvement in benefaction. His son is the director
of Erciyes Feneri and a spice merchant. Among his three sons, he is the only one who is
active in the field of benefaction in Kayseri (though the other two were relatively young
when I did my fieldwork). In our conversation, he said he had not pushed his son in this
direction, but that the son had somehow chosen to take this path and had begun
financially supporting and working for vakifs. Ahmet H.'s surprise over his son's
course was actually a rhetorical one, which was used to enhance his picture of Kayseri.
In the same conversation, he told me how his own father had educated him about gift
giving and its etiquette, and it would, indeed be surprising to hear that he did not adopt a
similar pedagogical attitude towards his own children. All the hayirsevers I have
interviewed or had conversations with have mentioned how their parents affected their
early experiences of giving. Take for example Ali Riza 0.:
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After Friday sermons, my dad used to distribute money by my hand. I
mean, he literally gave the money to me and I passed it on. When
somebody came asking for help, he would always tell them that he had
to check with me first. Then he would tell me, 'Son, we should give so-
and-so this amount of money? I have already prepared it, but you see to
the situation first and give it'. I would ask, 'Dad, why don't you give it
yourself?' He would tell me plainly that he was trying to habituate me
into giving.
I have heard about this particular way of educating children on matters of beneficence
more than once. I have also heard another formulation of the same practice described as
'to make giving a habit of hand'. These premeditated and shared techniques aim to
make beneficence part of children's, an act of habit that he or she will perform almost
automatically in the years to come. A vakrfci woman gave a more detailed account of
her pedagogical efforts to raise a 'compassionate' child through this kind of habituation.
She would take the child with her whenever she needed to make a visit to a poor family,
make the child spare money from his allowance to give away, and even tell the child to
cut some of his spending (like buying fizzy drinks) to buy 'bread for the poor'. This
woman was later warned by others against the strictness of her method. But, whatever
the method, Kayseri hayirsevers agree upon one thing: gift giving is learned in
childhood and becomes part of a person's habitus only through this early learning.
Middle-aged hayirsevers remember their parents' deliberate efforts, as well as acts of
giving, which influenced them by setting an example. See, for example, how Kemal T.
remembers his mother:
My mum died when she was just over 50. Although she had spent most
of her life in material hardship she could not resist it when she saw
somebody in poverty. We are greatly influenced by her. One day I came
back home and could not find the jacket of my only suit. I asked my
mother where it was. She said' I saw somebody who was really cold and
poor so I just gave the jacket to him'. I was perplexed. I asked what I
would do then. She told me that she would fix something for me. She
really did, I did not experience any problems.
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Kemal's jacket story is not unique. Stories of fathers who take their jackets off on the
streets and hand them to someone in need, or mothers giving away their children's
clothing, practically form a genre in Kayseri. I do not question the authenticity of these
stories. Instead, I would like to emphasise that they have a greater significance when
thought of together. Kayseri philanthropists situate these instances into their
pedagogical formation, and make use of them to explain the reason they were
performing beneficence: they are simply habituated to do so. Such an explanation gives
philanthropists a way out of the conventional, voluntaristic and individualistic
framework, and helps them locate these acts within a story of formation.
Philanthropia
In its original Greek, philanthropy means 'love of humankind'. In that sense it is a
universal and non-discriminatory love directed towards an anonymous mass called the
humanity. As much as phi/os means love in the sense of caring and nourishing, it is not
simply an abstracted love. It includes taking care of, benefiting and watching over
humankind. Because it is directed at humans as a species. not as persons, it is a Godly
virtue. Later it became a sought after virtue of kings (Ferguson 1959) who are supposed
to love and take care of the part of humanity for which they are responsible.
Some Kayseri hayirsevers expressed humanitarian concerns as a source of responsibility
when I enquired about their motivations. This responsibility was attributed to their faith,
and hence it was formulated as something learned during religious cultivation. Hamdi
<;.'s discourse on philanthropy illustrates this reasoning-loving humankind as a
religious dictum:
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The basis of our charity should be the love of humanity. This is what we
have learnt from the prophet and from Qur'an ... In Western thinking,
there is the premise of doing no harm. You don't have to do any good,
but don't do harm. In Islam the basic tenet is being beneficial to human
beings, so you have to do good. This is the sole object of Muslims.
Yet there are others who attribute philanthropia to human nature, suggesting that human
beings are preconditioned to love and care for each other. Therefore, it is an intrinsic
virtue all human beings share, and cannot be attributed to a religion or a particular
group. As Nihat B. suggests:
Human nature is based on charity. I mean, one of our most beautiful
natural qualities as humans is this feeling of charity. Whether you are a
Muslim or a non-Muslim, it doesn't matter. Everybody has this inborn
quality.
A similar challenge to ascribing acts of beneficence to Islam came from Ahmet H. when
our conversation was intercepted by another person the room, who provided a religious
explanation to the endowments. Ahmet H. counter-argued:
Let's not explain everything with religion. For example, if I pay my due
zekat, should I still be engaged in vakif work? Not necessarily. But on the
other side, there is a humanitarian responsibility ... If you come across an
old man who fell and broke his leg, you take care of him. Or if you come
across a crying child, is it my duty [to help her]? There are all sorts of
institutions to take care of them. But you cannot think that way, at that
moment. You have a humanitarian responsibility.
In this second explanation regarding the source of philanthropia, there is a reference to a
calling that these men experience and cannot completely attribute to their religious
standing. It is a call that asks to be answered in the moment, not postponed or
transferred, because it directly addresses the inborn qualities of man. Human beings are
hardwired to answer that call. So in this understanding, love for humanity has to be
universal, both at the level of subjects and at the level of its object. In contrast,
philanthropia attributed to religion is universal only in terms of scope and inclusiveness.
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Kayseri hayirsevers discursively shuttle between these two levels of universality
whenever they mention love for humankind.
What is striking in all three of these sources of motivation-indebtedness to the city,
upbringing and love for humanity-is that hayirsevers explain their acts of beneficence
with reference to an obligation that is somehow engrained in them, rather than being a
product of free will or desire. They are constituted as benefactors while complying with
an obligation to give. Their agency is limited in this respect. In a rather contradictory
way, they respond willingly and voluntarily to this obligation. As I have discussed in
detail in previous chapters and also mentioned above, benefaction precedes the
benefactors, and the obligation to give creates the gift giver.
Prolonged lives
So far I have listed a set of motivations Kayseri philanthropists described in our
interviews that are not necessarily religious. But given that most of these people self-
identify as Muslims, other formulations regarding beneficence are articulated within a
religious vocabulary. The most famous of these formulations is attributed to the
prophet. In a hadith, the Prophet Mohammad says: 'If a human dies, then his good
deeds stop except for three: a sadaqa jariyah, a beneficial knowledge, or a righteous
child who prays for him' (Sahih Muslim 2001, hadith number 1383). Sadaqa jariyah is
often translated as 'continuous charity', and is used to describe perennial and perpetual
endowments. In that sense it includes any endowment that survives its benefactor, like
mosques, hospitals, bridges, fountains and so on. As long as these endowments benefit
someone, the person who contributed to the construction is expected to accrue merits
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even after death. So sadaqa jariyah is seen as a way of extending one's lifetime, or at
least as a preparation for the afterlife.
Another common religious formulation comes in the form of a dictum, again with
reference to a saying of the Prophet Mohammad: 'He who sleeps contentedly while his
neighbour sleeps hungry did not believe in my message'. Without exception, all of the
hayirsevers I talked with cited this hadith. For them it meant more than a neighbourly
responsibility; it was a test of their faith and belonging to the community of Muslims. It
therefore required solutions that address the community as whole, or at least all Kayseri
citizens. As Ahmet H. suggests:
He who sleeps contentedly while his neighbour is hungry is not one of
us. What does one of us mean? It means according to our faith,
according to our traditions and Islamic manners. It means your
neighbour should not be left hungry. If I do not have the chance of
checking my neighbour regularly, enter his home or ask if he has food
in his cellar I should uphold this principle with soup kitchens and
serve everybody.
Upholding society
One last line of reasoning behind hayirsevers' acts of beneficence is their belief in the
role of beneficence in sustaining society. According to the few who mentioned this as a
reason they perform beneficence, the satisfaction of the basic needs of the poor keeps
them from insurgency and violence. See, for example, what Kemal T., owner of a
private hospital, and Kadir 0., a food manufacturer say, respectively:
Consider this: Somebody is suffering from hunger on the street. This is a
major weakness for society. Or, for example, a student has to give up
school because he cannot pay the tuition fee. This would lead him to
revolt against society. Maybe this is the reason behind rebellious
anarchist youth. When society does not care of these people, it leads
them to insurgency and you end up with people who do harm to society.
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I mean, of course, may God's bounty be on everyone, but this is the
balance of the world. Some people are rich, others are poor. May God
uphold this balance. When all this happened in Argentina, Turkey was in
a crisis too. We were in an even worse situation. Why weren't there any
lootings? It is thanks to hayirsevers. This is a very good thing.
I mentioned that this discourse is limited to a few, actually a very particular group of
people. The more involved with vakifs a hayirsever is, the more frequently references to
personal responsibility are found in his discourse. As engagement decreases, as is the
case with occasional donors like Kadir 0., the manifest motivation behind endowments
becomes the abstract notion of upholding society and social cohesion. They are the ones
who see a threat to their class positions in extreme poverty and desperation; they
therefore approach beneficence as a societal 'safety valve' of the society, which absorbs
the threat of radicalisation of the poor. However for vakifcis and those hayirsevers with
more direct contact with vakifs, the act of extending a hand to someone in need is an
aim in itself. It is not approached as an instrument for sustaining society as it is or for
defending class interests, but as he act of saving a person-just that one person-and
for that moment only.
Conclusion
The literature on philanthropists in Turkey is rife with demonisations and idealisations,
each working in favour of one ideological stand (Ozel 1994; Selvi 2001; Bikmen and
Zincir 2006; Seker 2008). These wealthy capitalists are either seen as status-seeking
individuals, whose philanthropic activities should be approached within the framework
of economism, or as pious Muslims who simply observe God's orders to spend their
wealth on the righteous path of religion. Each explanation has its explanatory value,
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given that both of these frameworks have partial validity with respect to the practices
and motivations of the philanthropists themselves. They are also equally flawed in their
blindness to the complexity the field and the rules that bind actors.
Given this critique, I suggested focusing on the regulatory mechanism of the field as the
source of the obligation to give. With reference to the manifest motivations of
benefactors and their own confusion about the issue, I have argued that the source of
obligation cannot be traced back to the individual will and consciousness. It is indeed a
calling that is born out of a complex interaction between the rules of the game (i.e. gift)
and the habitus of individuals who have developed certain dispositions over the course
of their lives. Therefore, neither intentionalist explanations with reference to religion
nor the structural determinants that refer to class positions are sufficient to do justice to
the topic. In the next chapter, I will continue this line of argument with the
intermediaries of the beneficence field at the centre of the discussion, those vakif
workers who distribute the funds made available by hayirsevers to beneficiaries, and
who perform this task with an ethos that links them to philanthropists both morally and
discursively.
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CHAPTER 5 HIZMET: AN ETHOS OF SERVICE
This chapter aims to illustrate how gift-giving operates in the beneficence field and how
it is enacted in religiously informed vernacular terms. In order to achieve this end I
borrow Ilana Silber's conceptualisation of gift-giving within a religious imaginary. In
her work on donations to medieval European monasteries, Silber (1995) approaches this
particular form of religious giving as a 'total phenomenon' in the Maussian sense, which
means giving has political, economic, moral, spiritual, social and individual dimensions
that affect and shape social relations in a plurality of ways. In order to get a hold of this
total phenomenon she suggests making an analytical distinction between the theory and
circuit of gifts, but without overlooking either, which is common practice in the study of
religion. She convincingly argues against such contrasting approaches to religion, which
are known for 'dismissing religious beliefs and values as mere ideological varnish
covering up the underlying social and economic interests actually furthered (the actual
gift "circuit"), or on the contrary, giving central weight to religious beliefs (or gift
"theory") and taking these pretty much at face value' (p. 225). Silber develops a more
composite approach and focuses on the mutual interaction between these two
dimensions of gift-giving.
This chapter follows Silber's insightful conceptualisation and focuses on the mutual
interaction between religious beliefs and social practices that surround beneficence in
Kayseri. The Kayseri beneficence field shows an intermeshing of public and private
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funds, NGO and municipal involvement and efforts by individuals who are not
necessarily related to any of the parties mentioned. This intricate circuit, which is upheld
by volunteers, benefactors and paid employees alike, is maintained and geared by a
shared ethos that makes such intermeshing possible. This ethos is signified by a
common repertoire of concepts, the most important of which is hizmet. This chapter will
particularly focus on the unfoldings of this particular concept as it signifies and shapes
acts of beneficence.
In colloquial Turkish hizmet (from Arabic khidma) loosely means service. In this
broader sense it denotes municipal services (belediye hizmetleri), for example, or social
services (sosyal hizmetler). Yet depending on the context it earns a religious emphasis,
and the meaning covers all human services with the ultimate aim of serving God.
Therefore, building a school, helping an old lady with hospital procedures, preaching
Islam or working in a municipal office may all be valued as hizmet. Regardless of
whether it is done voluntarily or as paid work, in this context, hizmet is identified with
its intention. Besides bringing together a variety of meanings, like charity, beneficence,
good deeds, paid service and duty, hizmet also brings a range of actors, resources,
materials and acts together, serving both as an encompassing paradigm and as a shortcut
to all the meanings it connotes.
This chapter elaborates on hizmet in its various aspects: as labour, as donations and as
networking. All of these aspects are explored around the main theme that hizmet
provides Kayseri beneficence actors with the 'theory' of gift-giving: its meaning and
spirit. As the chapter proceeds, it will become clear that hizmet, as gift. resists
immediate returns. calculation. anonymity and neutrality. Therefore it is also an
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important resource for network formation and peer relations, both of which rely on
personal ties. In the final section of the chapter I question the intentionality in hizmet
and end by asking if giving is a gift in itself; in other words, if there is a gift of giving.
Labouring for Hizmet
In the charitable field of Kayseri doing hizmet is most often understood as labouring in
one way or another. Any act, in any sector, whether performed by salaried workers,
volunteers or entrepreneurs, can be broadly described as hizmet, since it is service for
the a public good, for somebody in need or for the overall welfare of the society. For
example, businessmen claim that they do hizmet by creating jobs, just as schoolteachers
argue that they do hizmet by teaching morals alongside their official curricula. But most
significantly and without dispute, hizmet labourers are those who work for vakifs. These
workers may be paid or volunteering. However, my observations suggest that this
difference does not reflect on the self-conceptions of workers or the general treatment of
their work.
Whether paid or unpaid, hizmet is hizmet, because this particular qualification does not
stem from the nature of the work but rather from the intentions of its performers. In that
sense both volunteers and salaried workers claim that 'we do not expect anything in
return.' This phrase is not a simple misrepresentation of the truth for those who receive
monthly salaries for their work. It is indeed indicative of how they approach their
labour, how they want it to be presented: as gifts. By suggesting that they are labouring
not for the sake of money, not for any immediate return, but 'to help out other people '.
'for the sake of God' and 'for it is our duty', even those who are paid try to refrain from
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having an expectation of return. This does not mean that they are actively
misrepresenting the truth. Instead, this is their truth. What they are doing, and their
intentions for doing so, exceed any immediate return. This is their way of framing their
acts as acts of gift-giving.
However, as in any gift act, there is always the question that silently lingers in these
claims of altruism and selflessness: Am I going to receive anything back? One day, from
somebody? Beyaz, an exemplary figure in Kayseri beneficence field, whispered the
question with the help of a proverb: 'Who serves in the dervish lodge drinks the soup.
Would any of those (pointing to Erciyes Feneri beneficiaries) offer us a bowl of soup
when the day comes?' When I asked him what he meant, he clarified: 'You know, in the
Judgement Day, are they going to testify for us?' Beyaz's contemplation is indicative of
the paradoxical nature of gift-giving. The first rule is not to expect a return, but at the
same time the gift itself obligates return. The paradox is resolved by the lapse of time
between giving and reciprocating and the undeterminability of the return-gift (Bourdieu
1997a).
All vakifs in Kayseri heavily rely on volunteer labour. This is in accordance with the
national situation. In his research covering approximately 500 vakifs operating
throughout Turkey, Carkoglu (2006) found that on average, vakifs employ 4 volunteers
for every salaried worker. In Kayseri, because the volunteer numbers change drastically
over time, often with no record of the tasks, numbers and working hours performed, it is
not possible to produce exact numbers. But my observations support Carkoglu's
findings about reliance on volunteers, in fact to a greater extent.
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All Kayseri vakifs have a few employees on salary, and it is these people who do most
of the routine work. Volunteers are not expected to work regular hours or perform well-
defined tasks. Rather, they are used as an emergency workforce, meeting up for
extraordinary events like fundraisers, mass distributions, and assisting with Ramadan
meals and health check-ups. At most vakifs the directors also work voluntarily. These
volunteers, whether they do the dishes or run the organisations, have a self-conception
of doing hizmet and devoting their time to a sacred cause. Most volunteers describe
what salaried staff do in identical terms and do not differentiate between themselves and
the employees on the basis of pay under normal conditions, but may question their
hizmet at moments of crisis.
One such incident occurred during a clothes distribution event held by Erciyes Feneri. A
tension was simmering between the volunteers and staff from the start, with the staff
unhappy taking orders from the volunteers. The volunteers had already been advised
about uneasiness among the employees, but a few senior volunteer women did not seem
to heed the warnings. Just a few days after the distribution began, an argument broke out
between an employee and a volunteer over a pair shoes to be given to a beneficiary.
Soon, the argument became so heated that other volunteers had to interfere and walk
their friend to another room. Once the door was shut the woman involved in the quarrel
burst into tears. Others tried to calm her down, and the leader of the volunteers reassured
her of the value of her labour, telling her not to mind the employees because they simply
worked for money, while she, like all other volunteers, worked for God. Therefore she
had to maintain her composure, knowing that what she was doing was superior.
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However, during lunch with the staff I observed similar reasoning from the employee
who had been in the argument. According to him, what they, the workers, did at Erciyes
Feneri day and night was hizmet, while these women who came in once in a while and
acted as if they owned the place were only there to reaffirm their self-worth. What is
striking about this rather ordinary organisational problem and crisis of hierarchy is the
similarity between the moral claims of both parties. Hizmet in this sense is not only
something performed but also something to be competitively claimed as an indicator of
moral value. But it was also the denominator as it appeared in the reconciliatory
intervention of the director later that day: 'We are all here for hizmet, for doing good,
for God's sake; you had better remember this when you have problems with each other.'
The line between volunteering and paid work is not only blurred because of the self-
understandings of actors. There are also material reasons that reinforce this ambiguity.
As I said, vakifs in Kayseri usually employ a few full-time employees to make sure that
operations are not slowed by the constant in- and outflow of volunteers. Yet it is
common practice to pay wages to those in need and let others volunteer. In most cases it
is the need of the employee and the financial resources of the institution that determine
the nature of employment, not the position itsel f. Work requirements are almost never
clearly defined. Most of the salaried workers regularly work overtime unpaid, or handle
tasks that are not in their job descriptions. Their self-conception of doing hizmet, not
simply work, is reinforced through these practices. Despite the fact that in some vakrfs
these low wages and extra work border on exploitation, employees conceptualise it as
their gift to the beneficiaries of their respective organisations. Most express gratitude for
having such a job, like Emre of Erciyes Feneri, who worked the first nine months of his
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employment without social security: 'Not everybody is as lucky work wise as I am.
Here you get both money and blessings.'
Men and women often work together at Kayseri vakifs. There are only a few gender-
segregated vakifs, yet even they require the mixing of genders at important events.
However, at all mixed-gender vakifs, most of the paid employees are men. Women, if
they are given paid employment, usually do secretarial and cleaning jobs. The only
exception is the female director of Melikgazi Vakfi, who is the only woman in a high-
level position. Both men and women serve as volunteers, but the amount of time one is
able to spare for hizmet, as well as when and where they do volunteer work varies
greatly according to gender and age. For vakifs that are not intimately connected to a
religious order it is harder to attract volunteers in general, especially men. With the
exception of a few retired middle-aged or elderly men, the only male volunteers in such
organisations are found at the managerial level. They either work on the board of
trustees, away from daily operations but still with a say on greater decisions, or they
contribute through their managerial skills by working as directors. Outside of this, it is
women who do most of the volunteering. But the more organisations are bureaucratised
and salaried workers take on full-time jobs to handle routine work, the less space
volunteer women find to contribute.
Still, there are some occasions when women's contributions become vital for the
organisations. I described one such occasion in Chapter 3 with regard to the Erciyes
Feneri clothing distribution project. Another occasion of intimate contact, this time with
beneficiaries, is discussed in detail in Chapter 7. But there is one more important role
women play in vakifs: organising charity fairs. Charity fairs are particularly important
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for the discussion I develop around hizmet because they are the occasions on which
labour becomes crystallised as hizmet.
Charity fairs
Every year, all Kayseri vakifs organise charity fairs to raise funds and make themselves
known to the public. During the charity fair season, that is between early May and mid-
September, there are a number of fairs on at any given time in the city. Organisations
compete for access to venues, apply as early as possible for permissions so they can be
among the first to open up a fair in order to attract more enthusiastic shoppers. Although
charity fairs are not the main, or even the greatest source of income for vakifs, they are
afforded great importance by workers and volunteers alike.
More than one hundred people are mobilised for at least one month to organise each
fair. Most volunteers are inactive throughout much of the year, and consider the fairs a
chance to contribute. Charity fair preparations and their day-to-day management are
usually reliant on women's involvement and labour. During the charity fair season,
ordinary vakif operations are often suspended and women, both temporally and
spatially, take over the institutions. At the fairs, the nature and gender of charity work
changes, different meanings of money become observable and the vocabulary of hizmet
crystallises in innumerable encounters and iterations every day.
During my stay in Kayseri I visited several charity fairs organised by vakifs and
volunteered at one of them for two weeks. Although these fairs differ in scale and take
place at different venues, they all have common defining characteristics. Goods on sale
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are either handmade, like hand-knit vests and jumpers, embroidered tablecloths and
bedcovers, and hand-sown bags and clothing; or they are donated by their producers.
Donated items range from furniture to plastic flowers, from trainers to toys. Materials
for the handmade items are often to women who do not have the means to financially
support vakifs but are willing contribute by the organisations. These women produce
marketable items all year round, to be sold either at the charity fairs or at other
fundraising activities. Both handmade goods and donations are sold below market price;
charity fairs thus attract not only the wealthy of the community but also lower- and
middle-class shoppers who find many bargain buys at the stalls.
In addition to the variety of consumer goods, all charity fairs also sell food. Homemade
cakes, biscuits, snacks, pasta, tarts, puddings, baklava and local specialities are prepared
and served daily. Most of the fairs offer special hot dishes that are very labour-intensive
and hard to find at ordinary restaurants. Some of these dishes, like manti (an Anatolian
ravioli particularly associated with Kayseri), are prepared by scores of women before
the charity fairs, kept in freezers and then cooked and served on the day of purchase.
Others are prepared daily by a large group of female volunteers and workers backstage
while the fair is going on. With women's labour free-flowing, these dishes are also
extraordinarily cheap, making them a preferred alternative to restaurant lunches for
students and working people.
Most of the vakifs in Kayseri are legal branches of some religious orders. These vakifs
have well-established and expansive labour pools, which allow them to easily mobilise a
great many people when hands are needed for charity fairs. For independent vakifs like
Erciyes Feneri or Darulaceze Vakfi, however, recruiting this much-needed labour force
167
is a new challenge every year. This task is exclusively taken up by vakrfci women, who
make use of their social capital to organise teams in their neighbourhoods, among their
circles of friends and sometimes even among the beneficiaries of their respective vaki fs.
The only beneficiaries whose help is elicited, however, are the rare women who either
explicitly express a wish to help with vakif work, or those who are well-known by or
have been befriended by vakifct women.
Volunteer women do not work only during the preparation phase of the charity fairs.
They build these fairs from scratch and manage them to the end. It is the women who
decide on the assignment of tasks to people, the prices of items on sale, and the supplies
needed for production and maintenance. They actively produce, sell and compete with
each other to generate more income for their institutions. The role of men is limited to
finding the venue, transporting large items like stalls, ovens, cookers and the furniture to
be sold. They then sit by the entrance and wait for orders from women to run errands.
They do not enter the kitchenlbackstage without permission, because women express the
desire to be more comfortable and relaxed their outfits. Neither do they intervene in
decision-making processes, however troubled they may become. Charity fairs are
unequivocally recognised as the women's realm, even though most of these women hold
no official positions at the vakifs,
Women volunteers at charity fairs express an 'addiction' to these events. Every year
they start planning for the occasion months ahead of time. As the scheduled date
approaches they become more and more enthusiastic. claiming to derive pleasure from
the hard work. Meryem, a middle-aged volunteer, used to repeat, 'Nothing can compare
with the charity fair,' as if a mantra. When I asked what made it so special, she would
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tell me to come and see for myself because 'it has such a different feel.' During and
after the fair, women exhibit pride in the visible traces of their exhaustion, like swollen
ankles or sleepless eyes, but follow this by emphasising they do not feel this exhaustion;
that they surpass their normal physical limits. To make this point, Remziye, another
seasoned volunteer, once told me, 'You should see the fair, Hilal, you should see the
fair. You get tired, you're worn out, you're wasted, and still you go home and cook for
the next day'. Apparently, charity fairs are an event to look forward to for women. A
similar enthusiasm is visible in the pages of other ethnographic books on voluntary
welfare provision. Deeb (2008) relates how Lebanese Shi'i women working for
orphanages and aid centres derive pleasure and joy from what they do, which allowed
them to work extraordinarily long hours without complaint. One of her research
participants even suggested that 'this work is morphine' (p. 194). Harmsen (2008) hints
at a parallel source of motivation in Jordanian voluntary welfare organisations, but does
not take up the issue in detail.
However, the value of charity fairs is not unequivocally established among all related
parties in Kayseri. Instead, it is occasionally challenged by male vakif employees and
becomes a source of tension between men and women. The director of Erciyes Feneri,
who is a wealthy trader of spices and herbs, described this tension from the point of
view of male directors: 'Women, you know, make everything overly complicated. They
make such a big fuss, which then makes you question whether if it's really worth it. 1
can collect the amount of money they make with months of effort from my industrialist
friends in just a couple of days.' When this comment was discussed in a women's
meeting, it created an outrage. Women not only protested the derogatory
characterisation of their work style, but were especially furious at the possibility they
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might lose the chance to organise another charity fair on the basis of low productivity
and profitability. The women of Erciyes Feneri protested that there was more to charity
fairs than simply making money and raising funds; these will be discussed below.
The gift of labour
Within business principles that overvalue productivity, efficiency and profitability,
women's charity work may seem incongruous and out of place. The women of Kayseri
vakrfs do not make detailed cost analyses of their sales items. Their selected profit
margin is so narrow that they make almost no money, especially from food. Only those
items that come completely free result in a financially meaningful return. In 2009, after
a month of constant production and two weeks of sales at the Erciyes Feneri charity fair,
net profits barely covered the organisation's expenses for one month. For Dartilaceze
Vakfi the return was much lower. So as a tradesman himself, the director of Erciyes
Feneri has a point. Yet what is more interesting and important to the discussion in this
chapter is the women volunteers' point, which eventually convinced the director too:
that there is something more to charity fairs than making money.
Why these women do not make neat calculations as expected by the director cannot be
explained by inexperience or lack of knowledge. Instead, some of the women have been
working in similar organisations for almost a decade and others run their own
businesses. The reason they exhibit so little interest in cost-benefit analyses should be
sought elsewhere: outside the realm of economic calculations and market transactions
and within the realm of the gift. Everything that goes into and comes out of charity fairs
is a gift. This applies to the labour of the volunteers as much as it does to the donated
items. Women consider their labour to be gifts, and this understanding is the reason
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behind the silent and sometimes unconscious resistance to making calculations.
Volunteers find it incomprehensible to attach any monetary value to labour spent on
hizmet and often donate their labour to charity fairs without accounting for it.
While women do not openly count their hours and measure their contribution, this
particular kind of disinterestedness is not only a matter of work etiquette. It further
implies that labour is not considered a factor in determining the monetary value of
charity fair goods. Labour is not added to the prices, which would otherwise increase
profit margins considerably. On the contrary, it is deducted from the price, in a manner
of speaking. Therefore, instead of creating a greater return for the organisation-and
thus a greater gift to the organisation and its beneficiaries-women's labour, embedded
these products, most significantly becomes a gift to the buyers.
This does not mean that women do not keep track of what they do. They track whatever
they produce, for example, 'Today I cooked six pots of manti" or talk about how
swollen their feet are or how severe their headache had become. Nuran, who had a life
threatening health condition before she started volunteering at Erciyes Feneri, once told
me about this in detail:
I used to bake delicious cakes. So I thought: 'Why do I make these cakes
for my woman friends? I should better make them for the poor.' Next year
I stood behind the cake counter from early in the morning till evening,
every single day. I emptied the trays and cake stands. Then went home and
baked cakes with a 10 kilo bucket of flour ... I couldn't stand on my feet,
because they were so swollen. But, because I did all of this without
accounting for it, a goodness occurred in my body. I healed because of the
prayers and good wishes I had received. I believe I am alive because of
this.
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Nuran, then, gave me an account of what type of cakes she used to bake and how
sleepless she was during the fair. A vivid remembrance that comes after so many years.
Just like Nuran, charity fair workers keep track of the effects of their labour, which
cannot be completely quantified or measured, but this is not an equation of labour with
time, and of time with money. Their labour is inseparable from the production,
intentions and meaning involved in the activity. This takes us to one of the most
significant features of the gift as specified by Mauss (1990): inalienability. Unlike
commodities, gifts are not easily alienable from the person who gives them (or in this
case who makes them). By refusing to alienate their labour from the product, the women
volunteers of charity fairs mark what they produce as personal gifts, not as generic
commodities.
The conception of charity fair goods as gifts rather than commodities becomes
especially observable when a shopper protests that what he or she wants to buy is
overpriced. Although volunteers at the stalls often offer discounts and even give away
some items when they believe the shopper needs them, a customer grumbling about the
value of their goods causes consternation. Most of the women refuse to discuss the value
of their labour and take a defensive stance, blaming their correspondents for confusing
charity and business and failing to understand the meaning of hizmet. They sometimes
openly confront these customers, like Servet, a volunteer responsible for the sweets stall
once did: 'We are working here for God's sake, we are not salaried labourers! If you
cannot appreciate the haytr (beneficence) you perform by buying these items, then go
shop on the street!'
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The idea of labour as embedded gift is also crystallised with certain shoppers-those
considered to be appropriate subjects of the generalised generosity involved in
volunteering. The poor, the elderly and students are seen as perfect receivers of these
gifts. Women who work at the fairs become especially welcoming to these groups of
people, as they are seen as natural and deserving recipients of charity. They are worthy
of the gift embedded in underpriced goods, and even the additional gift of additional
price reduction and free items. The regular distribution of food and drastic discounts to
needy customers and students is a common practice at charity fairs too.
The gift of prayer
Charity fair volunteers make a deliberate effort to signify and further enhance what they
produce as gifts with rituals. These rituals most commonly find expression in
overflowing and indefinitely circulating good wishes like 'may God be pleased' (Allah
razt olsun). This phrase is evidently important with its reference to God as the receiver
of the gift: the gift of the customer that is instantiated through his or her shopping at the
fair and the gift of the labourer who works to make it happen. It is a wish for God to
accept the gift. This prayer is so naturalised that it often replaces an ordinary 'thank
you' altogether, coming out by habit of tongue. Still, it reminds everyone involved that
this is not a commercial transaction. Instead, it is a gift transaction with God as the
ultimate giver and receiver of gifts, and is therefore sacrosanct.
There are also some less naturalised ways to further enchant the goods sold at charity
fairs. Almost all fairs in Kayseri are launched with a ceremony that involves a short
recitation from the Qur'an and a prayer/appeal by an important religious figure. This
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ceremony is then repeated every day in a more informal fashion by the person who
unlocks the door of the venue early in the morning, and by volunteers and workers
before they begin their workday. At the Erciyes Feneri charity fair, the daily ritual of
collective prayer was directed by the leader of the female volunteers. This woman, who
was a renowned religious preacher, used to gather all the volunteers around her and
improvise a prayer in Turkish, interspersed with verses from the Qur'an in Arabic. The
prayer mostly consisted of an appeal for bounty; for well-wishes, peace and harmony
among the volunteers; and for the health and well-being of the customers. She would
conclude with a further appeal to God asking for the acceptance of both volunteers' and
shoppers' deeds and gifts.
While working in the production and sales of goods, some women have their own rituals
to accompany their actions. Some pray with beads while sitting behind the stalls, others
repeat a short prayer for every grapevine leaf they roll. Turning on and off the hobs and
ovens, lifting the lid of a pot or beginning to chop spring greens become occasions for
little prayers for the well-being of those who will eat the dishes and for acceptance of
the good deeds of those who prepare them. Usually, this constant enchantment of
production and the materials that come out of it takes place in a silent and naturalised
way. Women do not emphasise the symbolic and spiritual labour they imbue into these
items in order to increase their value. Yet there was at least one occasion on which the
way in which these rituals affect the products' quality was put on the table:
Every day during the Erciyes Feneri charity fair a man came to have an early dinner in
the company of a couple of women. He always ordered the women's food by coming to
the food stalls while the women sat and waited at their table. One evening. the man
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spoke of how glad they were for the fair, as they were finally having freshly cooked hot
dishes for dinner. I asked him if they worked until late. The man grinned and replied,
'We don't have a house to go, you know, we are in the estates business'. As I tried to
make sense of this seemingly meaningless sentence, one of the volunteer women
interrupted, took the man's order and thanked him goodbye. After he walked away, this
volunteer woman, Nuran, in a hushed voice and told me that she had been observing the
man for some time, and that she had become certain he was 'selling those girls'. It
appeared that I was the only one who could not 'figure it out'. In another moment, all
the women near us expressed with their agreement with this assessment and said they
hoped their food, which on which they had prayed, would help them redeem their paths.
Seyhan added that she was praying in particular for the deliverance and salvation of
these young women. Nothing was said or implied to the customers; they were politely
served and left unaware of the prayers, judgements and wishes hidden in the food they
were eating. But the gift was there, no matter if the receivers knew it or not. In that
sense, this maybe the closest that the gift, in the context of beneficence, can get to
Derrida's (1997) impossible gift.
The gift as exchange
I thus contend that shopping at charity fairs can better be understood as gift exchange
than as market transaction. Goods and products put on sale carry an inalienable
personal, social and moral value embedded within them which far exceeds their
financial value and importance. By producing and selling these goods, charity workers
are actively giving gifts, whereas by buying these items in the proper manner and by
recognising the gift aspect of the goods, customers identify and accept these gifts. In the
175
eyes of charity fair volunteers, those who try to bargain cannot recognise the gift and
refuse it. Refusal of a gift enacts the worst possible scenario in a gift exchange, as first
and foremost, acceptance of the gift is obligatory (Mauss 1990). Rejection creates a
shared negative feeling in those who laboured for that gift and becomes a subject of
hours of chit-chat. On the other hand, those who recognise and accept the gift then pay
the sum due. But what makes the interaction a gift exchange is not this payment.
Signification as gift is, once again, marked with utterances of recognition.
As mentioned earlier, these moments when things change hands are always highlighted
with the phrase 'may God be pleased' (Allah razt a/sun). Customers recognise the gift as
one primarily given to God, and say so. When charity fair workers receive payment for
their sales they reciprocate with the same phrase. This time it is the seller's tum to
appreciate this monetary transaction as a gift, again with the ultimate recipient being
God. Charity fair volunteers explicitly express desire for their gifts to be recognized; but
their faith in the final recipient gives them a tool to overcome their disappointments
when events do not unfold as they expected. A dialogue that took place between two
volunteers, in my focus group study shows this point:
Remziye: So, dear Hilal, we work for two months, just as much as we
work for our own households. We put that much effort, that much labour
in. But whether this effort is appreciated or not, is only known by God.
Nuray: We are doing it for God, already. So who else is to appreciate it?
Here Remziye implies that, at least at certain times she does not get enough recognition
and appreciation of her gifts. But expressing this disappointment is not a welcome part
of their public rhetoric about what they do. So Nuray reminds her of that, by pointing to
the final recipient of all gifts and thus the ultimate determiner of the value of deeds. This
idea. certainly gives women solace at moments of crises. However. this being said.
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what most ratifies volunteer women's sense of accomplishment in gift-giving is the
willingness of charity fair shoppers to enter into this enchanted exchange of things and
words. These customers are active subjects in this symbolic and moral meaning
creation, with the acts recognised as gift-giving. At first sight, charity fairs are not so
different from any commercial enterprise, and their customers seem no different from
high street shoppers. But a closer look reveals that those exchanges are closer to gift
than market transactions. As detailed in Chapter 1, market transactions are contractual
and tend to have closure when payment is made and goods are delivered. Customers
know what they are going to receive for what they pay. In short, the transactions have
no strings attached except those explicitly spelled out in the contract. For shoppers at
charity fairs the act of buying is itself an act of gift; a gift that is to be delivered to the
beneficiaries of the host organisation. Therefore, the transaction does not have closure
when they are handed the goods they have paid for. It is into open-ended gift flows that
they are entering. In that sense, shopping at charity fairs is seen by neither the volunteers
nor the shoppers as a structurally or fundamentally different kind of transaction than
making donations. Although customers 'buy' something, they know that, in the last
instance, their payment will be used for charitable purposes and will be accepted by
beneficiaries as a gift sponsored by a shopper.
So far I have tried to illustrate how labouring for hizmet is an instantiation of gift-giving
by focusing on different aspects of this labour, as it appears during charity fairs.
Certainly, labouring for hizmet is not limited to charity fair work. On the contrary, vakif
workers and volunteers tend to identify all vakif-related work with hizmet and therefore
to give their labour as gifts to beneficiaries on innumerable occasions. Charity fairs are
only one example of these occasions, but certainly a condensed one. I touch upon some
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other forms of labouring for hizmet in the coming chapters, but it is time to move on to
another form of doing hizmet: donating.
Donating for Hizmet
In Kayseri, although most of the vakifs organise charity fairs and fund-raising
luncheons, the greatest source of income for these charitable organisations are
donations. Donations are made either in kind or in cash. Some organisations receive
regular sums from their donors, especially from their board members, while others give
more sporadically and spontaneously. At certain times of the year, like at Ramadan or
Eid, donations increase dramatically; still, the flow of donations continues year-round.
In this section my focus will be on how money is differentiated according to the
intention of the donor and the source of the earning, and how it is directed at different
uses.
Richard Titmuss (1997) argues that donating for the welfare and well-being of strangers
is a modem phenomenon that runs counter to the mechanisms of gift as formulated by
Mauss (1990). What makes them inexplicable by the Maussian approach is that the gift
object, i.e. money, makes them alienable. What Titmuss says about money is, indeed,
very much shared in contemporary literature, but I will go against the grain to argue and
illustrate that money, at least in the context of donations, is not as alienable from its
donor as expected. Money goes through various processes on its way to becoming a gift.
This section is about the meanings, symbols and spells that strip money of its neutral
and colourless disguise and make it a means for hizmet.
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Religious money
One day at Erciyes Feneri, Beyaz was busy finding household furniture for a newly
graduated female schoolteacher who had no family or support in Kayseri. After
gathering some things from here and there, he made a phone call to a workshop to ask
for a desk. Later, when we went to the shop to collect the desk, the shop owner, who
was an acquaintance of 8eyaz asked, 'Is this desk for someone in need or are you going
to use it in the vakif office? I wanted to make sure, in order to decide whether to count it
in for my zekat or for my sadaka.' 8eyaz told him that the young girl who was going to
use the desk was really in need and added, 'It is as pure as zekat can be.'
In the charitable environment of Kayseri, for donations to have these clearly Islamic
markings-zekat and sadaka-distinguishing them from each other has practical
implications. A complex set of regulations based on scripture, exegeses and the
deliberations of religious scholars are applied to these different but closely related types
of donation and their usage.
As described in Chapter I, paying zekat is compulsory for every Muslim whose wealth
rises above a minimum level, and it is considered equal in importance to faith in God or
observation of prayers. Those to whom zekat can be given are listed in the Qur'an
(Tawba: 60) as such: 1- The poor, 2- The destitute, 3- Zekat collection officials (where
zekat is collected by the state). 4- Prospective converts to Islam (this is the only
exception to the rule that zekat must be given to Muslims), 5- Slaves (in order to help
them gain/buy their freedom), 6- Debtors, 7- Those who are in God's way (like those
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receiving religious education, those on their way to pilgrimage, those who fight a just
Jihad), 8- Wayfarers, travellers (given that they are in need).
Zekat cannot be given to non-Muslims, to one's close kin or, according to convention in
Turkey, to institutions like hospitals, schools, mosques and the like (Topbas 2006). Only
vakifs that distribute what they are given are seen as eligible for zekat. Zekat is also
bound by time; it should reach its final destination before the completion of the year in
which the zekat is due. This particular point is a source of serious concern as the director
of Erciyes Feneri notes:
It is not good for us to have too much donations. There is a limit to what
we can righteously distribute and spend in a short period of time. It is
people's zekat, so it has to reach its destination as quickly as possible.
You cannot wrap yourself in money; you have to transfer it. So neither
too little nor too much money is good for us.
In contrast to zekat, sadaka is a voluntary, yet strongly encouraged, act of Islamic
charity that has a wider meaning and coverage. It can be given to anyone under any
circumstances of temporary or permanent need. It can also be donated to welfare
institutions in order to serve a broader spectrum of needs. Because of its non-obligatory
nature, sadaka is often highly praised and is believed to lead to accrued merits with God.
Alongside the aim of helping someone out, sadaka may well be given with a variety of
intentions: to payoff some small sins, to cover the days a woman stopped fasting during
Ramadan due to menstruation, to show thankfulness for some gains or good news. in
order to protect loved ones from accidents. and so on. Moreover. sadaka does not even
have to be something material. A caring gesture, an attempt to help somebody or even a
congenial smile to a stranger count as sadaka.
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The boundlessness of sadaka and the highly regulated notion of zekat often create
practical complications for vakifs. Money and goods that are marked as zekat require
different treatment than ordinary donations that come in the form of sadaka. It is
controversial to use zekat money for administrative expenses, so some vaktfs handle this
situation by working only with volunteers and therefore avoiding any overhead costs,
while others keep different accounts for zekat and for donations of all other sorts.
Showing his own discomfort with the situation, the director of Erciyes Feneri told me
about how he covered the operational expenses of the vakif by setting aside the income
generated at the charity fairs for this use only. Yet sometimes this money is not enough,
so he attempted to find a religious justification for occasions to mix resources and has
consulted a religious scholar, who told him a story about the Prophet: 'One day
somebody asked the Prophet, peace be upon him, if they could pay for their camels'
feed from the zekat they collected. The Prophet approved, saying, because these animals
were working in the collection of zekat, of course they should be fed by zekat.
Nowadays our animals' feed is oil, so we may cover such expenses with zekat.'
Yet, among the vakifcis of Kayseri this reasoning and permission are often taken as a
last resort. Paying attention to benefactors' intentions and the characteristics of their
donations is seen as a requirement of becoming a just, trustworthy and pious person, and
hence a better vakrfci. In order to maintain this, charity workers often make daily
adjustments. For example, Beyaz uses various jacket pockets to store different sorts of
donations, while Neriman, the director of Melikgazi Foundation, has separate envelopes
in her handbag, each with a designated purpose. These daily and practical technologies
allow them to observe the meaning and quality even of individual banknotes entrusted to
them. In their hands, goods and banknotes carry the intentions, prayers and beliefs of
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their previous owners. They remam enchanted, individualised and marked with an
otherworldly stamp. This lets us question the alleged neutrality of money, an issue that
will be discussed below. But before that, another dimension of earmarking money will
be elaborated: the source of money.
Tainted money
Not only is money circulating in charitable gift networks marked with its purpose, but
quite commonly the source of money also contributes to its character. How particular
monies are earned directly affects how they can be legitimately and rightfully spent.
Some types of money are seen as dirty in origin and should be spent carefully. Among
the charity networks in Kayseri, what is openly considered to be dirty money is earned
interests. As both charging and paying interest are forbidden in Islam, while also being
impossible to avoid in contemporary banking, how one handles interest without doing
harm is a matter of serious discussion among the Muslim public (see Chapter I). Among
the vakifcis and beneficiaries, I have come across many creative ways to treat this 'dirty
money', all of which has had to do with cleaning, food and immediacy.
One day during Ramadan 2008, Erciyes Feneri Market was crowded with shoppers
carrying vouchers from organisations. These had been sold by Erciyes Feneri to
business people, who in tum gave them away as their own sadaka, to be spent at Erciyes
eneri market. I was helping out in the market because it was a particularly busy time of
year, and while bagging customers' acquisitions, I spotted a man who had tilled his
shopping cart with 14 packs of washing powder. 8 packs of wet wipes and nothing else.
After he paid with his voucher, as I helped him load his bags onto his bicycle I
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expressed my curiosity about all the detergent. The young man politely smiled and told
me that he was working as a porter in an upmarket high-rise. One of the landlords had
given him the voucher, but he knew this landlord was not a pious man and that he was
receiving interest. Since he could not be sure of the purity of the 'money' he had been
given, he and his wife considered the situation and decided not to use it on food, but on
something else. They did have three young kids who were experts in soiling their
clothes, so the young man bought bags of washing powder .• I do not know if this is the
right thing to do', he said, 'but you know, this is somebody's sadaka, you cannot throw
it away. But I wouldn't want to feed my children with forbidden money either.'
In this young man's story, two characteristics of the same money create a conflict
requiring a creative solution. First of all what this man was given is gift money, which
necessitates recognition and acceptance. The already existing relationship between the
young man and the landlord makes rejecting the gift impossible, and as gift money, the
landlord's dubious earnings make their way into the pious porter's pocket. But the
second characteristic of the money, that it might have been earned in religiously
forbidden (haram) ways, further taints it, keeping him from spending it on even basic
necessities. He comes up with a strategy that permitted him minimum contact with the
money, but that did not risk tainting the insides of the children. This conflict over
cleanliness and purity is resolved in its most metaphoric way: with soap. The young man
was attempting to wash away the stain on the gift money with 28 kilograms of washing
powder.
Viviana Zelizer starts The Social Meaning of Money with the statement, 'It is a powerful
ideology of our time that money is a single. interchangeable, absolutely impersonal
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instrument-the very essence of our rationalising modem civilisation' (1994, 1), and as
the book progresses she illustrates how this ideology has become so widespread and
convincing, and also how it is mistaken. Starting with the early theorists of modernity,
Marx, Veblen, Simmel and Weber, money has been attributed certain characteristics,
such as infinite divisibility, homogeneity, impersonality and liquidity, that make it an
effective agent of social change, a determinant of the impersonalised, mechanised and
disenchanted modem experience. In social sciences literature, money invariably appears
as a neutral yet powerful source of change in social relations-both their symbol and
their cause. This attribute of having the power to shape the social atmosphere finds its
perfect example in Georg Simmel's writing.
In The Metropolis and Mental Life (l964[1908j), Simmel positions money in a close
and mutually enforcing relationship with the modem psyche, namely apathetic blase
attitudes, as they share a certain 'erasing' effect: 'To the extent that money, with its
colourlessness and its indifferent quality, can become a common denominator of all
values, it becomes the frightful leveller-it hollows out the core of things, their
peculiarities, their specific values and their uniqueness and incomparability in a way
which is beyond repair' (p. 414). In short, money makes things similar to itself, imbuing
its qualities into every aspect of life that it touches. Zelizer (1994), illustrates how
'colour blind' Simmel's otherwise detailed and attentive analysis is by showing how
money itself is far from being homogeneous, impersonal and colourless. Instead, people
steadily earmark money, treat it differentially, categorise it and embed it in their social
relations. Therefore, as much as money has trans formative power over social relations, it
is deeply affected and constantly reshaped by social ties and institutions themselves.
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As I have tried to illustrate with the examples above, money that circulates in the
charitable networks of Kayseri is loaded with meanings, values and qualities that far
exceed its quantitative importance in the eyes of both receivers and donors. Money is
tainted one way or another and it is almost always earmarked. It is categorised according
to the way it is earned and the way it is spent. It is further categorised according to the
processes it goes through, especially the process of purification through charitable
giving. Doing hizmet through donations has the function of transforming money, from
wealth to the sacred sadaka and zekat.
An elderly vakifci man I met in Kayseri once told me that 'genuine Muslims' should be
grateful to the recipients of their zekat and sadaka, because it was the only way for them
to clean their money from its inherent stain. Hence, zekat, sadaka and any other kind of
donation are ways of purifying one's earnings and wealth. This idea is shared by
religious scholars (see for example Maududi 1984; Topbas 2006; Senturk 2007) as well
as Islamic economists (Choudhury 1983; H. Dean and Khan 1997). However, the same
feature of religiously motivated donations is also the target of cynical criticism (see for
example Cinar 1997). Muslim industrialists are accused of veiling the exploitative
nature of their means of making money by giving a tiny portion of it as zekat and
sadaka, or of attempting to wipe their consciences clean of the burdens of this dubiously
earned wealth.
Whether approached positively or with criticism, it is clear that the transforming and
enchanting logic of hizmet extends beyond interpersonal relations and one's labour to
the realm of materialities, even if that material is the seemingly colourless money.
Within the framework of hizmet, money is earmarked with the method of its collection
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and with the intentions for its expenditure. Therefore, donating for hizmet is, at the same
time, an act of meaning creation and social signification that challenges the alienability
of the most alienated and disenchanted of material objects, transforming it into a gift
with proper gift qualities.
Networking for Hizmet
On an ordinary day at work, Neriman, the director of Melikgazi Vakfi, spends a
significant share of her time talking on the phone. She receives calls from the manager
of the Industrial Zone, who is also the head of the board of the vakrf; from the mayor's
wife; the regional director of education; the superintendent of the university hospital;
and from school principals. She herself makes calls to municipal officers, other
members of the board of the vakif, some wealthy townswomen, the director of social
services, other vakifs' employees and volunteers, friends in the health sector, police
officers, pharmacists, and the governor's secretary. Her mobile phone seems to be her
most immediate and valuable instrument, almost the sole possibility that she might be
able to engage in her chosen work, since she spends barely three-to-four hours per day
in her office. She is always on the go, handling some task somewhere in the city.
Without her mobile, she would not be able to maintain her connections, and without
these connections she would be useless.
In Kayseri's charitable field, carrymg out most ordinary tasks involves plenty of
networking, outsourcing, and cooperation between various institutions and persons of
power and authority. These actors have positions in the public services, in vakifs or in
the business community. They mix and match efforts and resources, which may again be
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public or private, at the request of others in their networks. Whether the resources are
public or private is not a matter of concern for any of the people involved. Nobody cares
when Melikgazi's patient shelter is cleaned by municipal sanitation workers before the
governor's visit, or when Erciyes Feneri rents a municipal building for a symbolic
amount. In situations like these, what is problematised is the use of resources. Are they
used appropriately for hizmet or for private transactions? If they are used for the public
interest or for providing to someone in need, resources, either publicly or privately, they
are understood to had achieved their aim. If they come from a private donor, 'may God
be pleased with her'; if they are public resources, then this is what public resources are
for (still, 'may God be pleased with the person who handled the allocation').
The reason behind this indifference relates to the structure of organisations, as well as to
a paradigmatic imaginary signification that sustains the ethos surrounding this structure.
It is the institutional features of waqf that affect the contemporary beneficence field in
Kayseri. As I have discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the institution of waqf historically
resists delineations between public and private. Indeed it is built around an
understanding of the social universe wherein such distinctions are not so readily made.
Still, if we are to use this terminology, waqf can better be intimated as a personal act
with public aims and consequences. I want to underline the choice of concepts: personal,
not private. Private is not a suitable term for many reasons, two of which are of key
importance to this dissertation. First of all, waqf is a 'gift of law', as Isin and Lefebvre
(2005) put it. It is an act that creates legal subjects bound by a set of norms and statutes.
Second, waqf is an act of communication with a wider community, or a public if you
wish. It is an expression of interest, recognition and responsibility, and an attempt to be
known and accepted as a benevolent and caring person. The choice of terminology is a
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reference to this very personal desire. Waqf resists anonymity, as all waqf work is
known by its founder's name, whether a small roadside fountain or a huge mosque
complex. A broader discussion of the political and social impact of this personalistic
tendency throughout the institution's history can be found in Chapter 2. Here I want to
focus on contemporary glimpses of the same characteristic and its implications.
On the most primary level, in Kayseri, vakrf networks are based on personal relations.
Individuals acting within these networks may owe their social standing to their
institutional positions, yet in the field of gift-giving they are primarily taken as persons
with very personal characteristics: they maybe trustworthy, benevolent, hardworking,
pious, as well as unreliable, selfish, lazy, etc. They may have power over resources
through their connections, wealth, family names, or vocations. Whoever they are, they
are called into these networks primarily as persons, through personal ties. As a result of
these personalistic processes, bureaucratic red tape is often put aside, record-keeping is
taken loosely and the speed with which a request is responded to takes primary
importance. So, at the request of the superintendent of a public hospital, for example, a
patient's debt to the social security system can be covered by a vakif immediately and
the patient can be operated on the same day. Or, the prime minister could assign each of
his wealthy friends a construction project on a university campus and they would be
obligated to undertake the project.
Janine Clark (2004) describes a similar organisation of charitable work in Egypt, Jordan
and Yemen. She suggests that the horizontal ties that make up middle class networks
create conditions for the existence for many 'Islamic Social Institutions'. These ISIs rely
on personal relations for funding, to overcome bureaucratic obstacles. to recruit staff
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and volunteers, and for many other administrative issues. According to her, what holds
the ISIs together is the strength and breadth of the middle-class networks that support
them, though the benefits are not unidirectional. The members of these networks benefit
from the support they provide to ISIs as much as the ISIs benefit from their
contributions. These benefits are not necessarily material. A strong sense of solidarity, a
feeling of inclusion and harmony, and the satisfaction of being part of a group working
for a good cause are all significant outcomes of the lSI involvement. However, there are
undeniable yet indeterminable material benefits as well. A businessman's donations to
an lSI may initiate a commercial exchange between him and others in the network, a
voluntary service may turn into paid employment, and a favour for one's charitable
cause may be reciprocated with a favour of support to the charity of the other.
A similar observation is made by Osella and Osella (2009) in their study of the Muslim
Kerala entrepreneurs who made fortunes through their businesses in the Gulf states.
These wealthy men heavily invest in charitable projects, especially in the field of
education in their hometowns in Kerala. However most of these projects involve
mobilisation of state resources, businessmen's donations and local elites' participation.
This is possible because the Kerala rich are already implicated in a network that is
formed by marriages between families, business partnerships, and gifts and favours of
all sorts.
Clark's (2004) case studies in Egypt. Jordan and Yemen and Osella and Osella's (2009)
observations regarding Kerala support my observations in Kayseri that networks are of
prime importance to welfare provision. and that what makes these networks function
smoothly and keeps them geared towards further solicitation is the reciprocal exchange
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of gifts and favours. Therefore, as argued before, the gift relations that are the subject of
this thesis do not exist between the donors and beneficiaries alone. Alongside the gift
relations between intermediary vakif workers (vakifcis) and beneficiaries, another gift
circuit of vital importance in Kayseri is constituted by the gifts that flow between
friends, colleagues and relatives who donate, work for or otherwise support the vakifs.
This reliance on personal contacts encourages and justifies informality. Unless there is
an absolute need to do the paperwork, formalising the flow of resources is not seen as
necessary. Paperwork and formalisation are only mandatory for the immovables, like
buildings or sites. On such occasions, protocols are drafted to legalise the conditions of
the transfer that had been previously agreed upon again in private settings and terms.
Certainly, all vakifs are subject to annual government controls and they all keep ledgers.
Yet, as what comes in also goes out quickly, there is little time to record every record on
one little envelope in a vakifci's bag or to log the mattresses waiting to be collected in a
businessman's warehouse. The 'iron cage of bureaucracy' (Weber 1985) is antithetical
to the ad hoc nature and fluidity of hizmet. There are thus widely used shortcuts that go
unquestioned, since the people know each other and have established long-term
reciprocal relations. In Kayseri, doing vakif work is all about establishing these
relationships and increasing one's command over various forms of capital and over the
overall volume of it he or she has circulating within these networks. r will discuss this
Bourdieuian point further with the help of an anecdote:
One day in October 2008, Hamit Beyaz of Erciyes Feneri was busy helping to settle a
refugee family from the Caucasus in their new home in Kayseri. A Circassian himself,
Beyaz had known the family since the early days of their arrival to Turkey. They were
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not registered beneficiaries of Erciyes Feneri, but he was willing to use his own
resources to help them settle. The first task was to arrange accommodation. A friend of
Beyaz took care of this, renting a flat in one of the newly built mass housing projects on
the outskirts of the city, even paying first month's rent. Beyaz was supposed to furnish
the flat, as the family had nothing but their clothes. After telling me the story of their
troubles, he made a list of basic household items and started his first round of phone
calls. After a number of calls, he was promised a gas cooker, a sofa set, carpets of
various sizes, a bunk bed and its mattresses, a dinner table and chairs, a set of pots and
pans, a small second-hand refrigerator and a television set. Only half an hour had
passed, and the only items remaining on his list were a vacuum cleaner and a washing
machine. He told me that he actually had the washing machine. He had found one a
while ago for somebody who had not then shown up to collect it. So it could be of better
use now. He checked his list of immediate necessities once more and told me to have a
glass of tea and wait to see 'how God would send the vacuum cleaner'.
Beyaz's reach and ability to mobilise resources may be somewhat extraordinary, but the
incident illustrates commonplace networking, resourcing and outsourcing activities
undertaken by all those involved with vakifs in Kayseri. Being in this field, most
importantly, entails capacities to orchestrate one's own as well as other people's
material, social and cultural resources. 8eyaz's own network consists of fellow vakrf
workers, wealthy businessman, benevolent friends, public service employees, fellow
members of a religious order, and people from his ethnic community. Within this broad
and diverse network, he occupies an important node in the local charity field.
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Beyaz is not a wealthy man himself; indeed, he actually lives on the verge of poverty.
He looks after a family of five on his decent salary from Erciyes Feneri. Coming from
an impoverished migrant family he was a construction worker during his teens and
twenties. Then, while he was working in a construction site in Medina, Saudi Arabia, he
rediscovered his religion following some extraordinary dreams and coincidences. By the
time he returned to Turkey, he was a devoted and practising Muslim who wished to be
part of hizmet. Beyaz defines hizmet as being a servant of God by being a servant of
'the universe', as he puts it. With this aim, he began working in vakrfs through the help
of the religious group with whom he was involved. He was soon established as a
trustworthy actor in the field of beneficence in Kayseri. At the time of my research,
lacking the financial resources to support his hizmet, Beyaz was working as a salaried
employee of Erciyes Feneri. He held a decision-making position which allowed him a
flexible work schedule, and so he used to spend a significant amount of time in the
service of other vakifs or coordinating gift-giving of all sorts, including as described
above.
Despite the fact that Beyaz has very limited economic and cultural capital in the
Bourdieuian sense, his extensive social capital allows him to be a prominent actor in the
field of beneficence in Kayseri. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as an aggregate
of a person's at least partly institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and
recognition. Within these relationships one can pursue interest over the capital of others.
So, social capital gives a person command over other people's resources, reputations
and capabilities. This conceptualisation of social capital is shared by James Coleman
(1988). However, Coleman's approach lacks an understanding of the possible venues of
action for people who lack the initial social capital (Lewis 2010). Bourdieu's argument
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about the convertibility of capital is much more illuminating. When a person exercises
command over other people's resources, a conversion of types of capital takes place.
While Beyaz is relatively disadvantaged in terms of class and education, he has other
resources that can be converted. He is in particularly good command of language that
has a persuasive effect on his connections. This language is rich in religious references,
but its efficacy is not solely dependent on this. It is powerful because it is shared. It
speaks to the common sensibilities of the members of his circle, it is full of references to
shared past experiences, it thrives on a mutual ethos and employs signs referring to a
particular imaginary-the imaginary of waqf. If Beyaz's credibility is an accumulation
of various mutual exchanges resulting in desired outcomes, his command of a shared
language certainly has a multiplicative effect on this accumulation.
Although a substantial quantity of symbolic capital is required for one to be able to
mobilise resources within networks, the networks themselves are a powerful initiator of
beneficence activities. They are created and maintained through relations of reciprocal
exchange-gift-giving-among peers of different standings. What is exchanged is not
simply words and prayers like 'may God be pleased'. The material basis of hizmet and
all vakif activities can also be found in gift exchange. Within the networks of
beneficence, favours may be made with disinterested intentions. but they create an
obligation to reciprocate anyway. Reciprocation often involves another act ofhizmet. So
while the social ties between network members are strengthened, or at least maintained,
resources for beneficence activities are guaranteed without any open agreement or




One silent afternoon in Erciyes Feneri, an elderly man in a smart suit appeared at the
door. All the employees seemed to know him already, they all moved to greet him. He
was Selim Korkmaz, one of the organisation's founders and an important donor; he
rarely visited. Behind him was a young woman in worn-out clothes holding a tiny baby
in her arms. The baby was wrapped in a blanket. After greeting everybody, Korkmaz
explained that earlier that day he had gone to the hospital for a routine health check. It
was there that he crossed paths with the woman with the baby. She was at the hospital to
get treatment for her child, who appeared to have a serious disability in her feet. When
he inquired about her situation, she expressed her devastation, saying that the doctors
had treated them badly and refused to care for the child. She felt sure it was because
they were poor. Korkmaz decided to take them to Melikgazi Hospital for free treatment,
but on the way he stopped by at Erciyes Feneri to offer the woman some in-kind help.
While he was pushing the shopping cart in the market, filling it with one each of almost
every item available, we were instructed to find new clothes for the woman and the
baby. With the help of another employee, I collected several blouses, cardigans and
skirts from the shelves and gave them to the woman to see if she liked them. We then
went to the racks together to find her a thick overcoat. I was holding the baby as she
tried the coat on when Korkmaz appeared with a full cart and smiled at me. He said, 'Do
you know how lucky you are that you are now holding this baby? It is luck sent to you
by God. That doctor asked for money. He has no idea what real luck is!'
This idea of being lucky or blessed for helping a fellow human being is widely shared
among beneficence circles in Kayseri. This thinking has a number of dimensions. First,
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it certainly involves an acclamation of mutual help and beneficence. If being able to do
so is considered lucky, then it is certainly a good thing-a good thing both to do and to
have happen to you. Second, to do good is also a Godly gift, an occasion created for you
by God. And finally, it is a gift in the sense of being gifted. It is inborn; it is destiny not
of your own making. With all these dimensions it is a gift to be grateful for.
In this chapter I have explored the theory of gift-giving in Kayseri, which is often
expressed through the umbrella term hizmet. I have examined various disguises and
dimensions of the concept with equal emphasis on its religious connotations and its
practical role in the circuits of gift. Throughout the chapter I have suggested that labour,
donations, favours, words and prayers are gifts in a variety of ways. They are gifts to
beneficiaries, gifts to customers, gifts to friends and acquaintances who asked for the
favour, and finally gifts to God as the ultimate receiver of gifts. Therefore, hizmet
provides fertile ground on which to base relationships, and it further enchants these
bonds with a religious discourse. Spirally, the idioms and imaginary reproduced within
these relations can also be seen as sources of obligation to take part in hizmet, and
therefore to give gifts.
And yet, being able to participate in hizmet is a gift in itself. Those who give feel they
have already been given something, that they have already been implicated in gift-
giving. This is going against the assumption of premeditating subjects who think, decide
and donate, in that order; it suggests instead that gift precedes the subjects who enact it.
By arguing that hizmet is a gift given to them, vakifcis imply that what they are actively
doing is beyond their intentions, aims and beliefs-they are merely implicated in it.
This, I believe, is close to the Derridean notion of the non-intentionality of the gift
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-CHAPTER 6 OUR POOR: CRITERIA, ENTITLEMENT
AND JUSTICE
In Kayseri, workers and volunteers of waqfs would call the beneficiaries of their
organisations as "our poor" (fakirimiz [s.] or fakirlerimiz [pl.] in Turkish). Our poor are
those who are being cared for, who are assisted through organisations. It is a designated
term for those with entitlements to regular provisions or access to services. It
distinguishes the poor who are provided for by waqfs from others who are not, as well
as from those who are provided for by different waqfs. To become 'our poor' one has to
go through processes of evaluation, investigation, and finally, selection. This chapter
will take this complex and non-linear process as its subject matter and will focus on its
various elements: the terms of investigation; bureaucratic paperwork; the conceptions,
articulations and relationality of justice; and daily encounters.
The underlying theme of the chapter comes out of yet another name given to
beneficiaries. In Kayseri, "our poor" are also commonly called ihtiyac sahip/eri
(literally meaning "possessors of needs"), a phrase different than muhtac (needy). In a
paradoxical twist of language, people usually defined by what they lack come to be
depicted by what they have. Poverty in that sense becomes something not determined
by what is missing, but by what is out there, what is felt and lived. 'Possessors of needs'
have something recognisable, identifiable and very legitimate, and by virtue of
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"possessing" needs, they also possess rights: rights to receive, to be assisted and cared
for. Therefore what "our poor" possess is the right to have their needs satisfied.
Yet not every need qualifies someone as "our poor". Needs and situations are
differentiated from one another through a number of norms and practices, and only
some are deemed legitimate objects of intervention. Some needs are given priority over
others, sometimes through common sense (as in the case of prioritising the need for
food over the need for clothing) but also depending on the capacities of organisations to
meet them. Some organisations respond to immediate physical necessities, such as
medical or sanitation needs, some others to needs for education or home-making. Every
waqf defines and selects their poor according to their respective criteria while, at the
same time, trying to match needs with the means they possess.
Even among needs that fall into the categories defined by individual waqfs not all are
recognised or met. Identifying "valid" from "invalid" needs, as well as the urgent from
the deferrable=-even ignorable, requires more finely tuned screening techniques than
the simple determination of whether an supplicant's needs fall within the recognised
categories. "Who is the possessor of needs?" is the key question here, a question that
immediately breaks up into a score of other questions: Is it a woman or a man? How old
is he or she? Is he or she sick? Widowed? Married? With children? Without children?
With school-aged children? Where is he or she living? Working? Retired? Able-bodied
or disabled? Does he or she have family? Where is he or she from? What is he or she
wearing? Golden bracelets? A worn out summer jacket in January? Slippers? Heels?
Does he or she have government support? Any support? Benefits? Aid? Are there any
well-off family members? Such questions follow one another as the story of the
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supplicant takes on flesh and blood. The practice of digging for needs, truth and
urgency is also a practice of establishing categories into which to pour aspects of a
single, unique human story, making him or her identifiable, recognisable and ultimately
legitimate.
This chapter is an attempt to outline those practices that create subjects who possess and
utilise rights resulting from the recognition and legitimation of their needs. These can
all be read as practices that aim to define the just basis for determining which needs
should be tended to, and what entitlements should be derived from those needs. Yet
these practices, being attempts to locate, not products of, a precept of justice (or
justness), are not iterations of predetermined procedures. Instead they are singular,
sometimes unpredictable and often indeterminate acts of judgement. They may lean on
some written and agreed upon norms about what need is, what right is and what poverty
is. Yet equally they may circumvent, undermine or challenge said norms. Hence, I will
try to illustrate over the course of this chapter how these practices form and transform
these norms within the fluidity and elusiveness of the quotidian, in the slowness and
patience of the perfect continuous tense.
I argue that this fluid relationality is the location of justice. Because in the porous and
fuzzy borders of norms, procedures and categories, personal interactions can sustain
their moral weight; stories and needs are forgiven their singularity and persons are
recognised in their personhood. That is why the possessive pronoun "our" poor speaks
something more than the story of registering, record-keeping and administering. It tells
of responsibility, responsiveness and a performance of intimacy as much as it does a
story of inclusion. exclusion and discipline. But this is getting too far ahead for the
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moment. Before moving towards the edges let me first take you to the core, the core of
representation and discourse, where categories, labels, check boxes and computer
software reign.
Governing through Categories
Waqf workers in Kayseri are not alone in their efforts to use criteria to assess the
validity and genuineness of their supplicants' needs, as well as their inability to meet
those needs on their own. Indeed, a great bulk of scholarly work on poverty deals with
the same problem. With an ambition to create reliable, effective and realistic measures
of poverty, scholars, officials and technicians of all sorts define and redefine what
counts under the category of basic human needs and by what means these criteria are
satisfied. On the one hand, they try to set the minimums and maximums of each
domain, classify needs and requirements and establish norms that are expected to have
universal application. On the other hand, they look for ways to understand regional
differences and translate those differences into international comparisons. Affiliated
with a range of academic disciplines-particularly to economics, these experts create
indexes and charts that order countries according to their poverty levels, then subdivide
these poverty figures by severity, region, gender and age. They investigate how poverty
is related and/or correlated to other predefined social problems, like obesity (Pena and
Bacallao 2000; Prentice 2006), malnutrition (Sen 1981; Tanumihardjo et al. 200T) and
life expectancy levels (Wilkinson 1992; Marmot 2005). They also scrutinise how
poverty is intertwined with race, gender, ethnicity and age (Townsend 1993; Ravallion
1994). They develop schemes to help address problems accurately, given detailed
explanations regarding the measurement of poverty through innumerable criteria.
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Institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, UN commissions and international aid
agencies pick up on and utilise this 'data' to develop social and public policies on
poverty relief.
In social SCiences, this literature of measuring, assessing, classifying, scaling and
ordering poverty and the poor, has itself become a matter of analysis and criticism.
Although this critical vein of literature became more widely respected after Foucault's
groundbreaking intervention relating knowledge production with very specific modes of
power, for more than a century scholars had had the tendency to approach poverty not
as an empirical truth but as a matter of social treatment. As early as 1908, Georg
Simmel had written:
The poor, as a sociological category, are not those who suffer specific
deficiencies and derivations, but those who receive assistance or should
receive it according to social norms. Consequently in this sense, poverty
cannot be defined in itself as a quantitative state, but only in terms of the
social reaction resulting from a specific situation ... The individual state, in
itself, no longer determines the concept, but social teleology does so; the
individual is determined by the way in which the totality that surrounds him
acts toward him. (1965, 138)
In this vein of thinking, Simmel suggests that the answer to the question of what
poverty is could and should be derived rather from the treatment it receives, not from
what it is. Therein, he underlines the contingent and historical nature of poverty. Taking
a further step from that analysis has led social scientists to inquire as to what these
definitions and treatments tell-not only about poverty itself but also about that
particular society, its morals, regulations, social relations, divisions and governmental
mechanisms. How poverty is defined and treated at a certain moment and within a
certain society tell us about the core conflicts, overarching ideas and prevalent
discourses of that time and place. Therefore, in a sense, the knowledge and discourse
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that envelop poverty convey less about the so-called poor than about those who speak of
poverty.
Similarly, in an attempt to explore changes in discourses of poverty during the early
modern era, Mitchell Dean argues of England that '[p]overty ... does not exist...as
empirical truth. [It is] a product of the formation and transformation of definite
discursive and governmental practices' (1991, 8). In order to track this transformation
he focuses on the pauperism debates of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, and states that these debates signalled a rupture in ways of defining the poor
and managing the situation of poverty in England. According to Dean, this rupture can
be identified as a move from 'policing the poor' towards a 'liberal mode of
governance'. With this move, the previously local system of relief became highly
centralised. With the bureaucratic state's assumption of responsibility for the well-being
of its population, the private sphere of family that had already been affected by
governmental policies became a wholly legitimate area of state intervention. The male
breadwinner appeared as a category of social agency, held responsible for the material
conditions of his family. The private sphere thus became a sphere of economic
responsibility. Means tests and workhouse tests became the sole basis by which external
relief was determined. Because this involved rationalisation, he suggested, this rupture
paved the way to the modern bureaucratic welfare state in Britain.
The same period also witnessed an interesting disappearance of "the poor" from literary
genres. An enormous body of scientific work replaced sensuous portrayals of poverty in
novels and stories. For a period of time, description gave way to explanation. Sherman's
(200 I) interesting observation points to an increasing rationalisation and
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bureaucratisation around the issue of poverty, as an effect of a larger transformation of
power, or as Foucault (1976; 1991) would put it, a 'governmentalisation of the state'.
Foucault defines governmentality as 'the ensemble formed by the institutions,
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise
of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as
its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means
apparatuses of security' (1991, 102) and as a product of Western history. Developing
the finest techniques to govern populations has gradually become the major target of
policy, and an extensive body of knowledge has been created on the characteristics,
categorisations, quantities and qualities of these populations.
The constitution of these populations as the target of modem power is only one side of a
dual faceted development in Western history, i.e. the emergence ofbiopower. This very
specific form of power has been articulated in two distinct but related ways. The first
operation is on the human body: the optimisation of its capabilities, the control of its
excesses, the increase of its efficiency and docility. These modes of discipline were
cultivated and refined in the asylums, barracks, prisons, schools, workhouses and
plantations of the early modem era. The second operation is the creation and regulation
of species-bodies, primarily populations. This form of power has worked through the
processes of life, mortality, birth control, physical and mental health. Among these,
biopower is simultaneously individualising and total ising. It targets individual conduct
through its disciplinary mechanisms, while simultaneously producing the knowledge,
categories and policies that make it possible to regulate a population with the peculiar
ultimate aim of calibrating these two towards the well-being of the species-body.
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Poverty alleviation schemes, in addressing both the well-being of the individual poor
and that of the population (by managing the social vices that are often thought to be
related to poverty) provide especially suitable grounds on which to observe and analyse
governmental power. Yet it is important to keep in mind that neither addressing the
well-being of a collectivity nor creating categories and mechanisms to regulate and
manage that concern is unique to our historical epoch, or to Western history. To give an
example, waqf deeds during Ottoman times are characterised by detailed rhetoric over
who would be entitled to what kinds of services and what quantity of provisions would
be reserved for a certain group of people. As a result, hundreds of different categories
were established through Ottoman court cases to define people and position them vis-a-
vis each other (Kafadar 2007). Still if we are to direct our inquiring gaze towards the
content of these categories, classifications and criteria, there is something very peculiar
and specific about the more or less recent governmental power: its intricate and mutual
relationship with modem capitalism.
Population became a matter of great concern only when the wealth of nations started to
be evaluated not by territory but by the industriousness of their people. The productive
capacities of every single individual and the population as a whole then became the
main object of intervention, resulting anew in the production of numerous techniques
and great bodies of knowledge. Hence, addressing the well-being of a species-body is
addressing the productive capacities of this species-body, which in tum certainly applies
to poverty alleviation schemes and modem welfare technologies. Lydia Morris (2001)
argues that from Marx's lumpenproletariat/reserve army of labour to the underclass of
today's social policy debates, the poor have always been conceptualised in relation to
capitalism: as a matter of productivity, in terms of the healthy reproduction of the
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working class and/or as a potential source of insurgency against the structural
inequalities created by capitalist relations of production. Therefore, for more than the
last two centuries of Western history, how to govern poverty has been a question of how
to sustain capitalism.
In Kayseri, too, the issue of poverty is most often thought of together with the
problematic of productive labour. Willingness to work is valued and increasing people's
capacities for finding employment is an aim that is unequivocally supported. But it will
be seen as the chapter unfolds that even this idea is subject to debates when vakif
workers encounter the conditions of the people with whom they work, i.e. when the
theoretical meets the actual. But before getting to these controversies, I want to discuss
the criteria and techniques employed by the town's vakifs, in order to differentiate
between various needs and various supplicants.
Who will be our Poor?
An ordinary morning at Erciyes Feneri: Filiz is sitting behind the counter with her
computer on; Beyaz is standing, checking some folders stacked on the counter, chatting
with beneficiaries who are waiting for their turn to do shopping. The foyer is crowded
with people. A young pregnant woman opens the main door hesitantly. She checks the
crowd for a second then approaches the counter. She does not look sure about what to
do, and reluctantly says that she wants to register for provisions. Filiz points to Beyaz,
telling her, 'Our brother will take care of you.' Beyaz asks, 'How can I help you sister?'
The young woman repeats that she wants to register. Beyaz then says, 'We have some
criteria, we do not register just anybody. Are you married?' 'Yes" the woman says,
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faintly pointing her pregnant belly, 'I am expecting in a month and we cannot even find
a slice of bread to eat.' Beyaz then asks about the husband: 'What is he doing?' He
appears to have been unemployed for the last four months. Beyaz then says, 'I am sorry
but we cannot do anything about this. We do not help those who can work. We help
widows, or the husband should be disabled.' The woman looks greatly disappointed at
first, then with a glimpse of hope she says, 'But my husband is disabled, he has a
disability report from the public hospital.' Looking confused, Beyaz asks about the rate
of his disability. 'Seventy percent,' says the woman. 'Do you receive aid from any other
institution?' asks Beyaz. The woman replies, 'No.' 'Ok then, sister, tell me your name
and address; I will come to your house to see your situation. But you will need some
documents; make sure to prepare them before I come,' says Beyaz, and lists them: a
certificate of poverty issued by the neighbourhood authority, the husband's disability
report and a detailed family registry document. While trying to register these in her
mind the woman asks, 'When are you going to come?' Beyaz says he could not say, but
probably within a couple of weeks. The woman thanks him, reciprocates Filiz's smile
and leaves.
This encounter from October 2008 depicts an ordinary application for services with
Erciyes Feneri. People come seeking assistance, Beyaz asks them certain questions to
see if they fit the criteria. If they do not, he tells them about the rules and presents this
as an excuse for rejecting their application from the start. If the case looks a bit more
complicated or worth investigating he then asks for further documents or schedules a
home visit. The criteria look simple at first sight: The 'head of the family' should either
be absent (in jail, doing military service or in the hospital), dead, or disabled. If the
situation fits into any of these categories, the next requirement is that the supplicant
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woman should not be working with a salary or receiving any kind of pension. And the
final criterion is that the supplicant, or anyone from the household, should not be
receiving aid from any other vakif in Kayseri. In short, and in the exact phrasing of a
senior vakif director, aid schemes in Kayseri (including municipal and public funds)
'accept two types of families. Either they should be widowed and/or orphaned, or the
head of the household should be unable to work.' This categorisation points to the
underlying prerequisites of the aid schemes: the male breadwinner and industriousness.
The male breadwinner
As well known and naturalised as it is, the male breadwinner family structure is actually
a very particular type of household and labour organisation, in which the husband plays
the role of sole provider for his dependents, i.e. his wife and children, by working
'outside'. The wife makes her contribution to the household by working 'inside', mostly
in the form of unpaid domestic labour. Reproductive activities like cleaning, cooking
and child rearing then fall into the wife's area of responsibility. Yet there is a lot more
to this system than simple explanations about the division of labour, and a huge feminist
literature has grown out of these implications.
First, it is important to remember the historical specificity of this organisational
structure. Although patriarchal relations have shaped how labour is organised in many
different settings, feminist historians have shown in detail that it is the coming together
of patriarchy and capitalism that has paved the way to the birth of the ideology of the
male breadwinner (Janssens 1998). In agriculture, family labour is a universal norm.
Women and men may fill different roles and their activities may be differently
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valorised, but there is no divide confining women to the domestic sphere and making
her dependent on the husband's income-generating or subsistence activities. In fact,
women's participation in such activities is essential (Boserup 2007). In pre-capitalist
Europe female breadwinning activities were not the exception, and it was with the rise
of individual wage labour and the separation of workplace and home that the male
breadwinner became the norm (Oakley 1976). But a norm that is only feasible among
the upper and middle classes. Women and men in agriculture could never thrive with
such tidy divisions, much less slaves and indigenous women of the colonies.
Still, as an ideal, the male breadwinner has proved potent, and has shaped the prevailing
gendered establishment of Europe's citizenship regimes. In a discussion of coverture in
the U.S., Fraser and Gordon (1998) describe how white men's civil citizenship was
established through their status as household heads. According to them, 'having
dependents', just like property ownership, was established as a qualification for full
citizenship. 'The legal subsumption of wives in coverture, and the legal classification of
slaves as property, were no simple matters of exclusion. They actually helped instead to
define civil citizenship, for it was by protecting, subsuming, and even owning others
that white male property owners and family heads became citizens' (p. 121).
With the increasing dominance of the male breadwinner model in capitalist relations of
production, and with established gendered civil citizenship categories at hand, a viable
pattern for social citizenship was already in place. The ideal of the male-breadwinner
family unit has cut across all varieties of social welfare regimes in Europe and North
America and made its way to modern governmental establishments all around the globe.
Although, in practice, the model did not hold except among middle class families, and
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with the exception of only a few decades, it has survived counter practices, as well as
geographical and country-by-country variations, as an ideal.
In Turkey, the ideal found its bluntest expression in the civil code. Until radical changes
were enacted in 2002, Turkish Civil Code dictated, in the infamous Article 152, that the
head of the household was the husband. The husband was also held responsible for
providing for his wife and children. Women could not work or establish businesses
without the consent of their husbands until the Constitutional Court overturned the
article in 1990. After a struggle spanning over two decades, Turkey's women's
movement succeeded in making the newly drafted civil code egalitarian in many
respects. Now, at least according to law, the husband is no longer the head of the
family. Spouses have equal responsibility and rights in running the matrimonial union.
Women no longer need permission from their husbands for any kind of economic
activity.
The new civil code stripped the male breadwinner model of its legal backing. yet the
gendered nature of the labour market and the contribution-based social security system
keeps women dependent on their husbands regardless of legal regulation. In other
words, because of women's lower participation in formal paid jobs and tragically lower
property ownership rates, the de facto heads of families are still men. Moreover, a
recent report showed that even among women with jobs outside home, it is common
practice for them to hand their earnings to their husbands (Bingolce 2010). Hence, it
would be wrong to assume that even a structural change in labour markets is sufficient
to shift this paradigm, because the resilience of the patriarchal family model cannot be
explained by material conditions only. As I have suggested above with reference to
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vanous scholars, the strength of the model does not necessarily stem from how
accurately it holds with lived reality. Instead, it should be understood as a patriarchal
model that serves to keep women subordinate even though it cannot keep its promise of
providing for them. So despite the fact that recent changes in the organisation of
capitalism favour women for low-paid, part-time and informal jobs, and although
women increasingly take part in income-generating activities in urban contexts, their
status as housewives and dependents does not necessarily change.
In Kayseri vakifs, as an underlying assumption behind the criteria for acceptance to aid
schemes, the male breadwinner ideal is intact. Not only is aid conditional upon the
absence or disability of the male head of the household, but whether or not a woman is
working is not a source of inquiry unless she holds formal and registered employment.
Home-based income-generating activities are seen as natural extensions of housework
and do not count as income. Yet for men, unregistered work (which is often the only
option for male beneficiaries too) is a source of persistent inquiry. It is reported both by
Bugra and Keyder (2003) and by Bora (2002) that women's house-based, informal jobs
are vital to the survival of households, and how pervasive it is, particularly when men's
employment is intermittent and insecure. Despite such evidence, women's alleged
dependency saves them from investigations of their informal work.
Although the norm looks solid and perfectly functioning at the level of vakif
administration, female volunteers and workers at these organisations continuously
challenge the male-breadwinner archetype. For example. Erciyes Feneri volunteers
actively encourage beneficiary women to seek employment. They even question their
reasons for not working. In 2006. Erciycs Fencri women coordinated with a local
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geriatrics clinic to train their beneficiaries as professional carers. Some of these trainees
were then employed by nursing homes. Even though there was no such training at the
time of my research, I observed vakif women mobilising their personal networks to find
cleaning, babysitting or patience care jobs for beneficiaries. The nature of these jobs
takes us back to the question of women's place and the value of female labour, which is
shared despite variation in attitudes regarding women's dependency.
Productive hands
Eight days after the pregnant woman's application to Erciyes Feneri, I am travelling in
Beyaz's van towards the outskirts of the city. It has been a tough day. We have already
made seven visits. Two of the visited supplicants were not at home so we left notes with
neighbours. At another two, we found only teenaged girls at home. 8eyaz asked some
questions at the door but we did not enter the houses. At another flat was an old woman
looking after her three grandchildren. Her story was devastating; 8eyaz approved her
registration to a scheme. After two more visits, we finally make our way to a newly
emerging neighbourhood called Esentepe. Yet finding the address proves to be almost
impossible: the street we are looking for does not exist. In the end we have to call the
supplicant for clarification. The address seems to be correct. In fact it had been correct a
week ago but the municipality changed the street names in the meantime.
Finally we arrive at the newly built apartment block. The pregnant woman's husband
meets us on the street. One of his legs is visibly shorter than the other one and seems
dysfunctional-he limps heavily. He lets us in. We take ofTour shoes and wait for him
to guide us towards the living room. It is a new flat, barely furnished. In the living
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room, there is only a two-seater sofa and an armchair. There is not a single carpet in the
whole house. A flower-patterned fabric is laid on the floor of the living room, as a weak
substitute for a carpet. Although it is a three-bedroom flat, only one bedroom is
furnished with a bed and a closet. In the kitchen is a small table and four chairs. The flat
is otherwise completely empty. On the armchair in the living room sleeps a two-year-
old girl. Her visibly pregnant mother sits on the sofa. As we enter she grabs a chair from
the kitchen and leaves the sofa to us. Beyaz asks the man how long he has been
unemployed. He says, 'Four months.' Beyaz asks whether he receives disability
benefits. He says, 'No, I cannot. My disability rate was seventy percent but then the
public hospital took it down to forty percent. Now I am not eligible.' Beyaz looks
thoughtful as this rate does not match the criterion of Erciyes Feneri, which is fifty
percent. He then asks, 'Do you receive unemployment benefits?' 'No,' says the man
again, 'you have to accumulate 600 days of contributions in the system. It appeared that
1 only had 559'. He continues, 'I have been looking for a job since then, but with the
financial crisis, nobody is hiring anymore.' Beyaz then wonders what kind of a job he
could do with his disability. Anything that does not require standing all day long,' he
says. Beyaz nods appreciatively. He asks how long they have been married. The woman
replies, 'Three years,' while she hands Beyaz the family registry and disability report.
He briefly scans the documents. Then tells them to come to Erciyes Feneri next day to
finalise their registration and to receive their first provisions. We leave. On the way
back to Erciyes Feneri, Beyaz tells me that he barely avoided crying while we were
there.
This is how a typical home investigation takes place. Not only at Erciyes Feneri, but
among other vakifs and public offices that offer aid schemes as well, every application
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is fmalised after a visit. These visits are designed to obtain first-hand evidence of
poverty, hut they also allow negotiation of the organisational criteria since, supplicants
have more chances to tell their stories in this setting. What is negotiated during the
specific occasion I portrayed above is one of the core criteria shared by all aid
institutions: the male head of the household's inability to work.
Ifa household with a male 'head' (or with a son above school age) is to be registered to
an aid scheme, there should be justifiable reasons for this. To be working is the norm
for men and to not be working for any reason is seen as a deviance. If this 'abnormality'
cannot be justified it becomes treated as a moral deviance. Idleness and laziness are
seen as social vices that should not be encouraged and supported. This discourse is so
pervasive that the vakifcis of Kayseri often find themselves having to desperately
defend themselves against accusations of 'encouraging laziness' and 'attracting the idle
masses to town'. Instead of discarding this discourse in its entirety, vakrfcis negotiate its
terms and participate in its constitution by establishing criteria and categories to
distinguish 'the lazy' from 'the unable' .
Being unable to find a job does not usually count as a legitimate reason for not working.
Quite to the contrary, such an explanation is often seen as an excuse for 'laziness'. I
have heard the argument 'Nobody can claim he could not find a job in Kayseri. There
are always some openings in the industrial zone' more than once. But in fact there aren't
always jobs awaiting applicants. During my period of fieldwork, the effects of the
international financial crisis were almost palpable, with factories laying off workers one
after another. During this period, DISK, one of the largest federations of labour unions,
announced that Kayseri Industrial Zone had reduced its capacity by 16,000 during the
2007-2008 period (Radikal 2009). Moreover, in 2008, the unemployment rate in
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Kayseri was 11.1 per cent, slightly above the overall rate of 11% for Turkey. Finding
employment in Kayseri was no easier than anywhere else. When the effects of the crisis
became undeniable, the image of Kayseri as an industrial haven where jobs were
plentiful came under discussion by the vakifcis themselves. Many were in favour of
including the unemployed in aid schemes, but their own resources had also been
negatively affected by the crisis. Every time someone attempted to begin a conversation
on the issue, it would come to an abrupt conclusion as soon as the issue of means-and
thus the impossibility of further inclusion-was brought to the table.
Given these limitations and mindsets, every application is still an occasion for the
negotiation of norms and criteria. As in the story of the disabled man above, the
findings of an investigation are weighed against each other to manoeuvre what could be
deemed an unfit case towards entitlement. At this stage of human contact the
particularity of needs and the singularity of the story affect the outcome as much as do
established norms. A wife due to give birth in very near future, a visible disability (even
though the degree of severity had not been deemed to meet government standards), the
absence of many ordinary household items and the man's expression of his willingness
to work, while not objectively quantifiable, are certainly as recognisable as evidence of
'genuine' need, and thus an entitlement, by the family. In that particular moment, being
just appears to manifest itself as a disregard for regulations (which are taken as the basis
for justice), counter-weighing them with the 'realities' of the singular. The moral weight
of these realities provides leverage against the claims of discursive truth in the norms
and standards. The cultural baggage represented in a pregnant woman is one source of
leverage, and the missing furniture and appliances are another. But r will leave them
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aside at the moment to focus on another, one which relates to the issue of
industriousness: the supplicant man's willingness to work.
The hardworking and the beggar
One's desire and determination to work is highly appreciated among the vakifcis of
Kayseri. Women volunteers appreciate and support beneficiary women's attempts to
invent income-generating activities like lace-making or knitting. Directors express their
desire to include the working poor to aid schemes but complain about the insufficiency
of their resources. Even those in formal and regular jobs, but who receive minimum
wage, are considered worthy of support. Yet they are left out of schemes, again, due to
limited funds. Industriousness and productivity are thought highly of, but are not
accompanied by any attempts to make the beneficiaries more productive or to increase
their worth in labour markets. Except for sporadic efforts by women (like the geriatrics
training mentioned before), such enterprises fall out of the area of activity of the vakifs,
and vakifcis settle for mobilising these nuances in drawing distinctions between
supplicants. In that sense, attempts towards governing the productive capacities of the
poor are minimal.
Although having a job or even being able to work disqualifies one for aid schemes,
there are many registered beneficiaries of Erciyes Feneri and Darulaceze who are like
the husband of the pregnant woman. This situation is often justified with a desire to
reward the hardworking for their efforts. The hardworking, here, is positioned against
the beggar and the indolent. In this comparison the hardworking is mostly described in
terms of being responsible and independent, and of accumulating just (helaf) earnings.
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Beggars may be responsible, but are perceived as lacking in just earnings and honour.
And the indolent seem to lack all of the above characteristics, and indeed they generate
a sense of outrage among the vakifcis. I recall, for example, an occasion when Beyaz
returned from a home visit annoyed and furious. He had gone to investigate the home of
a construction worker who had been unemployed for a fairly long time. Yet, when
Beyaz arrived there at II a.m. on a weekday, he found the supplicant man just getting
up. Beyaz lectured the guy about the vices of laziness and questioned his sense of
responsibility, as well as the genuineness of his need, asking, 'How can an unemployed
man sleep until noon instead of going out and looking for work? If you are not willing
to take care of yourself, do not expect us to do so.'
Idleness is a common theme in discussions of poverty and welfare provisions. From the
workhouses of seventeenth-century Britain (Polanyi 1957; M. Dean 1991) to the
unemployment benefit regulations of modem welfare states (Fox-Piven and Cloward
1972; Katz 1989), examples of tests for idleness and precautions against it are plentiful
in European history. Lydia Morris (2001) describes in detail how poverty has been
moralised in England since the sixteenth century, when landless masses began flowing
into cities. The regulations that followed the famous Poor Law of 160I sought ways of
administering the mostly vagrant poor. Practices like assigning each to a parish and
confining the able-bodied poor to workhouses were all aimed at fighting the 'idleness
and vagrancy' of the victims of the Great Enclosure and the effects of early capitalism.
Coming to the nineteenth century's New Poor Law, pauperism was commonly seen 'by
implication as a wilful choice of the idle, who were to be denied community
membership not just by physical removal to the workhouses, but also by moral
condemnation' (ibid. 36). As Morris illustrates, the equation of poverty with idleness
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and moral degradation has travelled through discourses of eugenics, the
lumpenproletariat and Social Darwinism, well into twentieth-century discussions on the
culture of poverty and welfare dependency.
Within this framework beggars have been doubly condemned and often criminalised as
sources of social vice, manifesting idleness, intentionally declining work and
parasitically living off other people's earnings (Morris 2001). But, notwithstanding the
observable similarities in today's Kayseri, it would be wrong to attribute universality to
this discourse. Discussing how begging has been perceived in Muslim societies, Amy
Singer (2008) notes that until the end of the nineteenth century beggars were widely
tolerated and sustained in the Islamic World. Even when begging was criticised, it was
not done so on the basis of social morality, but formulated within terms of faith in God.
An outspoken critic of begging, Al-Ghazali of the twelfth century argued that, although
it may be permissible in certain situations, begging is not laudable for two reasons:
'First, begging suggested that one's belief in God is flawed, either through lack of
confidence that God would provide or by the intimation that a person might somehow
share in God's attributes, either as a provider or as a source of shame for the one who
begs. Second, begging risked testing another believer in an inappropriate manner by
demanding charity and so perhaps compelling a person to give to or refuse someone for
the wrong reasons ... ' (ibid. 169). This attitude towards begging as a test of one's faith
or as a risk to another's moral standing is paradigmatically different from an approach
to poverty as a social ill or moral vice. Here, problems associated with begging are
those of the relationship between a person and God, and with the person from whom
charity is demanded. There is not a society or a population involved whose well-being
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could be threatened by such an act, neither there is a concern about idleness. In this
view, working to earn money may be encouraged, yet not working is not stigmatised.
Nadir Ozbek (2002) reports that until 1750, there had not been a single attempt to
eradicate begging or to make use of the productive capacities of the poor in the Ottoman
Empire. Later, sporadic and unsystematic attempts to regulate begging began to be
observed in large urban areas. Yet well into the twentieth century, beggars had their
own guilds and their own legal status in the cities. Officially, begging was treated like
any other vocation (ibid. 74). Around 1890, public discourse around beggars changed
markedly. Beggars began to be characterised in newspapers as an urban disturbance.
Singer (2008) approaches this change in discourse, which could only be attributed to the
influence of a stratum of the bureaucratic elite, as a manifestation of desires for
modernisation. Pamuk (2006) makes a similar observation and contends that the
Ottoman elite adopted a Western gaze, looking at its urban spaces with contempt and
curiosity, and attempted to erase whatever this gaze was attracted to. Ozbek (2002)
notes the irony of the situation, observing that even the descriptions of beggars on the
streets of Istanbul were direct translations from French newspapers (p. 82, note 37).
In the end, laws criminalising begging and vagrancy, the first of which was issued in
1909, were generally ineffective. There were a few deportations from Istanbul, and even
fewer prosecutions, but no attempt to nudge beggars towards work, even though this
was the manifest aim of the law. In the republican era begging has been seen as a petty
offence and punished with a minimal monetary tine (Article 33, Resmi Gazete 2005).
Despite these laws, there have been only irregular and sporadic efforts to arrest and
penalise beggars. In the public discourse, however, begging is increasingly perceived as
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a form of organised crime, with beggars being forced to work on the streets by gang
leaders (see for example ATO 2004). Hence, they become seen either as victims or
profiteers of a criminal organisation, which in turn has little to do with genuine need.
In the vakifs of Kayseri begging and its local variation, 'gathering' are almost
unanimously despised. Part of this ire is created by shared opinions about idleness and
parasitism, yet there are other issues that affect attitudes towards beggars as well. In
order to provide a more complete picture I should clarify the meaning of 'gathering'
ttoplaytctltk). In the vernacular language of Kayseri vakifcis a gatherer is a person who
collects aid from various vakifs and public institutions, and allegedly sells some of these
aid items for cash. Among vakifcis, not only are gatherers' intentions and moral stances
continuously questioned, the genuineness of their need is also under suspicion. They are
seen as professionals create waste among already limited resources. With their 'fake'
needs and cons they are vakifcis' and social workers' anathema par excellence. Beggars
are usually lumped together with gatherers as professional liars, storytellers, and
performers of poverty and misery.
In addition to suspicions about the morality of supplicants, this manifest disdain towards
beggars and gatherers has two facts. The first of these is related to issues of funding,
while the second presents concerns about justice. There is strong agreement between the
directors, workers and benefactors of'vakifs in Kayseri on the purported negative affects
of gatherers on the field of beneficence. Benefactors want to be confident about the fate
of their donations-that they are spent for right reasons to meet the just and genuine
needs of the poor in Kayseri. Personal networks of trust are the sole sources of this
guarantee. All vakifs rely on these networks of trust to collect regular donations, and
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thus to sustain their activities. Because trust is built around personal recognition, it is
equally common for it to be lost with a counter-story. Stories of gatherers and beggars
who abuse vakifs are argued to have a geometrically increasing effect on the
trustworthiness of these organisations. In order to fight this problem, eight of the most
prominent vakifs in Kayseri cooperated with the Kayseri Metropolitan Municipality
tKayseri Biiyiiksehir Belediyesi, KBB) to create a shared database. Known as
Information System of Households in Need of Help (Yardtma Muhtac Hane Bilgi
Sistemi, HBS), this database was built by the Social Services Directorate of the
Metropolitan Municipality. The idea behind HBS was to scan for poverty in the city and
to register everybody whose income fell under a certain level. According to the
municipal officer who initiated the project, there were four motives behind this
tremendous task: First, to create a social risk map by registering those who are disabled,
widowed, etc. Second, to avoid wasting resources by preventing duplicate aid. Third, to
maintain the trust of benefactors. And fourth, to guarantee that no one who needed help
was missed by the aid schemes.
The municipality initiated the HBS project In 2005. In 2006, 15,000 households,
totalling approximately 60,000 citizens, were surveyed. The objective was to have
surveyed the whole population of 91 1,984 people by the end of 2009 (TOiK 2009).
Despite these ambitious goals, as of 20 II, not a single survey has been added to the
original 15,000. It is not possible to foresee the future of the project, but the current
picture attests at the very least that the declared aims of creating a map of social risk and
an all-inclusive database of "ihtiyac sahipleri' (possessors of need) have been
postponed, if not quietly abandoned. We are then lett with the other two aims:
preventing duplicate aid and creating trust.
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In order to achieve this goal, the municipality donated computers to participating vakifs
and organised training sessions to teach vakif employees how to use the database.
During my fieldwork, six of the participating eight vakifs were regularly entering data
into the system. They also entered their registered beneficiaries, further developing the
database. With these entries, duplicate aid could be detected immediately after the
introduction of the system, and these beneficiaries were given the chance to choose one
vakif and give up the rest. Now a crucial part of the assessment and registration
processes is cross-checking supplicants' declarations that they were not receiving any
aid with the information in the system. Because previous entries are also accessible. it is
possible for vakif workers to question the supplicants regarding reasons their
entitlements were withdrawn by another vakif
Left in the hands of the vakifcis this highly developed and centralised surveillance tool
now serves some practical needs of the organisations. Disregarding the municipality's
requests that all fields of the questionnaire be completed, vakifs entered only the names
and addresses of supplicants, and the type of the aid scheme to which they were
registered. They did not collect any data regarding family members, their ages,
education levels, income-generating activities, health condition, household need, home
towns or migration histories, as requested by the municipality. Neither did they create
records for rejected applications. Within the current use of the system, it is possible to
argue that the initial design of the project, which had aimed to document then govern
the welfare of poor citizens, gave way to a more pragmatic use with one aim: detecting
scams and fraud. With this tool, vakif directors' hands were strengthened in their
attempts to persuade potential benefactors.
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The second facet of the expressed disdain towards beggars and gatherers is related to
ideas and concerns about justice. Some vakifcis occupy positions that involve assessing
needs, outlining the rights that might derive from these needs and helping beneficiaries
turn entitlements into means to meet their needs. How to prioritise between various
needs and to whom to extend a hand are decisions that must be be made, and vakifcis
unavoidably make judgements in the course of these decisions. While coming to
decisions they make claims to justice and justness. This particular sense of justice is
essentially relational. This relationality exists first with reference to the dialogical
character of the decision-making process, which involves at least two parties: the
supplicant and the vakrfci. Here, beggars are despised for the reasons articulated by at
Ghazali, especially the notion of compelling a person to give charity for wrong reasons.
They are blamed for inappropriately and unnecessarily testing a fellow believer's faith
and obedience to God's orders, i.e. being generous in giving.
Justice is also relational in that it is always referential towards third parties not directly
involved in the process of judgement. These third parties are other beneficiaries, other
supplicants, and even unknown others who have needs but have not made demands
based on those needs. They are the 'others' alluded to in excuses like, 'If we register
you it would be an injustice to others we have rejected on the same grounds.' They are
the consolidated 'people' alluded to in such phrases as, 'Still be grateful, there are
people who are worse off than you,' and named when it is argued that, 'We accepted so-
and-so. now we have to be just!' Hence, all judgements and decisions refer to this
sometimes intimately known, sometimes anonymous mass of others who possess needs.
Need is recognised and treated with distributive and comparative aspects of justice in
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mind. Within this context, helping professional beggars and gatherers whose needs are
not justifiable is a breach of justice, a violation of somebody else's rights.
There is one more aspect to this overly present relationality. Kayseri vakifcis can be
seen as often doing care work with resources that are not their own. They see
themselves as intermediaries between benefactors and beneficiaries-between the
owners of means and the possessors of needs, respectively. As another vakifcr, Sena,
once commented, they 'hunt someone else's bird with someone else's stones'.
Occupying this intermediary position, vakifcis find themselves in situations wherein
they are charged with deciding where and on whom to spend donations. Yet
administering someone else's money has implications beyond those that relate to
maintaining trust in order to to keep receiving funds. As I discussed in detail in the
previous chapter, donations carry a history of their own, traces of previous owners. The
intentions of benefactors and whether the money is zekat or sadaka restrict the areas in
which the money could be spent. As I described before, zekat in particular can only be
given to certain groups of people to meet certain needs. Vakifcis carry this burden of
managing the beneficence of others while remaining loyal and just to their cause and
their intentions. Judgement, an attempt to be just, therefore involves relationality in one
more sense, that of having an indissoluble connection to benefactors via the medium of
their donations. Spending these (almost) borrowed resources on beggars and gatherers,
whose needs and conditions are questionable, is considered an injustice to the
benefactors as well.
But, in accordance with the principle of relationality in its first sense-as an interaction
between vakifcis and supplicants, there are always variations in the ways vakifcrs deal
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with beggars. For example, the director of Meligazi follows a principle of never turning
anyone away empty-handed. So even if she knows perfectly well that the person in front
of her is a professional beggar and that her story is not true, she does not risk refusing
any genuine need. She describes her solution to the problems of justice and
righteousness as one of practicality: she does not spend vakif resources or any zekat or
sadaka portion of what was given to her for distribution; she uses only her own
resources on supplicants she cannot trust. In this way she re-calibrates the relationship
as one between herself and the supplicant only.
Another variation of this is performed by the Erciyes Feneri employees working in the
vakif's Turkish bath. These two female employees told me that they actively hid
information about a beneficiary they knew to be a beggar. The employees knew this
woman personally, and because the beneficiary woman begged only when she ran out
of basic necessities, they did not perceive her behaviour as indolence or parasitism. In
their eyes, this was a subsistence activity. In the last instance, not all begging was the
same, nor everyone's stories.
Possessions
Recall the home visit I mentioned earlier, and recall what the supplicants' home looked
like. After we came back to Erciyes Feneri that afternoon, Beyaz continued to dwell on
the emptiness of the house. His impression had heavily influenced his decision, and
what he was most touched by was that emptiness, those missing items we were so used
to seeing in every other flat: carpets, sofa sets, dining tables, cupboards, dressers, chests,
televisions, radios, computers, kitchen appliances, etc. Otherwise, the house looked
new, clean and in good condition.
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During these investigations, poverty must be materialised in front of the vakifcis to
convince them of the genuineness and urgency of need. This expectation signals an
underlying assumption about poverty, that it is an observable material condition, in such
a way that one can recognise penury almost at first sight. Most important is this visual
recognition: what the investigator sees, and then codes as signs of wealth or poverty, is
taken as proof. Yet there are also moments when poverty manifests itself through other
senses; the smell of damp, a shiver from the coldness of a room or the coughing of a
sick child is jotted down in a mental note.
Partly due to the fact that decision-makers in Kayseri vakifs are often those who make
the home visits, no written or recorded material is produced out of these investigations.
Typically, no photographs are taken nor forms completed, though this is not a uniform
practice and is a matter of debate on ethics among vakif workers. For example, within
the municipal bureaucracy, investigators are often low-level employees, while only their
directors have the authority to make decisions regarding the distribution of provisions
like daily bread or hot dishes from municipal soup kitchens. In this case investigators
are asked to provide visual evidence when a case becomes controversial. In one such
situation, Sena, the secretary to the Director of Social Services. went to visit a
persistently demanding supplicant's home with a camcorder. After a very tense visit she
returned with footage, which then travelled around in the municipality. I watched it on
Sena's computer. The whole of the footage was of the household items in the
supplicant's home. The voices of both Sena and the supplicant woman were heard in
discussion off-screen, but even without seeing their faces it was apparent that the
woman's strenuous efTorts to tell her story did not catch Sena's attention. Rather. her
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gaze was directed towards the woman's possessions: extra carpets stacked behind the
door and rooms crammed with furniture.
There were many other reasons (like her grown-up children and their earnings) for the
rejection of this woman's demands, but this intrusive footage and in particular the
abundance of carpets provided the municipality the most solid grounds for their
negative decision. What the supplicant possessed was taken as proof of wealth, and
wealth is always taken as a disqualifier. Indeed, detecting signs of wealth is the main
component of investigations. In Kayseri vakifs this is done in a very informal and
personal way. Larger international aid organisations like Deniz Feneri use official
investigation forms on which all possible household items are listed, from washing
machines to mobile phones, and these forms are then presented to decision-making
bodies to paint a picture of the family's degree of poverty. These investigation
processes are very much quantified and objectified, and in that sense different from
those at Kayseri vakifs; nonetheless, all these share the assumption that poverty is
detectable through what a household possesses and lacks.
Home investigation, or a home visit as some vakifcrs say to sugarcoat it, is structurally
an intrusive surveillance technique. It exposes the inside of a person's home, her
belongings, living arrangements, possessions or lack thereof, and even the contents of
her refrigerator to a stranger's eyes. Some vakifcis are sensitive to the violation this
investigative strategy involves and develop techniques to tum the occasion into
something else, as will be seen in Chapter 7. This awareness has motivated some vakifs
to develop policies that avoid documenting poverty, especially with photographs and
video recordings, because the insult such a practice adds to the injury of the poor. Yet
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there are cases like Sena's in which no one seems to care. Although how the situation is
handled makes big difference, home investigations in general emphasise the imbalance
of power and create shame in the beneficiaries that is manifested alongside an anxiety
over what their possessions might tell the investigator.
With this anxiety, supplicants sometimes feel the need to warn against the impression
investigators may take from the appearance of their homes. Some tell how wealthy once
they were, others disclose which items were the gifts of benevolent neighbours and
relatives. Supplicants try to shift the focus of investigation from possessions to income;
as one woman said, 'We have all the fancy furniture but at the end of the day you
cannot eat your sofa.' These arguments are often found to be plausible, but how to get
the truth under the glossy layer of commodities is a matter of discussion, within which
uniform resolution is impossible to achieve. Possessions, then, become another item of
negotiation during home visits. In attempts to be just in decision-making, then, even car
ownership might at times be ignored, while at other times a new mobile phone may
create suspicion.
Frank Prochaska's (2008) account of visiting practices in Victorian England tells a very
similar story. In Victorian England household visiting was the paramount activity of
charitable work and created a mobilisation of volunteers to degrees almost unseen
before. But unlike the practice in Kayseri, these visits were not simply directed to
documentation and vetting purposes. 'The simple doctrine that informed district visiting
for much of its history was that impoverished and benighted souls could be saved by the
agency of another human being. who cared enough about them to be interested in their
survival and spiritual well-being' (p.61-62). Yet. just like in Kayseri the visits were
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sources of both hope and anxiety for the members of the poor households, because of
the surveillance, canvassing and even invasion involved.
Responsibilisation and Moralisation
The disabled supplicant with the almost empty house comes to Erciyes Feneri next
morning, as he was instructed. He is driven to the market by his brother and mother.
They enter the building together and look around for Beyaz. After welcoming them, I
go to find him. He is in the kitchen fetching his tea, but comes back hastily, greets them
and takes the man's documents in order to finalise the registration. The man and his
family are now entitled to 80TL (£35) worth of goods every month from Erciyes Feneri
Market. Because the earliest scheduled shopping day for his neighbourhood is quite a
while later, Beyaz tells him to take his first shopping trip then and there, as an extra.
When the man enters the market to fill his shopping cart, Beyaz calls on Emre (another
Erciyes Feneri employee) to fetch four carpets from the depot and instructs me to find
clothes for the expected baby. Emre brings the carpets, I leave the baby overalls and
vests, along with some other items for the mother, next to the cashier. When I go out to
the foyer, I hear Beyaz and the man's brother talking. It appears that the brother is a
municipal constable, in a moderately paying, stable position. Beyaz reproaches him
saying, 'What kind of a brother are you? If you had bought one carpet each year with
your constable's salary, that little kid would not have had to grow up on bare floors'.
As we have seen with the idea of the male breadwinner and through discussions around
idleness, the issue of responsibility always accompanies poverty discourses. It is not
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necessarily one of individualised liberal responsibility as Dean (1991) argues regarding
Britain. Neither it always takes the shape Morris (2001) describes or blaming the poor
for their poverty (although it is occasionally the case). But certainly the vakifcis of
Kayseri try to assign responsibility to others, not necessarily in the sense of holding
these others responsible for the current situation, but in the sense of requesting that one
take responsibility for alleviating the effects of poverty. As seen in this anecdote, it is
almost always family members who are invited to take on this responsibility. Siblings,
fathers, children and even more distant relatives are expected to take care of their fallen
kinsmen (especially kinswomen). It is seen as a natural responsibility, causing great
dishonour if not taken. So, family members are enquired about during the application
and assessment process, both to learn whether or not they are dependent on the
supplicant and because they are viewed as possible assets-just like a house or a
pension.
A detailed family registry (one of the documents required from every prospective
beneficiary) is often used as a reference point for this inquiry. The document lists
marital status and kin from both older and younger generations, i.e. spouse, father,
mother and children, as well as siblings if the supplicant is not married. In addition to
names, the registry details the ages and civil statuses of all listed, along with
information regarding death, adoption, marriage and divorce. With the help of the
registry, vakifcis ask about the vocations and whereabouts of those who might be held
responsible for the well-being of the supplicant. In the case of older beneficiaries these
are often the children, for young widows they are the parents and brothers.
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If these family members are poor themselves, their morals are not questioned. But if
they are well off, vakifcis question why they did not help out. This line of questioning
works in two interrelated ways, both interrelated directions: It makes the familial tie
both an issue of responsibility and morality. Because familial care responsibilities are
taken as natural, their absence is seen as a moral deviance--on either the part of the
'irresponsible' relative or the non-receiving supplicant. By extension, if it is seen as
possible that the wrongdoing resides with the supplicant, this causes suspicion that leads
to further scrutiny. For women supplicants such suspicion has additional implications.
For example, in one case, the morals of a young divorced woman were called into
question by virtue of the fact that she was not receiving any support from her father or
brothers, who had objected to the divorce.
If responsibility is mostly sought from men, morality is often treated as a female issue
(for a similar observation from Lebanon see Jawad 2009b). Similarly and with close
relation to family honour, morality is assumed to reside in women and hence comes
under greater attack when women fall destitute. The most imminent and immediate risk
purportedly faced by women upon losing their male relatives is losing their sexual
honour. So choosing women as the prime target of beneficence not only stems from the
idea of female dependency but also from ideas about the fragility and weakness of
female morality. Women may not be expected to work, but they are certainly expected
to actively protect their honour. One of the primary tasks of aid organisations is to help
women 'protect' themselves by providing them a certain level of material assurance (to
keep them away from male abuse and prostitution). With all these concerns in mind,
what troubles vakrfcis most are the cases of sex workers. Concerns about public
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morality and sex workers' well-being often conflict thus causing tensions that are both
internally felt and publicly discussed.
Justice as Relationality
So far I have tried to illustrate the prevailing nonns at Kayseri vakifs that define certain
people as eligible to receive provisions. At the same time I have attempted to give
examples of how these norms are sidestepped, challenged and discussed; that is, how
they are tactically used by vakifcis to reach judgements about people's needs and
means. I have also briefly argued that non-uniformity in the decision-making process is
related to vakifcis' concerns about justice and being just. These concerns are an
intrinsically relational phenomenon. So far, I have delineated three levels of this
relationality: the dialogical relationship between vakifcis and supplicants, the vakrfcis'
distributive responsibility to 'possessors of needs', which also refers to unrelated third
parties, and the ties between the vakifci, the beneficiary and the benefactor established
through unalienable donations.
Yet there is one more dimension of this relationality that has been left un-discussed:
relations with God, as an omnipresent transcendental judge. For the vakifcis of Kayseri,
the reason they do what they do is often very simple: they claim to do it for the sake of
God. Religious texts and teachings invariably value charitable work, caring about and
caring for others in society. Then for beneficence workers, being a vakrfci is itself an act
of piety directed towards gaining God's mercy. But it is at the same time a burden, a
risky business compared to other forms of piety, like daily prayers or fasts. What makes
this kind of work risky and troublesome (veballi) is the possibility of doing an injustice.
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since an ultimate judge would evaluate all judgements. If charity is done to please God
and if it is certain that God is particularly displeased by injustice, the risk of making
unjust decisions becomes overwhelming. This fear is what Neriman, the director of
Melikgazi describes as 'what keeps me awake at night,' and what makes Beyaz consider
giving his efforts up in favour of a safer life track. This is also why, on the first morning
of clothing distribution, Erciyes Feneri volunteer women could be found worriedly
talking among themselves:
Hatice: I considered not participating in this. I am so afraid of doing injustice.
God save us, it is such a responsibility!
Sabahat: And what is worse is we are giving away other people's donations ...
I am losing my mind when I think about it; what if I give one person more
and the other less?
Ferda: You should not think this much. It is also a matter of kismet you know.
For one person you cannot find anything to fit despite all your efforts. Then
comes another person and beautiful items almost present themselves. It is her
kismet. .. But, of course, we should not overlook any obvious injustice.
What is striking here is that these people usually stand behind their acts, arguing their
justness. But still they are afraid. They may judge their own actions and decisions as
just, but theirs is not the final evaluation. Despite all norms, religious precepts, texts,
teachings, guidance, and bureaucratic and egalitarian mechanisms, God's judgement is
not accessible to human beings. It is a deeply effective unknown. Without having access
to this unknown and ultimately righteous judgement, capacities of human beings to
justice are limited from the start. This incapacity postpones a final and ascertainable
judgement indefinitely. This dimension of relationality, i.e. a continuous reference to an
omnipresent, ultimate but not-immediate judge is, aside from other dimensions, what
gives the assessment and decision-making processes their plasticity and fluidity. Within
all these relational considerations, no one criterion has any more meaning than as a
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tactically and selectively used rhetorical tool for making an argument about what is just
and what is unjust.
Bourdieu suggests that "[hlabitus is in cahoots with the fuzzy and the vague. As a
generative spontaneity which asserts itself in the improvised confrontation with
endlessly renewed situations, it follows a practical logic, that of the fuzzy, of the more-
or-less, which defines the ordinary relation to the world" (1987; quoted in Wacquant
1992, 22 Wacquant's translation). The practices of vakifcis and the judgements they
have to make in the course of becoming just vaktfcts, exhibit this fuzzy logic. Every
encounter is an opening to reconsider the criteria of acceptance, past decisions and acts,
as well as those not immediately affected by their decisions but whose presence haunts
the encounter right from the start. Even if the official criteria of their respective
organisations, shared assumptions, stereotyping and prepossessions delimit vakrfcis'
field of action, with every life story heard or witnessed, they reposition themselves and
manoeuvre with these limits+-challenging, bending, reinterpreting or silently ignoring;
not only within these limits.
Conclusion
In this chapter I explored how vakifs choose their beneficiaries and the grounds on
which this selection is based. I also wanted to illustrate the principles and assumptions
underlying the most naturalised criteria, like the male breadwinner, industriousness,
family responsibility or what a poor household should rightfully possess. However, as I
have contended, neither these criteria nor the assumptions on which they are based are
absolute in their applicability. Vakrfcrs in decision-making positions within vakifs strive
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for justice, which cannot be guaranteed through the strict application of these rules.
Every encounter demands individualised treatment (however slight the differences
between scenarios might be) and this treatment depends greatly on the interaction
between vakrfci and supplicant. It is thus during this interaction that the relational
aspects of justice unfold.
In Seeing Like a State (1998), James Scott discusses how 'the poor' are made 'legible'
by fitting terms, categories and characteristics that are observable, assessable and
amenable to the management and information regimes of modern bureaucracy. He calls
this phenomenon a 'tunnel view' of the reality. 'Tunnel view' is an appropriate
metaphor on which to end this chapter. Seen through categories, schemas and check
boxes, there is always a fragment of reality, a fragment which is understandable and
governable. Yet reality lurks outside the tunnel, complex and unbounded. Attempts by
Kayseri vakifcrs to create more accurate, sharpened and finer criteria by which to judge
their claimants never ends, yet outside these criteria=-outside the tunnel-in the multi-
relational and multi-referential practice of justice, they are in the realm of care and in
the realm of ethical complexities. These two realms will be the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 7 ETHICS OF BEING A VAKIF<;I
Among those who work in the field of beneficence in Kayseri, a significant distinction
is made between vakrfcis, the men and women of a vakif, and hayirsevers, benefactors
or philanthropists. Although these two categories are often used descriptively, they are
also notably value-laden. Vakrfci refers to those who put their labour, time and energy
into charitable work, whether in private or institutional settings. They are the volunteers,
employees, managers, and active board members of charitable organisations. They may
also be men and women who do not have any institutional engagement but are still
known for 'devoting their lives' to beneficence. Vakifcis have close contact with the
people they help out. Hayirsever, on the other hand, literally means 'those who love
philanthropy', connoting a lesser degree of hands-on involvement, but moral and
financial support from outside as benefactors. Hayirsevers are usually not involved in
the daily operations of institutions but support them through donations, preferring in
particular large-scale projects like the construction of schools or mosques. Of course,
most vakifcis financially support their institutions and engage in private benefaction by
giving money away too, so it is not possible to apprehend this distinction by focusing on
the kind and quality of what is given.
Proximity to beneficiaries distinguishes vakrfci from hayirsever. The philanthropists
rarely meet the people their contributions affect unless invited by organisations to
observe how they are being put to use. But these occasions are less about engagement
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than they are about overseeing the use of money. In contrast, being a vakrfcr involves
extensive encounters with the persons in need, as well as occasionally establishing long-
term, sustained relations.
This distinction between vakrfci and hayirsever has important gender and class
dimensions. In corollary with the uneven distribution of property ownership among men
and women in Kayseri (as throughout Turkey), hayirsevers of the city are almost
exclusively men. Although it is quite common to come across schools or soup kitchens
named after women, this is because of an established tradition that husbands or sons
sponsored civic gifts in commemoration or in the name of women from their families.
Yet among vakifcis, men and women are equally active, either as volunteers or as paid
employees. Again, as a direct derivative of ownership of wealth structures, hayirsevers
exclusively belong to upper classes, while among vakrfcis some industrialists work
actively within the organisations they founded, as do workers, who try to survive with
their part-time salaries.
In this chapter I focus on the formation of vakrfci subjectivities through a discussion of
the processes of ethical self-formation. Here by ethics I refer to an intersubjective and
relational phenomenon that finds both its content and its expression in practices of care
(both for self and others) rather than in already defined norms and values. Thus, in this
chapter my discussion of the formation of ethical beings particularly refers to the
development of capacities to care and give.
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Ethical Bodies, Embodied Affects
In Politics of Piety (2005), Saba Mahmood discusses the premises of positive ethics in
understanding ethical and pious agency. According to her, in post enlightenment
thinking, ethics is often conceived as an abstract system of principles, values and
regulations (p. 119). In this Kantian tradition, ethical reasoning is more heavily
emphasised than ethical practices, which are either seen as habits that do not qualify as
virtues or as actualisations of some abstract values and principles. By this
understanding, ethics always begins within the person (with critical reasoning) and not
always but usually creates a change in the behaviour. Therefore, the direction of ethical
transformation is from inside to outside. Yet in positive ethics-Aristotelian ethics-
moral actions are seen not as contingent but constitutive elements of the content of the
ethical norm (p. 120). Therefore the variety of relationships that can be established
between the constitutive elements of the self (including the body, affects, volition and
reason) and the accepted norm become a matter of analysis (p. 120). This variety allows
transformation to travel in the opposite direction-values and attitudes changing with
the alteration of actions and behaviours. Rituals, prayers, fasts and meditation may all
be counted as classic examples of technologies of transformation that start from the
outside. In this vein, I approach the formation of an ethical being through the ongoing
processes of becoming a vakifci as a matter of adapting actions, donning new stances
and meticulously working on behaviour.
In the Kayseri beneficence field there are, of course, religiously informed norms, which
are clear and hardly surprising: a vakrfci should be indiscriminately compassionate to
all creatures of God, be patient, gentle and humble. These norms are repeated piously as
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they represent the will of God in the name of being good Muslims. Similar ethical
considerations are observed by Jawad (2007; 2009b) in her work on Lebanese religious
welfare organisations, among which are Christian and Muslim institutions belonging to
various sects. Jawad (2009) gives particular emphasis to the humanitarian aspects of the
prevailing ethical standing of the workers at these organisations, and employs a virtue-
ethics perspective to suggest that more than being simply normative, the ethical
formations of these various actors are a product of character. However insightful is this
approach, it could be developed further, for it leaves out the corporeal dimension of
ethics. Although ethical arguments, and actors' identification with and employment of
these arguments, are important, inquiry and conversation should extend beyond this to
explore multiplicity and ambivalence in the bodily cultivation of religious ethics. To do
so would allow us to understand how norms are inhabited, challenged or desired.
As I have mentioned, vakifcis have first hand, face-to-face encounters with the
beneficiaries and supplicants, and they are responsible for the immediate care-giving
and care-taking activities their organisations offer. Their daily contact with beneficiaries
and supplicants lead vakrfcis to revise their attitudes (not always intentionally) and
force them into situations they would have otherwise avoided. They are impelled by the
singularity of the encounter and the intimate content of the care relationship. Their
position forces them, first of all, to alter their embodied dispositions against the poor
and poverty. Let me illustrate this with an example.
When 1 asked the female volunteers of Erciyes Feneri how volunteering affected their
lives, Aliye explained, 'I have gone beyond myself. I used to refrain from eating
strangers' food but I've started eating it. I used to refrain from sitting down in a poor
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house but I started to do that. I've witnessed great changes in myself, and I am very
happy about it.'
Aliye is a wealthy woman aged over 60. She covers her hair with chic silk scarves and
always wears elegant clothes. Her golden-rimmed eyeglasses and rings of precious
stones give away her upper-middle-class position at first sight. She is now responsible
for running the public bath of a charitable organisation in Kayseri, where she interacts
with the poorest women and children of the inner city. Catering to those who do not
have access to running water, she is at ease with women roaming around the bath naked,
making casual and friendly conversation or smoking in the foyer without the slightest
embarrassment about their nakedness. And there, Aliye sits, chats with them, checks
their papers, and fortnightly shares the Turkish bath experience, including being washed
by one of the employees of the bath. Users of the bathhouse services usually bring some
food with them and offer to share their food with employees, including Aliye. She
accepts and reciprocates with her own food offerings. She and two employees, who had
once been beneficiaries before being offered employment a couple of years prior, eat
lunch with a score of naked and half-naked women and children hanging around.
Having once been uncomfortable entering homes in slums, she now has the most
intimate contact with their inhabitants, albeit not free of conflict and restlessness.
Aliye's experience is not unique. Other vakifcts, too, narrate similar stories and are
routinely affected by similar daily encounters. These narratives, first, indicate the
dispositions these women have had all their lives: Poverty is dirty, even disgusting,
which therefore leads to a very visceral and bodily repulsion. Notwithstanding the
stories of the poor-but-tidy as a possible exception, there is always a reluctance to
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establish physical ties with the poor: eating their food, cuddling their kids and visiting
their homes creates discomfort. Second, uprooting these dispositions is possible but
only through a tedious, tense and multidirectional process. Let me first briefly dwell on
the first point to explore the question of what such a feeling of disgust does.
Affects of poverty
According to Sara Ahmed (2004) emotions reside neither in the subject who feels them,
nor in the object that gives rise to the feelings. Instead emotions are a matter of how
objects and subjects come into contact. Therefore there is always a reading of a lived
history into the encounter that creates the emotions. Certain bodies become objects of
disgust as they evoke histories of accumulated and associated signals, as through skin
colour, nakedness, odour and sight. However, that these signs are contingent does not in
any way diminishes the material reality and effects of the emotion evoked.
Disgust in particular entails proximity between subject and object, and it immediately
urges bodies to withdraw. Bodies draw back for fear of contamination. Disgust attests to
the fragility and permeability of the skin and the body's openness to such threats from
the outside (no matter if these threats have any objective basis). And with this
immediate bodily reaction, disgust functions as the perfect mechanism for abjection
(Kristeva 1982; Lorde and Clarke 2007). Bodies that cannot be contacted, bodies that
have contagious qualities are created at the moment of disgust. Yet neither the emotion
itself, nor the effects and 'borders' it produces, can simply be reversed through retlexive
processes. 'Emotions shape the very surfaces of bodies, which take shape through the
repetition of actions over time, as well as through the orientations towards and away
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from others' (Ahmed 2004: 4). Therefore emotions bear a weight more onerous than
those of psychic states, and they are difficult to erase. Reinforced by a lifetime of
material and discursive iterations, the contingent associations that entangle certain cues
with certain emotions can only be undone with diligent bodily work. In our case this
bodily work has its great significance in the possibility of subverting abjection.
Accounts of poverty alleviation and containment describe in detail how the emotions of
disgust and fear of contamination have shaped policies addressing the poor and are
affected by the discourses that inform those policies (M. Dean 1991; Morris 2001).
Images of beggars with missing limbs and open wounds, pauperised women threatening
the psychological and physiological well-being of society through sexually transmitted
diseases they might disseminate, and street children sneaking into clean family homes
may all be recalled from a vivid reservoir of social imagery. Even if these seem too
marginal to invoke a common feeling of disgust, milder images of shanty towns with
open sewage, little snotty faces on rubbish heaps smiling for cameras, leaking ceilings,
and that very particular smell of dampness, feel all too familiar, evidence that poverty
itself is often perceived as dirty. In Kayseri, these images are even intensified with
reference to local Gypsies and Kurds, who are doubly stigmatised when poor. With or
without an element of racialisation, these images and recollections of poverty work
through sensations and bodily responses.
The narratives of vakrfci women in Kayseri are no different in making use of such
sensationalist images. A very palpable sense of lacking, not only of certain comforts or
basic survival requirements but also of assumed hygiene and cleanliness standards,
accompany their vivid descriptions of poverty. Yet, in a twist, disgust is replaced with
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compassionate contact in a particular strain of these stories. The common antagonist in
this type of narrative is Nevin Akyurt. Until her death in 2004, Akyurt had been the
local heroine of the vakif field in Kayseri. She mobilised the wealthy to attend the needs
of the city's poor by establishing these foundations, and encouraged women to take an
active part in their operation. Yet, as these women's stories attest, the most impressive
aspect of her dedication was her private acts of benevolence, which often involved very
intimate care. Consider what two of her disciples told me during our informal
conversations:
One day, she took me along to [visit] Zehra. She was taking continuous care
of that lady, who had serious mental health problems. We went to her place,
which was simply a dump. She was living there with several wild dogs she
used to sleep with, cuddling. I guess this was the way she protected herself
and also stayed warm. She was a wild lady, never letting anybody close. She
used to scream and attack strangers that approached her. But she trusted
Nevin Abla deeply. So when we went there I was really frightened by the
scene and by her looks. I hesitated to get out of the car. Nevin Abla told me to
follow her. We approached Zehra. She had that wild and dangerous look at
first. Then she recognised Nevin Abla and visibly relaxed. Nevin Abla went
to her side, patted her hair and talked with her. Then she wanted her to get
into the car. Then, we took Zehra to Nevin Abla's house, where she
personally washed her. Then she made her sit on the carpet and started to pick
lice from her hair. She cut her hair, washed her clothes and later we took her
back to her place. I could not possibly have touched that woman but Nevin
Abla was like this. There was a lot we should have learnt from her (Neriman).
There was a very old couple, living on their own in a rotting apartment. She
found them somehow. The old lady was paralysed. so she was in diapers. Her
husband was doing his best but his condition was also miserable. Nevin Abla
used to visit them regularly, change the diapers. clean the lady up, wash her
and take their clothes to her house to wash. She would even comb her hair
and embrace her like a child (Ipek).
We learn more, like that Nevin Akyurt would never hesitate to enter anyone's home, sit
there and eat what was offered. She would play with kids. She would dress the most
terrible of wounds. And in any case she would establish physical contact with people
she was trying to help as a natural requirement of care. There is certainly a disciplinary
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aspect to this extension of care, which will be discussed later in the chapter. For now, I
will stick to how Akyurt's example is interpreted among Kayseri vakifcis. The legend
of Nevin Akyurt first and foremost relies on transgression of usual physical boundaries
between strangers, boundaries created especially through the emotion of disgust. These
boundaries, certainly, have very strong class and ethnic dimensions, yet in the first place
these are boundaries between people not immediately and intimately related, whose
skins are strange to each other. Therefore the most significant quality of Akyurt in the
eyes of the vakifcis is this extension of intimate care across difference and social
distance.
Yet all these stories carry a sense of exceptionality; they are almost always followed
with the addendum that it was not possible for Akyurt's disciples to match her example,
that she was extraordinary. By being exceptional, anecdotes about Akyurt often function
as reminders and invocations of the normality of recoiling in disgust, while at the same
time they allude to the possibility that this norm may not be set in stone. In that sense
the legend of Akyurt provides a regulative ideal, one which is unreachable but, in
striving to emulate her, opens a path towards ethical transformation.
This ethical transformation, as exemplified by Akyurt and expressed in the self-
narratives of Aliye and the other vakifcrs, does not necessarily imply a radical change in
the conception of the poor as dirty. While it has led to a habitual presumption that they
are not, behavioural change on their part neither begins nor ends with such a change in
assumptions. It is rather a piecemeal transformation that resides in action more so than
in a reflexive questioning of beliefs and conceptions. The crux of the ethical
transformation is acting it out before becoming it.
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At the risk of losing sight of nuances and personal differences, I can sketch an overview
of the process as such: A woman decides to do some 'good' for the needy of her town
for any number of reasons. She certainly has the aforementioned negative
predispositions and embodied feelings, but figures being there will push her into
situations she has never experienced before. As she acts out her decision, sometimes
even in spite of herself, these actions settle in her body and conscience, slowly evolving
into an ethical habitus.
Positive ethics
In order to explore 'the work that bodily practices perform in creating' this ethical
subject (Mahmood 2005, 160), I return to the work of Mahmood and the source of her
inspiration, Michel Foucault. In his later work, Foucault (1997a; 1997b) approached
ethics as 'care for oneself, by which he meant the operations of a person on his or her
own soul, thoughts, body and feelings. This is different than the established conception
of ethics as a product of mental capacities and contemplation. Foucault's notion of
ethics is primarily embodied and acted out. This approach is built on the notion of ethics
in Greek antiquity and especially in Aristotle. Given the influence of Aristotle on
paradigmatic Islamic scholars like Al-Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun, Mahmood (2005)
observes a very similar understanding and practice of ethical formations in Islam.
According to Aristotle, 'States of character anse out of like activities' and virtue
inhabits one's body only through working on it. Virtue is not what we have as part of
our nature but it is natural to strive for it and be able to build towards it. Yet virtue is
learned only through acting virtuously. Continuing with Aristotle, 'For the things we
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have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders
by building and lyre players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just
acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts' (2002, bk. 2: I).
Doing in order 10 become requires a significant level of discipline and repetition
because only in this way does a virtue become ingrained in character and habitus, which
drive an unconscious, unpremeditated repertoire of actions like those of Nevin Akyurt.
The idea of an acquisition of virtue by relentlessly acting it out has significant
ontological implications. First of all, it implies an understanding of the human body not
as the vessel for inner qualities but as an agent for sowing and fostering these qualities.
It is a body that is formed by the ethical transformation it is performing. Therefore, it is
malleable and affective, as well as effective and active. In order to explain this
paradoxical notion, I will borrow from Mahmood's reading of the Foucauldian concept
of docility. She argues that:
The capacity for action is enabled and created by specific relations of
subordination. To clarify this paradox, we might consider the example of a
virtuoso pianist who submits herself to the often painful regime of disciplinary
practice, as well as to the hierarchical structures of apprenticeship, in order to
acquire the ability-the requisite agency-to play the instrument with mastery.
Importantly, her agency is predicated upon her ability to be taught, a condition
classically referred to as 'docility'. Although we have come to associate
docility with the abandonment of agency, the term literally implies the
malleability required of someone in order for her to be instructed in a particular
skill or knowledge. (ibid. 29)
This brings us to docility, which means not only being submissive and controlled, but
also being plastic enough to be formed, taught and shaped; hence docility has the
capacity to subject one to discipline and also to situations that may create pain.
discomfort or anxiety. As a condition of ethical formation. docility involves both being
open to the interventions and interlocutions of trusted masters-of-the-trade, and also
245
subjecting oneself to tedious control and repetition. It is acting upon the self as much as
it is allowing others to act upon that self. While discussing my methodology, I
suggested, upon reflection on my experience in Kayseri, that rendering oneself docile is
a precondition of embodied and internalised learning. Now, I expect, the
methodological and substantive significance of this are better linked. If docility is
allowing one's dispositions to change through repetition of bodily performances and
being receptive to pedagogical formation by a mentor, in Kayseri Nevin Akyurt served
as a mentor of this kind, to whom most of today's vakifcis have once submitted
themselves.
Discipline
Just as care for the self involves discipline of the self, care for the other contains an
aspect of discipline as well. Remember the quotes from Nevin Akyurt's friends and
disciples, which I had used to illustrate the significance of the transgression of bodily
boundaries among Kayseri vakifcis. One more strikingly consistent theme in these
stories was that Akyurt had been cleaning the people she had cared for. She took Zehra
into her home, washed her and picked lice from her hair. She washed the old lady and
changed her diaper. Akyurt was certainly caring for these people in a very corporeal
sense, but at the same time hers was an effort to make their bodies meet her standards.
What she recognised as a need-cleanliness-was at the same time a terrain of
discipline and control. This mutuality of care and discipline crystallised before my eyes
when I witnessed Neriman and Beyaz's failed attempts to 'help' a family.
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One day Neriman, the director of Melikgazi, received a call from a woman about a
neighbouring flat that was full of garbage. This neighbour called Neriman for help after
the stench had become unbearable and their efforts to convince the mother of the
household to clean had ended in a violent argument. Neriman called Beyaz, and they
went to see the condition of the flat. It was so full of all sorts of junk that it was no
longer possible to enter some of the rooms. The household consisted of two teenage
girls, their mother (who was collecting the rubbish) and a bedridden father. The
conditions of the two young girls, the terminally ill father and the mentally ill mother
moved Neriman and Beyaz deeply and they decided to do something for the family.
Registration to the Erciyes Feneri aid scheme was the first and easiest step to take. They
then convinced the girls to empty the house, made arrangements to keep the family
away during that process and finally called the municipality to ask for trucks. Then,
everything in the house except a few items of personal use, was loaded onto the trucks
and taken to the city dumping grounds. Neriman got the house cleaned and
whitewashed. Both she and Beyaz used their contacts to find new furniture and finally
took the family to their renewed and refurbished home, expecting them to be happy and
grateful. But the mother was inconsolably upset with the situation. Neriman tried to
arrange psychiatric care for her, but she refused and finally chased her from the house.
Neriman did not give up. She was determined to 'save the girls even if it was impossible
to help the mother.' This proved difficult, however.
I met the girls in Neriman's office a few weeks after the big cleaning operation.
Neriman invited them to share the latest developments on the issue of private school
tuition they had said they needed. Then, we all got into Beyaz's van and went to see the
house. The girls were not happy with this idea but they obeyed Neriman's wish. The
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interior of the flat was covered in muddy cat paws. All sorts of rubbish lay on the floor
and furniture. The house was filled with a smell that made breathing almost impossible.
Without a word, Beyaz went outside to wait for us. I sincerely wished I could have
joined him as I nearly fainted from the smell. Neriman was totally disheartened. In a
sweet voice (actually in an almost weeping tone) she begged the girls to keep the flat
clean. They stared blankly back at her. She shifted to an angrier tone and told them of
the amount of work she had undertaken to make the flat' an inhabitable place'. Both the
girls appeared indifferent to the lecture. Neriman was helpless. So we left. On the way
back she was truly upset and she dropped a few tears. She told me how many times she
had told the girls to keep the house clean, even promising to bring them gifts on the
condition of cleanliness. Apparently nothing had worked. Gradually Neriman gave up
the effort and left the family to themselves.
From our conversations throughout this process and from the way she approached the
girls, I knew Neriman really cared about the family and their well-being. She did what
she thought was best to care for them, yet she neither established the relationship she
wanted with the girls nor did she accomplish her task of cleaning the flat. But on the
way to failure she showed me how care was intricately related to discipline (or in this
case even to coercion). This problematique of discipline requires further attention.
In a Foucauldian sense discipline is a modality of power which aims to effect the
conduct of individuals in prescribed ways. Foucault's intellectual interest had been in
the technologies of discipline people were subjected to via total institutions like prisons
or asylums, and on the disciplines (as professions) that institutionalised these
technologies with production of knowledge (Foucault 1975; Foucault 1976). A
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significant number of these disciplinary professions are related to care work, like
medicine and psychiatry. There is also an expanding literature that employs
Foucauldian thinking to approach others like poverty alleviation (M. Dean 1991), social
work (Gilliom 2001) and nursing (Hugman 1991).
According to Fox (1995), as much as the literatures coming out of these disciplines has
contributed to professionalisation and thus to disciplinary power, the social sciences
have approached the issue of care as if it were determined primarily by way of
discipline. Fox calls this emphasis 'the vigil of care' with reference to Florence
Nightingale, who christened vigilance as one of the pillars of the nursing profession.
Care, practised as vigil, is an activity of surveillance and an exertion of disciplinary
power over those being cared for. While Fox limits his analysis to the discourse of care,
in the daily experience of care relationships, this vigil becomes even more prominent,
just as it became evident in Neriman's campaign against the 'junk-house' and its
inhabitants.
Discipline is also evident in the creation and application of selection criteria for
beneficiaries, for this process has the potential to push beneficiaries into a rigid table of
categories. House inspections performed to cross-check supplicants' stories and to
witness first-hand the level of poverty could well be seen as prime disciplinary
techniques. These techniques tum supplicants and their lives into an object of vakifcis'
gaze, which sweeps rooms, furniture and household members to ensure applicants'
conditions qualify them for registration. As in the case of municipal worker Sena and
her camcorder, technological devices can be used to extend the gaze to those unable to
be present for the first-hand evaluation.
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But, as I suggested in Chapter 6, these inspections often serve as an opportunity for the
supplicant to detail her story, establish a personal connection with vakifcis and negotiate
the terms and conditions of care, as much as they form a backdrop for disciplinary
interventions. They offer supplicants a feeling of recognition and vaktfcis satisfaction
from their work. According to Fox (1995) what takes place on such occasions of mutual
understanding is care-as-gift; a possibility, he argues, that is severely overlooked in
social sciences. He identifies care-as-gift with feelings and virtues he derives from
Helen Cixous' (1996) work: generosity, trust, love, affection, benevolence, patience and
curiosity. In Cixous' formulation these 'feminine' qualities of 'the Gift' are
counterpoised to the elements of 'the masculine realm of the Proper': property,
propriety, possession, identity and dominance.
Fox's (1995) understanding of gift is strictly unidirectional, i.e. as generosity; therefore
it cannot recognise the fact that even gift relations can be disciplinary, although they
were enacted with true feelings, as listed above under the title the Gift. As I elaborated
in Chapter 1, gift is primarily a relationship, not a thing that is given. And within this
relationship, power and status can be played out, as can equality and mutual respect. I
therefore suggest focusing on the encounter itself and locating discipline and gift where
they belong-in the realm of intersubjectivity, rather than categorically naming some
practices 'discipline' and others 'gift'.
Such a view would also critique one aspect of Foucault's understanding of ethics as care
for the self. Foucault's genealogy may appear to be strictly about the self an inward
looking, non-porous and unified self that diligently performs mental, spiritual and
corporeal work on itself. Although he mentions in passing that care for oneself is a
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precondition of care for others and vice-versa (Foucault 1997b), the problem of others
on this ethical quest remains under-theorised. All in all, however important it is to
recognise embodiment and the element of discipline, Foucault's view needs
development from the standpoint of recognising ethics as one's relationship to the other
(Gilligan 1982). So far, it should have been clear that the core of the ethical
transformation I have been describing about Kayseri vakifcis is necessarily located in
encounter with others; it is self-formation that is not contained within the self, but that
comes into being in the realm of the social, in personal relations and connections. It can
therefore only be understood using an intersubjective approach. Intersubjective theory is
vast and a further discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation. But there is one
strand of scholarly work which owes a lot to intersubjective theory and has to be studied
here: the ethics of care. That is because I contend that this is a particularly relevant way
of shifting the locus of ethics from the individual to the relationship. If ethics is an
activity as Aristotle claims, then it is an activity of extending care to others within the
realm of vakif work in Kayseri and elsewhere.
An Ethics of Care
In contemporary social science literature, questions concerning the issue of care have
often been dealt with by feminist scholars, who work relentlessly to move this subject
from its 'peripheral' location-where it is conceived as a 'natural' maternal attitude-
towards political, ethical and psychological debates surrounding the issues of human
societies. Care is an act of concern for the other, as well as an active undertaking that
comes out of this concern. It is a fundamental part of human lives, in good times and in
bad. in sickness and in health. It is a daily necessity for human life, and not merely in
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times of crises, like in the case of hospital care. Therefore, it is worth every effort to
revalue care in all its societal dimensions. However, in this section I will offer only a
very selective reading of this literature, delving into the intersubjective and relational
aspects of care.
Joan Tronto defines care with certain 'core values' and phases: (I) attentiveness and
caring about, (2) responsibility and taking care of, (3) competence in meeting needs and
care giving, and (4) responsiveness and care receiving (1993, 106-107). These values
have since informed many theorisations of the ethics of care (Sevenhuijsen 1998;
Sevenhuijsen 2003a; Sevenhuijsen 2003b; Komter 2005; Hollway 2006). Thus, a brief
exploration would help clarifying the concept of care as it is used in this chapter.
According to Tronto (1993) attentiveness is the starting point of any caring relationship.
Care begins with caring about, and hence a recognition of need, which captures the
attention. Without attentiveness it is not possible to meet needs, as they would not even
be acknowledged as such. Attentiveness is especially related to understanding the
other's needs, his or her particularity as a separate human being and the requirements of
this particularity. Yet I share Hollway's (2006) concerns regarding Tronto's approach.
Her conceptualisation of attentiveness is too dependent on voluntaristic and rationalistic
assumptions. On the contrary, as Hollway argues, attentiveness stems from processes
that are less volitional than it first seems, usually functioning at an unconscious and
embodied level.
The second value, responsibility, assumes the duty of meeting recognised needs. It is
therefore similar to answering a call and taking action. Through responsibility, the
252
abstract notion of caring about turns into a solid and practical caring for. Yet assuming
responsibility does not make one capable of providing 'good-enough' care. The
performance of care requires skills, habits and bodily orientations that cannot be
obtained in a moment, but can only be aggregated over a lifetime of care experiences.
This brings us to the third requirement of care: competence. Competence in the
provision of care only comes with practice, as care can only be learned by doing.
Finally, responsiveness as a skill is about the interaction between the give and receiver
of care, about the openness of each to the other's situation and reactions. This value,
along with attentiveness, emphasises the intersubjective nature of care relations.
Wendy Hollway, a critical psychologist informed by psychoanalysis and object relations
theory, identifies two developmental processes that are key to acquiring these values:
identification and differentiation. Hollway (2006) notes that although these processes
are chronological in that they appear at infancy, they are also simultaneous over a
lifetime. All our lives, identification is vital for recognising and responding to others'
needs, while differentiation is critical in order not to dominate and oppress the other
with the act of care. Hollway bases her theorisation of the capacity to care on the
'tension between experiencing the others needs and one's own difference' (ibid. 125).
Similarly, Richard Sennett (2003) suggests that in order to care, one should initially and
falsely (as Adam Smith argued) assume somebody else's pain as his or her own. So an
act of care 'begins as a mistake', but at that moment of identification, one should
recognise that the carer and the cared for are actually separate beings with different
needs. This simultaneous happening of the 'mistake' ofidentification with the other and
the correction of this 'mistake' is the precondition for mutual respect.
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When differentiation and identification are not seen as rivalling processes but as
orthogonal axes of the process of subjectivity formation in relational terms,
attentiveness and responsiveness find their true basis (Hollway 2006, 109). But it is
important to acknowledge the inherent ambivalence and fluidity of these qualities and
the phases of care that accompany them. The axes of identification and differentiation
both have extreme ends towards which one can slide. The swing between assumptions
of omnipotent knowledge about the other's needs and effective differentiation, as well
as the swing between over-identification (hence unbearable pain) and dis-identification
(abjectionlothering), is at best managed individually in each and every instance.
Sometimes the pain of identification is so high that the other's needs may be completely
ignored. Sometimes the caregiver exercises domination over the one in need, operating
under the assumption that all the needs and desires of the other are transparent to the
caregiver. Other times the individual feels his or her autonomy is under threat because
of the neediness of the other. Yet there are also times in which care may become a
pleasure in itself because of the pleasure/relief it provides the cared for. Maybe
capacities to care can best be conceptualised as capacities to manage the swing of these
pendulums in such a way that the particular needs of the other are both recognised and
met within the intersubjective space of conscious, unconscious, bodily, verbal and
affective communication, as acknowledged by mutually interrelated individual subjects.
Kayseri vakifcis cannot always manage the swings of the pendulum between
identification and differentiation. All scenarios I listed above arc observable in their
interactions with beneficiaries. There are times when the needs of a beneficiary arc
completely overlooked, usually with excuses made about the unavailability of
resources. Other times, identification is so strong that an encounter leads to sleepless
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nights and feelings of pain and incapacity. There are even cases, as with the scenario
between Neriman and the two girls, when a vakifci's disciplinary desires, coupled with
improper differentiation of herself from those whom she cared for, ends in emotional
outburst. But there are also times in which for some, the act of care leads to satisfaction
and a feeling of mutual recognition and understanding. How this is to be achieved and
how the balance is to be maintained is a matter of constant discussion among the
vakrfcis themselves. Warning each other, reflecting on past conduct, critiquing the
actions of third parties, all these help shape and maintain a norm as a way of coming to
terms with this highly affective swing. Yet as they commonly acknowledge, this tension
is only lived through and managed by an accumulation of embodied and unconscious
knowledge stemming from experience.
In order to explicate the dimension of embodiment further, I will cite Hollway, wherein
she defines identification:
The psychoanalytic concept of identification embraces processes that are
conscious and unconscious, embodied, affective and cognitive, both primary
(unthought) and secondary (thought) processes. Without the psychological
capacity to identify with others across the boundary that comes to define one
individual from another, compassion and concern would be impossible. We
can only know what another person is experiencing through empathy or
'fellow feeling'; that is, through using ourselves as an instrument of
understanding (2006, 14, italics mine).
Hollway's idea of using ourselves as instruments to understand the other's experience
illustrates the level of significance the role bodies (not only as flesh and blood but also
as the locus of senses, sentiments and reactions) plays in the process of identification.
Maurice Hamington (2004) develops this aspect of care further with the concept of
'caring knowledge'. For him, caring knowledge is most importantly knowledge of the
body. Bodies communicate and understand more than what is available to the
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consciousness. Consider the body that recoils with a sense of disgust even when the
subject's intentions had been to remain indifferent and respectful. Or consider the
involuntary cry of the witness to an accident, as if she herself, not a stranger, had been
hit. Identification, in that sense, is most importantly the embodied knowledge of having
a body that is fragile and a psyche that hurts, bleeds, enjoys and longs just like others.
Of course, identification does not imply the subject understands the other to be exactly
like the self. Healthy development goes hand in hand with the process of differentiation,
and the recognition of the other as a unique self (Hollway 2006). It also means
approaching the body as the site of otherness, of divergent needs and sensitivities.
In an attempt to think about the ethics of care through the lens of Merleau-Ponty,
Hamington (2004) approaches care as a phenomenon that is ultimately embodied, and
argues that bodies are not only objects or instruments of care, but that they are also the
very possibility of care. This possibility is related to the unarticulated and often
unconscious (and also involuntary) nature and primacy of a body's knowledge, and its
communication of this knowledge through behaviours. Because of this, as Hamington
argues, 'as a corporeal potential, care can be cultivated or diminished through practices
and habits' (ibid. 5). Similarly, Selma Sevenhuijsen argues that 'the core idea of the
ethic of care in my view is that care is a practice, and that it is crucial for developing a
moral attitude-and thus also a moral vocabulary-of care by engaging in the practice
of care. By doing so, care can in fact grow into a disposition, a part of our everyday
thinking and doing' (Sevenhuijsen 2003b, 18; quoted in Hollway 2006, 9-10).
The vakrfcis of Kayseri practice care in order to fulfil their duties through the quotidian
of their work. They learn by doing, by bodily involvement; and as I have suggested
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before, they experience an ethical transformation as part and parcel of this bodily
involvement. This transformation shifts their boundaries and potentially their notions of
dirtiness and cleanliness, which are often indexes of racial and class discrimination (for
a wider discussion of how cleanliness functions as a tool of distinction see Douglas
2003). What requires emphasis here is the fact that care as a practice of ethics is not a
process that starts and ends with an individual self. It is a relational and intersubjective
phenomenon, an interaction, an exchange. As such, care has an ontological proximity to
gift, and certain aspects of gift relations could well be extrapolated to offer a deeper
comprehension of care relations.
An Ethics of Giving
In June 2009, I spent a day with Nihal and Fatma, travelling all around Kayseri in
Nihal's car. These two women had participated in the founding of this vakif and had
remained involved as volunteers. The organisation helped poor couples who wanted to
marry but did not have the means to do so, and today we were on a mission to do
supplicant home visits. With the help of sponsors, the organisation provided basic
household items, furniture, a wedding gown for the bride and a suit for the groom. They
would also cover associated legal fees. Its employees used a checklist for preliminary
supplicant assessments with the aim of verifying their poverty and/or orphanage. This
was followed by the home visits to cross-check the stories.
On this particular day, our trip began with getting lost on the outskirts of the city such
that we spent more than an hour finding the first address, which had been inadequately
reported. The supplicant's house was situated in a garden, typical of the summer homes
257
of Kayseri's wealthy, but it was visibly old and weary. It was a lovely day, so although
the lady of the house invited us in, Fatma and Nihal preferred to sit on the benches in
the garden. When we were settled the lady rushed back inside to make us tea, despite
Fatma and Nihal's objections. When she came back, she told us that she was trying to
arrange her son's wedding. She was facing difficulties because all the family's wealth
had been lost as a result of her ex-husband's lifestyle. She was concerned that her
application remain hidden because she did not want her in-laws to learn about their
financial problems. Fatma was particularly taken by the story and openly empathised
with the woman's wish. After checking with Nihal (without saying a word, but by
exchanging a knowing glance and a nod) Fatma then approved the application and
explained the necessary next steps. We sat there for almost an hour, sipped two glasses
of tea, and as we were leaving Fatma and Nihal hugged the woman and kissed her
youngest child, a ten-year-old boy, affectionately.
At our second stop on the other end of the city, we were welcomed into a shanty, bereft
of even the most basic household items. There, the mother of the house offered us
peanuts and tea. Again, we spent nearly an hour chatting on and around the story of the
bride-to-be. Fatma and Nihal offered them advice about how to get more than the
routine package, consisting of a bedroom set, an oven and a sofa set. We left the house
hugging and kissing everyone-including the neighbours, who happened to drop by
while we were there. When we got to the car, Fatma told Nihal to put a note on the
family's file indicating that they should be given extra food boxes.
There were ten addresses on our list that day and it was already past noon. So Nihal and
Fatma discussed refusing any food or drinks, and cutting the visits as short as possible.
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They wished to stick to their primary aim, which was investigation. But we ended up
eating a plateful of cherries at our next stop. Fatma and Nihal had to spare the next day
(which was a Sunday) finishing the visits, since we managed to make it to fewer than
half the addresses on our list.
On that particular day, Fatma and Nihal exemplified many of the elements of care that
define vakifci ethics in Kayseri. They were attentive to the stories of supplicants and
responsive to their particular needs. They were also congenial in their attitudes and
established physical contact freely and frequently. They were well equipped to ease the
anxiety the supplicants likely felt in relation to being inspected. Moreover, they looked
quite comfortable receiving offerings from beneficiaries. I suggest that every single one
of these elements of conduct has strong ethical and political implications.
I have discussed the meaning and significance of touch earlier in this chapter, and
suggested that crossing the physical boundaries created by established emotional
histories is an important aspect of extending care to the supplicants of Kayseri vakifs.
But unlike the examples from Nevin Akyurt's life, those instances of contact are not
often directed towards any concrete physical need, like dressing wounds or washing the
elderly or the disabled. Physical contact, in the form of a hug, a firm handshake or a
lending hand for changing socks and shoes, usually performs a different function:
recognition of the other as a fellow human being, and therefore, in a very subtle way,
subverting the abjection that often taints similar encounters. Hence, what Fatma and
Nihal actually gave through their tight embraces was the gift of recognition.
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The second element that requires attention is Fatma and Nihal's easiness with accepting
offerings from beneficiaries. While they declared to the host each time that it was
exceptional for them to accept something from supplicants, the proceedings of the day
attested otherwise. They never refused anything or established boundaries that would
have hinted a refusal from the start. If their discourse of not accepting gifts was a
declaration of a certain understanding of professionalism, their practices referred to a
more powerful calling, or better entrenched ethical values about personal relations: a
gift obliges acceptance.
This obligation is worth dwelling on. Although they begin with an ethical dedication,
moments of contact between vakifcis and beneficiaries involve an obvious inequality of
power. While one of the parties has an immediate need that asks to be taken care of, the
other party has the power to decide whether or not to attend to that need. For vakrfcis, it
is easy to cause injury. For beneficiaries, shame and humiliation are never far off. How
this inequality is to be managed is often posed as an ethical question. Resorting openly
to the paradigm of gift is an often-used strategy in the face of this question. In order to
understand how gift helps resolve some of these tensions, we need to remember the
features of gift discussed in detail in the introduction and Chapter I. As I elaborated
there, contrary to common understandings of voluntariness, gift is defined by
obligation: obligation to give, obligation to accept and obligation to reciprocate. Only
when this cycle is smoothly completed, or when completion is left open over time, goes
the given thing acquire the status of gift. If the cycle is broken because of an
interruption to the cycle of obligatory acts, this causes a crisis in the relationship the gift
upholds.
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Keeping this in mind, it should be clear why refusing certain offerings might insult the
beneficiaries with whom Fatma and Nihal were interacting. In the context of vakifci-
supplicant interactions, a glass of tea or a plateful of cherries constitutes a gift. When
they are rejected without acceptable cause (like health problems) it becomes a problem
of recognition of personal value, for a gift is inalienable from its giver. These small
offerings are at the same time counter-gifts given in return for the vakifcis' interest in
the supplicant's case, as well as for the anticipated support from the institutions. This
brings us to another effect of gift: that is utilised as an ethical means by to handle
inequality .
By obligating a return, gift, essentially, has a levelling effect. Its reciprocal nature does
not delete inequalities. But because it recognises every actor involved in the gift
relationship first and foremost as a giver, it is onto logically a relation between equals,
i.e. persons who are equal in their capacity to give. In that sense everyone is rich
enough to be able to give and everybody is poor enough to receive something from the
other. The positions of giver and receiver are interchangeable. Indeed, they have to be
interchanged if the gift is to be completed. So, accepting beneficiaries' offerings (which
includes peanuts as well as prayers) is recognising them as givers. What they give does
not have to match what they were given, for gift resists calculation and symmetry
anyway.
Conclusion
I started this chapter by describing a distinction Kayseri vakif workers make between
two types of involvement with vakifs. This distinction is between hayirsevers and
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vakrfcrs. Hayirsevers are philanthropists who support vakifs with their donations,
otherwise their involvement is limited. Vakifcis, on the other hand, actively work at
vakifs and have close contact with their beneficiaries. This chapter has been dedicated
to exploring the implications of this contact.
I suggested that by being in touch with beneficiaries, vakrfcis render themselves
amenable to the effects of contact as part of their self-formation as ethical beings.
Therefore, as much as being a hayirsever is a hygienic way of (non)engagement, being a
vakrfci makes one susceptible to the other's material and inner world, hence allowing
transgression of established barriers. These barriers not only find expression in status
and class signs, opinions and bigotry against the poor, but also have an unconscious and
corporeal dimension. There are palpable bodily boundaries between the poor and well-
to-do of Kayseri, and VaklfIY1S'ethical transformations involve shifting these boundaries
and slowly working on their class habitus.
I have tried to theorise this particular form of transformation with a discussion on
positive ethics and argued that what gives this particular ethical formation its strength is
its practice as care. So I have relocated ethics from the sphere of religious canons to that
of the lived experience of care, as an empathetic encounter with the other. Such an
approach has two broader implications. First, ethics becomes a matter of formations,
and of becoming rather than normative discourse. Second, it is located in the
intersubjective realm, where one person's self-understanding, as well as behaviours, are
developed in relation to the other's.
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Finally, I discussed how gift informs the ethical dimensions of these encounters. The
approach of care as gift-act in itself is widely accepted, but in order to make the
argument more explicit, I turned to the etiquette of giving and receiving things, as
illustrated by some vakifcis. I argued that accepting what is given is as important as
giving in order for a gift to be a genuine gift. Therefore, accepting counter-gifts is part
of vakrfci ethics, communicating respect and recognition to beneficiaries. I will further





In the previous chapter I explored the ethical transformation of vakrfcis while they
practised care for the beneficiaries of their organisations. I also mentioned that vakifcis
distinguished themselves from the hayirsevers of the town by their involvement in this
hands-on care work. In the eyes of vakifcis, hayirsevers' support for vakifs is never
enough, because these wealthy businessmen are allegedly more concerned with
conspicuous endowments, such as buildings, than with providing assistance for an
anonymous mass of needy people. Indeed, these people are destined to remain
anonymous to hayirsevers, while being personally known by vakifcis. I suggested that it
is there the rupture lies between these two types of beneficence actors, and that this
rupture has important ethical and political consequences. The ethical implications have
already been discussed; to conclude this dissertation I will focus on the political
possibilities that arise from this cleavage.
Vakifcis' boundaries and bodily limits became prone to change as a result of their work
experience, even though these boundaries had been part of their class habitus shaped by
a negative discourse towards poverty. Therefore, these boundaries are not easy to
overcome or to displace. However, the result of these unavoidable encounters,
combined with aspirations to become better Muslims, was the cultivation of empathy
among vaklf~ls-a fellow feeling, which is not restricted to their peers. The core of this
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empathy is recognition of the other through identification: identification with
precariousness and mortality, the immediacy of physical needs, and the challenge of
taking life's blows with dignity. Through this empathy, class barriers become porous
and can occasionally be crossed. This might be a minor outcome, but it is significant
nevertheless, because it is an important lesson about 'respectful' techniques of welfare
provision.
The distinction between hayirsevers and vakifcis can be mapped onto the model
developed by Turkish social scientist Taml Bora (2009). Reflecting on ways of fighting
poverty, Bora suggests the analytical use of four typologies: social rights, charity,
solidarity and self-organisation. Social rights refer to the content of social citizenship as
understood within the framework of welfare states, whereas self-organisation refers to
community and grassroots organisations that either aim to provide through its own
resources or fight for these rights to be provided. These two forms of welfare provision
to needy members of society either address the state or tum to the community for self-
sufficiency. Charity and solidarity, on the other hand, share the characteristic of being
dependent on other peoples' will to share their wealth with those in need. But the
similarity between the two stops here. They are different in their implications and
potentialities. While charity is giving without establishing any personal relationships,
with the recognition that a hint of intimacy may tum the encounter into one of
obligation, solidarity aims for exactly what charity tries to avoid: establishing personal
contact. Welfare provision through beneficence swings between charity and solidarity
because of these characteristics, which reflect the rupture between vakif workers and
benefactors. Solidarity is the potential outcome of contact, not of gift-giving as such.
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At a time when social sciences seem occupied with understanding the consequences of
spatial segregation in urban centres, of gated communities and slums, of the spatial and
hierarchical imprint of increasingly uneven income distribution, of network societies
and redundant populations that are not even a node in these networks; in short, with
social distances stretching to an unbearable extent, to talk about potentialities for cross-
class, cross-status solidarities may seem utopian. Certainly, the encounters themselves
do not guarantee any understanding of equality. On the contrary, they may turn into
stages for the performance of class divisions, social stigmata and power inequality. But,
on occasion, when the parties involved are tuned into each other's stories and needs,
something else may be born: mutual respect.
Richard Sennett's Respect in a World of Inequality (2003) diagnoses contemporary
societies as suffering from a scarcity of respect, despite the fact that this precious
substance is completely free of charge. He then contemplates the sources of inequality
and how disrespect is implicated in these inequalities in modern societies. Sennett
argues that the modern code of respect includes three dicta making it possible to be
respected and to feel self-respect: 'make something of yourself, take care of yourself
and help others' (p. 260). All three have the effect of emphasising and creating
inequalities. First of all, not everybody has the same ability to make something out of
himself or herself: people differ in their talents, mental capacities and physical
conditions. Second, not everybody is able take care of himself or herself. Dependency is
an inescapable aspect of life, whether it comes in the form of disability, age-related
health conditions or poverty. And, finally, not everybody is given the same chances to
help others and participate in community building. Welfare provision is a territory
where all three, especially the last two, of these bases for disrespect are structurally rife.
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Sennett puts forth a couple of modest proposals to build respect within relations and
encounters that are marked by inequality. As an antidote to the dictum of independence,
he suggests admitting just claims of adult dependency. Chapter 6 of this dissertation is
devoted to analysis of the task of identifying and recognising these claims. Clearly,
vakifcrhk, in general, is based on a recognition of dependency. However, the question
of what constitutes a just claim of dependency does not have an easy answer and, as I
have shown, is open to contestation and negotiation. Vakifs develop criteria to
determine just bases for acceptance and rejection. In that sense, 'seeing like a waqf' is
not much different than 'seeing like a state' (Scott 1998). Official categories and
acceptance criteria aim to make supplicants legible and manageable in a fashion similar
to modem technologies of govemmentality. However, as impossible as it is to argue that
state policies are uniformly applied by 'street-level bureaucrats' (Lipsky 2010), it is
equally unrealistic to assume that vakifcis uniformly follow the procedures of their
respective organisations. Just as the employees of the state who interact with citizens on
a daily basis, vakifcis have discretion over the extent to which they follow the
procedures. In the context of vakifs, deciding on who 'our poor' will be, and thus who
has needs that create rightful entitlements, requires a relational and fluid notion of
justice. Understanding the needs of the other, as I have also shown, is not a
straightforward process. It is, in the intensity of encounter, about finding a momentary
balance in the pendulum's swing between identification and differentiation, between
using your own experience as a human being to understand the other and recognising
the uniqueness of the other's condition and needs. But first and foremost, it is a process
of acknowledging that other's vulnerability, incapacity and dependency as human
conditions that can be admitted respectfully.
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The fluidity and flexibility of the notion of just dependency create tension between
different actors in the field of beneficence in Kayseri. Both in the media and in private
conversations, a local version of the proverb 'give a man afish and you feed him for a
day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime' is enthusiastically recited by
businessmen, high rank local bureaucrats and even by hayirsevers who find vakif work
useless, if not harmful. Once I witnessed an outburst from Neriman when she was
confronted with the same argument in a meeting of prominent townswomen. She first
laughed angrily and then said, 'Are you kidding? Who is going to learn fishing? The 80-
year-old man or the widow with four small children? I would rather feed them all their
lives than tell them this proverb once!'
Sennett's (2003) proposed precaution for hindering the potential of inequality hidden in
the final code of respect, 'help others', is to permit people to participate more actively in
the conditions of their own care. What he means by this is not only encouraging
independence when possible, but more importantly letting recipients reciprocate. With
this assertion, Sennett invokes gift relations. In Chapter 7, I explored how the
mechanism of reciprocity is actively used by vakifcis to express respect. The counter-
gift that is offered by beneficiaries and accepted by vakifcis has a levelling effect.
Certainly, it does not delete inequalities, nor does it finalise transactions, as it would
have in a commodity exchange, but it creates a subject who gives out of a subject who
receives.
Mary Douglas candidly and famously asserts that 'there should not be any free gifts.
What is wrong with the so-called free gift is the donor's intention to be exempt from
return gifts coming from the recipient' (1990, 1). It is this exemption (when invoked)
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that gives the benefactor an upper hand, strips the other party of its capacity to be a
giver, and hurts him or her for always being on the same side of an asymmetrical
relationship. On the other hand, asymmetry is unavoidable and is even desirable in gift
relations. Unlike market transactions, gift loathes symmetry, for it connotes calculation
and contract (Young 1997). What makes gift relations potentially equitable is the
interchangeability of positions in this asymmetrical reciprocity. This is why Sennett
firmly asserts that 'reciprocity is the foundation of mutual respect' (2003, 219).
With this discussion on respect I do not intend to argue that vakifcis uniformly act
according to these principles, reinforce the self-respect of the people they work with and
make them feel respected. Vakifci practices are heterogeneous; they vary from person to
person, between organisations and on different occasions. Ultimately, all encounters are
unique, and respect, being an intersubjective phenomenon, is contingent over space and
time. Moreover, vakifcis do not enter the field of beneficence stripped of their long-
existing dispositions and moral registers. While they try to construct vakifci identities as
just and pious persons, they have to juggle these existing references, habits and values,
as well as self-expectations regarding professional behaviour. Critique of others, and to
a lesser degree self-critique, is a favourite pastime among vakifcis and a significant way
of negotiating the contradictions and juxtapositions of varying registers. Reflecting on
similar contradictions he observed among youth in Egypt, Schielke argues that pious
commitment is 'a fragile form of continuous self-suggestion rather than a cumulative
self-perfection' (2009, 34). Although I agree with this statement with regard to most
vakifcrs. I can also safely argue that there are others who are approached as exemplary
figures because they habituated the most desired behaviours. These very same people
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have a good reputation, a solid network and significant social capital in the field of
beneficence because they exhibit a level of virtuosity.
Here I use the term virtue in its Aristotelian understanding, as 'excellence'. Therefore,
being virtuous is both acting as a virtuoso, with full grip of the language, idioms, rituals
and etiquette of the field, and also with virtue, with ethical judgement that is directed
towards achievement of an inner and interpersonal goodness. Virtuosity is then about
both being skilful and making situated judgements that are directed towards an ethical
and existential question. It is knowing whom to call, what to say, how to interpellate
others in relations of obligation. and while doing this assuring others and oneself of the
quality and justness of motivations and practices. Language plays an important role in
this endeavour. Being in good command of the rhetorical devices and this specific
vocabulary is a vital part of virtuosity.
This language, as has become apparent throughout the thesis, is permeated with
religious idioms, concepts, stories and references, but is not limited to these. It also has
a hint of the vernacular, which gives speakers shortcuts in argumentation, and
references to more humanitarian discourse of rights and obligations. This language
provides common ground for differently positioned actors of the beneficence field,
especially when interests and opinions are in conflict. For example, beneficiaries invoke
this language and refer to their God-given right to the satisfaction of basic subsistence
needs, while vakifcis refer to justice and the rights of third parties, which they are also
responsible for observing. Or, some vakifcis make elaborate use of religious stories to
convince hesitant and unenthusiastic hayirsevers of the other-worldly rewards relating
to their prospective donations. A good command of this idiomatic language legitimises
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claims, judgements and decisions, and therefore makes up a significant part of actors'
symbolic capital.
Language and vocabulary are relevant to this thesis for one more reason. They are
expressive of the imaginary signification that creates and maintains the field at the
levels of institutions and individual subject formations. I have discussed this with
reference to the concept and practice of hizmet and the institution of waqf. Hizmet
provides both the paradigm and the ethos that bring together a wide variety of resources
and actors. It flexibly delineates the boundaries of what is accountable, permissible,
legitimate and just; and by implication it determines what is wrong, unjust or simply
aberrant. In that sense, it is possible to approach hizmet as a theory that informs gift
networks in the context of beneficence. It regulates and gives meaning to volunteering,
fundraising, donating and networking. Gifts that circulate through these activities
connect people and lead to lasting relationships that outlive the original transactions and
related interactions.
At various points in the thesis, I have emphasised a feature of gift glimpsed between
hesitant and obscure answers when my inquiry was directed towards motivations and
intentions. Just as the obligation to give precedes the giving subject, hizmet is
understood to be beyond the intentions and consciousness of the actors involved in it.
The obligation lies somewhere outside the subject, whether it is formulated as
indebtedness to one's home town or as a humanitarian responsibility. In either case it is
not an inborn desire and decision that determines the act of giving. Moreover, both
benefactors and vakif workers approach hizmet as a gift received. Therefore, from their
perspective it is something to be thankful for as much as to be proud of.
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In this dissertation I focused on the appearances of organised hizmet observable within
the boundaries of vakifs, Certainly, and as I mentioned earlier, hizmet is a much larger
concept than can be grasped solely by looking at this limited aspect of it. It is rich in
connotations and references to multiple registers, ranging from citizenly duties to
religious obligations and rewards. Therefore, it is widely used in the discourse of the
powerful, by politicians, businessmen, religious leaders, and lay people alike. This
richness and flexibility deserves to be studied in its various guises, but this can only be
accomplished in a future project. For this study, I have had to limit my scope to hizmet
organised in and around contemporary vakifs,
Waqf is the predominant institution involved in the formation of the field of beneficence
and the subjectivities of beneficence actors. It is an institutional framework and an
imaginary signification at the same time. In Chapter 2, I provided a detailed account of
these two aspects and illustrated the contemporary significance of both in the Turkish
welfare regime. With this account I emphasised its in-between character in the eye of
established social science understandings of public and private, self-interest and
altruism. In Chapter I, I discussed how social citizenship literature is stuck between the
state and the market because it relies on an ontological model that approaches human
beings as creatures driven by self-interest and profit maximisation. In order to control
the allegedly essential qualities of men, proponents of social citizenship, as such, tum
their faces to the state. They not only approach the state as the sole provider of welfare
but also recognise it as the only source of legitimacy when it comes to caring for fellow
citizens.
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Scholars of Islamic economics clearly have a different vision, which I have briefly
reviewed, as it constitutes a source of moral action in the field of beneficence. Islamic
economics, with its foundational ontology that is significantly different from that of
homo economicus, places gift-giving at the heart of economic action and recognizes it
as an integral part of the economy, rather than as a marginal addendum. In this context,
caring for fellow human beings is an injunction (however vaguely defined and open to
practical interpretation) to be taken seriously. The significance given to it finds its
expression in the historical institution of waqf. Waqf is a non-state institution that
creates its subjects as citizens who are responsible for the welfare of others, subjects
who are lawful givers and receivers with rights and entitlements. This is primarily a
political and ethical formation, unlike the formal and categorical belonging commonly
evoked by contemporary notions of citizenship.
Any practice intended to satisfy needs (even the most physical ones) should be
approached not only as a matter of functionality directed towards survival, but also as a
quest for the meaning of life, existence, and ways of being human in a society.
Throughout the gradual development of this thesis I have looked for traces of this
existential search within the field of welfare provision, beneficence networks and
among vakif workers. Slowly, I have carried my argument from the general schemes of
political economy towards the ethical formations of subjects in their relationships with
others. If there is one conclusion to draw from this quest, I would contend that welfare
provision is an ethical problem that asks the question of how to live a just and
meaningful life as much as it is a political one that addresses this question with
reference to other people's needs.
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